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Methodology
This report draws upon a wide range of sources, including extensive qualitative interviews 
conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina between June 2006 and July 2009. The first set of 
interviews was undertaken by Eric Witte, a consultant to the Open Society Justice Initiative, 
in June and July 2006. The remaining interviews were undertaken by Professor Orentlicher 
during visits to Bosnia from November 29–December 8, 2006; June 8–12, 2007; and July 
13-23, 2009. In addition, Professor Orentlicher interviewed various officials and staff of the 
ICTY in The Hague on November 17, 2006 and March 6–9, 2007 in connection with this 
study, as well as a companion study of the impact of the ICTY in Serbia. Ines Tadic´ served 
as Professor Orentlicher’s interpreter for interviews with non-English speaking sources in 
November–December 2006; Haris Imamovic´ did so in July 2009.
The interviews in Bosnia were not undertaken as part of a quantitative research project 
and the sources therefore cannot be described as representative in the sense that a quantita-
tive project would support. However, interviews were conducted with a wide cross-section 
of individuals from each major ethnic group in Bosnia. Several considerations guided the 
selection of interviewees. Some sources, such as judges and prosecutors at the State Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were selected by virtue of their firsthand knowledge of a subject 
addressed in Chapter VI: the relationship between the ICTY and the State Court of BiH’s War 
Crimes Chamber.
10    METHODOLOGY
A second broad category of interlocutors comprises intellectuals whose specialized 
knowledge and positions—whether as journalists, academics, leaders of civil society organiza-
tions, or otherwise—enable them to observe broad trends in their country and whose insights, 
collectively, were particularly helpful in synthesizing information from other sources. While 
interviewees included Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, this report generally does not identify their 
ethnicity, as many emphasized their discomfort with the extreme ethnicization of politics and 
identity in Bosnia.
Finally, interviews were conducted with victims of wartime atrocities in several loca-
tions, including Prijedor, Potocˇari, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Lašva Valley and Sarajevo. These inter-
viewees came from all three of Bosnia’s major ethnic groups, but—reflecting that Bosniaks 
constituted the vast majority of civilian victims—Bosniak survivors loomed especially large in 
the research. Interviews were conducted with both leaders of victims’ associations and people 
who are widely described in Bosnia as “ordinary victims.” Their stories, resilience, and courage 
are, however, anything but ordinary. 
  1 1
I. Introduction
On May 25, 1993, the United Nations Security Council improbably launched a new era of 
international justice. Amidst a blizzard of resolutions addressing the conflict then raging 
in the former Yugoslavia, the Council adopted yet another, this time creating the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). If the new court evoked the potent 
symbolism of Nuremberg, its creation also seemed to symbolize the United Nations’ lack of 
resolve—another in a series of inadequate responses to atrocities routinely described as the 
worst in Europe since World War II. 
Before long, however, what began as an ad hoc measure became a global paradigm: 
Since the ICTY’s creation, international or internationalized courts have been established to 
respond to sweeping atrocities in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Timor 
Leste, and a permanent International Criminal Court is now operating in The Hague. Perhaps 
more important, the work of these courts has invigorated prosecutions by national courts, the 
principal pillars of judicial protection against atrocious crimes and the indispensable partners 
of international and hybrid courts. 
Moreover, the ICTY and its sister tribunal for Rwanda (the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda, or ICTR) have generated a rich jurisprudence of international humanitar-
ian law, which now informs the work of national as well as other international courts. These 
contributions have been widely recognized, and rightly so. But until recently, few efforts were 
made to understand the impact of the ICTY and other international courts on the societies 
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most profoundly affected by their work, including their effect on victims and perpetrators. 
Yet these communities are among the most important audiences for the Tribunal’s work—in 
the case of victims, because the justice the ICTY dispenses is their justice, and in respect of 
perpetrators and the communities that abetted their crimes, for reasons we explore further 
in this report. 
In 2006, the Open Society Justice Initiative began a three-year project to examine local 
perceptions of the impact of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia, focusing on Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In May 2008, the Justice Initiative published the first report resulting from 
this study, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia. The International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) provided myriad contributions to that study, and joins 
the Justice Initiative in producing this report. 
That Someone Guilty Be Punished examines local perceptions of the ICTY’s impact in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (referred to in this report as “Bosnia” or “BiH”), the country that 
endured the most extensive ravages of “ethnic cleansing” during the 1990’s Balkan wars. As 
such, this report is above all an account of the ICTY’s impact on those who survived unspeak-
able crimes. In addition, it examines the Tribunal’s impact on those who committed or silently 
condoned wartime atrocities in Bosnia, and on Bosnia’s domestic capacity to ensure criminal 
accountability for war crimes.
While this study is based upon extensive research of relevant sources, one of its prin-
cipal aims is to capture perceptions of the ICTY among Bosnians themselves. Their voices 
infuse the narrative, and their perceptions and priorities largely inform the structure of this 
account. This study describes Bosnians’ expectations of the ICTY—or as it is known in the 
region, “the Hague Tribunal” or simply “The Hague”—comparing their hopes to the goals 
enunciated by the Security Council when it created the Tribunal and by the ICTY itself. In 
succeeding chapters, we examine Bosnians’ perceptions of how well the ICTY has succeeded 
in meeting their original as well as evolving expectations and, to the extent possible, tie those 
perceptions to specific aspects of the Tribunal’s performance.1  
One of the key challenges in a study of this kind is to disentangle victims’ inevitable 
dissatisfaction with verdicts that cannot restore what they have lost forever from their disap-
pointment in imperfect legal processes. While recognizing the inherent difficulty of doing so, 
we have done our best to distinguish between these two. We believe that a better appreciation 
of both sources of disenchantment can improve future efforts to provide justice to victims of 
atrocious crimes. With respect to the former, our interviews with Bosnians make abundantly 
clear that, if nothing else, care must be taken to avoid raising unrealistic expectations of what 
trials alone can achieve. Indeed, during numerous interviews over two and a half years, the 
theme of “unrealistic expectations” arose often. With respect to the latter, our study identified 
several respects in which the quality of justice surely can be improved.
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Victims’ Justice
The Security Council recognized several supporting reasons for creating the ICTY, and stu-
dents of transitional justice have elaborated further justifications while questioning others. 
Our interviews in Bosnia reminded us that for those who survived wartime atrocities, the 
Tribunal is important for one reason above all—to provide justice. 
It was in Bosnia that the depredations associated with “ethnic cleansing”—an attempt by 
one ethnic group to purge territory of other ethnic groups by inflicting horrific crimes on their 
members—reached soaring proportions. While members of all three of Bosnia’s dominant 
ethnic groups suffered atrocities at the hands of others, Bosniaks—the word commonly used 
by Bosnian Muslims—bore the brunt of nationalist fury. According to the most authoritative 
database on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 83.33 percent of the civilians who were killed or 
are still missing as a result of wartime violence were Bosniak; 10.27 percent Serb; and 5.45 
percent Croat.2 
These are the data of victims who did not survive the harrowing crimes that consumed 
Bosnia for three and a half years. Today, Bosnia is filled with individuals who did survive but 
whose lives were shattered. No measure of justice can restore what they have lost, and the 
survivors we interviewed are acutely aware of this: Trials cannot bring husbands, children, and 
parents back to life or dispel the lasting trauma of being raped or detained in conditions evoca-
tive of Nazi-era concentration camps. But many Bosnian survivors “desperately need justice.”3 
As one of our interlocutors noted, they “weren’t just hit by a bus. Someone did terrible things 
many times over.”4 Those who survived unfathomable cruelty “don’t expect perfect justice,” 
she continued, “but they want some kind of justice.”5 Law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ made 
much the same point, noting: “After all kinds of war crimes and genocide, the people need 
some sort of satisfaction … that someone guilty be punished.”6 
Like many survivors, Mirsad Duratovic´ is perplexed when asked to articulate his reasons 
for supporting the ICTY despite his disappointments in its performance. Duratovic´, who was 
interned in the infamous Omarska camp at the age of 17, counts more than 60 relatives lost 
to “ethnic cleansing” in Prijedor. “What I have gone through,” he explains, “I think whoever 
was in my shoes would … like to see some justice being done.” If the interviewer ever experi-
enced what he had, he continued, “then it would be clear to you … why you want [ justice].”7 
Gradations of Justice
For most Bosnian survivors, justice is not experienced as black or white, something the ICTY 
has either provided or has not. Instead, the Tribunal’s work has provided some measure of 
justice, often experienced as flawed, sometimes deeply so. Since much of this report explores 
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the gap between Bosnians’ expectations of justice and their perceptions of the ICTY’s actual 
achievements, it is important to emphasize at the outset that the victims we interviewed believe 
that what they experience as imperfect justice is infinitely preferable to none at all. Like many 
of our Bosnian interlocutors, journalist Gojko Beric´ distinguished his concerns about discrete 
aspects of the ICTY’s performance from his core belief in its worth: “My complaints are all 
about the methods of [the Tribunal’s] work, but this is not the essence.”8 Indeed, our Bosnian 
interviewees were keen to ensure that we did not misinterpret their criticisms of the ICTY as 
a judgment that its creation was misguided. 
That said, there is a large distance between Bosnians’ original expectations and their 
perceptions of what the ICTY has achieved seventeen years on. Many Bosnians had “great, 
great expectations of international justice”9 in the Tribunal’s early years. Some of their expec-
tations, at least in retrospect, were unrealistic and laid the ground for disappointment. Many 
hoped that the Tribunal would prosecute virtually all war criminals—a staggering prospect in 
view of the scale of atrocities committed during the 1990s Balkan wars. That the ICTY began 
its work by indicting lower-level perpetrators may have reinforced these hopes, while also 
diverting precious resources from the more important task of prosecuting the masterminds 
of mass atrocity.10 With no outreach program in place for the first six years of its existence, 
moreover, the ICTY had no formal process for managing expectations in Bosnia or for mak-
ing sense of actions that, however justified, often seemed incomprehensible to victims some 
2,000 kilometers away. 
This study takes a closer look at other aspects of the ICTY’s performance that have 
either frustrated victims’ expectations or gone farthest in meeting them.11 In the first category, 
several emerged repeatedly in our interviews:
Sentencing patterns. ICTY sentences have on the whole been cause for profound dis-
appointment and at times anger among victims and others in Bosnia. Individuals whom the 
ICTY has convicted of war crimes12 have received sentences as light as two, three, five, six, 
seven and eight years’ imprisonment and are typically granted early release. In the eyes of 
most victims, sentences this short lack any just proportion to the gravity of crimes for which 
they were imposed. Short sentences, made even shorter by early release, have at times had 
another painful consequence: Victims who have testified in The Hague soon find themselves 
enduring the daily indignity of encountering the defendants against whom they testified, 
now their neighbors. Beyond sentence lengths, moreover, many are highly critical of seeming 
inconsistencies in ICTY sentencing. 
Guilty pleas. Many Bosnians expressed particular unease with steep reductions in sen-
tences accorded defendants who have pleaded guilty. While this is partly a function of the 
fact that plea agreements were not part of Bosnia’s legal tradition until recently, this is hardly 
the whole explanation. Many Bosnians associate plea bargaining with two well-known ICTY 
cases, each of which produced problematic results. The first defendant to plead guilty before 
the ICTY, Dražen Erdemovic´, received a sentence of five years for his role as an executioner 
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in the Srebrenica genocide. Many Bosnians are unaware of the extent to which Erdemovic´ 
has assisted the ICTY prosecutor in other cases, and virtually all believe that five years is an 
indefensibly short sentence for a crime of this order.
The second guilty plea that arose repeatedly during our interviews is that of Biljana 
Plavšic´, a close associate of wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžic´ who later became 
president of the Bosnian Serb Republic herself. Although unwilling to agree to cooperate with 
the prosecutor in future cases,13 Plavšic´ received a sentence of only eleven years for crimes 
against humanity. Following its standard practice, the ICTY granted Plavšic´ early release in 
September 2009.
As these examples suggest, guilty pleas in war crimes trials are unlikely to be seen by 
victim populations as legitimate unless they fulfill two basic conditions: sentences should bear 
an appropriate relationship to the gravity of crimes committed and defendants should commit 
to cooperate with the Tribunal in exchange for a reduced sentence. Wherever possible, that 
cooperation should include providing information about the location of mass graves. 
Length and complexity of proceedings. Two interrelated concerns emerged with strik-
ing regularity in our interviews. As Omarska survivor Muharem Murselovic´ put it, the ICTY’s 
“trials took too long, way too long [a]nd … these whole proceedings are too complicated.”14 It 
is not just direct victims who see the Tribunal this way. Members of Bosnia’s legal commu-
nity are just as concerned. Sevima Sali-Terzic´, senior legal advisor to Bosnia’s Constitutional 
Court, describes the ICTY in much the same way as Murselovic´: “The ICTY seems a distant, 
complicated machinery. It has complicated procedures, its processes last forever.”15
Inevitably, the four year long trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloševic´, 
which ended before judgment when the defendant died, has come to epitomize this impres-
sion of the ICTY. Whatever the reasons for Miloševic´’s death before judgment—some of which 
were beyond the ICTY’s control, others not—many Bosnians believe that the Tribunal’s unnec-
essarily complex procedures deprived them of the justice of a verdict in this case.
“Tyrants on Trial.” Moreover, the Miloševic´ trial established a precedent that has vexed 
many victims—the specter of defendants, opting to represent themselves, transforming the 
courtroom into a political platform. In a report published last year, the Justice Initiative pro-
vided an in-depth analysis of how courts, including the ICTY, have met the challenges pre-
sented by “tyrants on trial” who represent themselves.16 In this study however, we provide 
another perspective: We describe how ICTY judges’ failure to control dictators in the dock has 
tarnished Bosnians’ experience of justice.
Long-lasting impunity: Karadžic´ and Mladic´. It has often been noted that, while the 
international community has coalesced around the position that international courts should 
use their limited resources to prosecute those who bear top responsibility for sweeping atroci-
ties, survivors often place greater store in seeing direct perpetrators—the individuals who 
raped them or killed their sons—brought to justice. Indeed, these are the people victims 
may encounter daily at the supermarket or on the street, not the high-level officials who 
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bear superior responsibility for the suffering they endured. While similar sentiments are 
not uncommon in Bosnia, most of the Bosnians we interviewed placed overriding impor-
tance on prosecuting those whom they see as the principal architects of “ethnic cleansing.” 
Along with Slobodan Miloševic´, two men loom largest of all in this regard: Ratko Mladic´, the 
wartime military leader of Bosnian Serbs, and Radovan Karadžic´, Bosnian Serbs’ wartime 
political leader.
Up until our last set of interviews in Bosnia, both suspects remained at large years 
after they were twice indicted on genocide charges in 1995—the second time for their roles in 
the Srebrenica slaughter of July 1995. By the time of our last visit in July 2009, Karadžic´ was 
awaiting trial in The Hague after his arrest in Serbia one year earlier. 
This study explores some of the reasons why Mladic´ and Karadžic´ were able to elude 
apprehension even when up to 50,000 NATO troops patrolled Bosnia in the early years of 
peace,17 when their whereabouts were more easily ascertained. Most important, in the imme-
diate aftermath of a vicious three and a half year conflict, NATO force-contributing countries 
worried that apprehending ICTY suspects would destabilize the fragile peace. In retrospect, it 
is clear that failing to arrest these and other war crimes suspects obstructed Bosnia’s postwar 
recovery in myriad ways. (Conversely, as we note in Chapter IV, to a limited extent the belated 
removal of some ICTY suspects through NATO arrest operations may have contributed to 
displaced persons’ willingness to return to their prewar homes.)
For those who had hoped the ICTY’s work would lay a foundation for reconciliation in 
the aftermath of ethnic violence, allowing indicted war criminals to remain at large came at 
a heavy cost, perhaps irreparable. “In the beginning,” Sevima Sali-Terzic´ reflected when we 
interviewed her in late 2006, “it was possible to have improvements with justice.” But in view 
of the international community’s failure to arrest Karadžic´ and Mladic´, she wondered if “it’s 
too late. Our ethnic relations are terrible…. Too much time was given to those who began the 
war to be in power after the war … to pretend that we have working ethnic relations.”18
During our first set of interviews for this study, when both Karadžic´ and Mladic´ were 
still at large, we heard repeatedly that this fact risked overwhelming all other achievements 
of the ICTY. Law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ summed up what we heard from many in 
Bosnia: The ICTY has done “so many good things but they’re in the shadow of Karadžic´ and 
Mladic´.” Because these two suspects had escaped justice for so long, she said, “many ordinary 
people [in Bosnia] can’t see the good things the ICTY has done.”19 Many recognize that it is 
not the Tribunal’s fault that the two were able to elude justice—the Tribunal has no indepen-
dent authority to arrest suspects and must depend on states and multilateral forces to do this. 
Even so, we were told, if the ICTY were to close its doors without obtaining custody of its top 
suspects, this would “reflect on the whole work of the Hague Tribunal. People will forget all 
other prosecutions.”20 
The belated arrest of Radovan Karadžic´ partially redeemed the international commu-
nity’s failure to secure his arrest sooner but did not erase the costs of his extended impunity. 
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Journalist Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ recalled the rush of emotions many Bosniaks experienced 
upon learning of his capture:
People were very happy and at the same time very sad. In the first moment people 
were on the streets celebrating. In the second moment, when reality hit them, people 
became really sad because they had to wait so long. There were many who cried that 
day, because, okay, it was so easy to do that [yet] he was free all that time. So it was very 
mixed.21
Still, if actions speak louder than words, many victims reached a new stage in their 
ascent from the deepest abyss of loss and grief when Karadžic´ was captured: they traveled to 
The Hague to see him in the dock. Ahmetaševic´ characterized their reactions this way: “Okay, 
he’s there and now you know he will never come out again. Now I feel much better.”22 
Perhaps inevitably, disappointments continue. On the day Karadžic´’s trial was to start, 
nearly 200 victims travelled over 1,200 miles by bus from Bosnia to The Hague to see Karadžic´ 
in the dock, only to find it empty—Karadžic´ boycotted the beginning of his trial, claiming he 
needed more time to prepare his defense. Karadžic´, a psychiatrist by vocation, had decided to 
follow in Miloševic´’s footsteps and represent himself in court. The frustrated victims could 
not understand why he was not compelled to appear in court when sitting only a few miles 
away in the UN’s detention facility.23 
Bosnians will doubtless experience a similar jumble of emotions when Ratko Mladic´ is 
finally found and, if captured alive, turned over to the Tribunal. Yet on one point, our Bosniak 
interlocutors almost universally expressed crystalline clarity: Justice will not be served if the 
ICTY fails to gain custody over Ratko Mladic´, who is widely seen to be even more culpable 
than Karadžic´. 
Further costs of time lost. The combined effects of protracted periods of impunity and 
lengthy trials have been burdensome, particularly for victim-witnesses. We heard repeatedly 
of witness fatigue. Although the subject arose principally in the context of challenges facing 
Bosnia’s relatively new war crimes chamber,24 it points to a larger dilemma confronting large 
numbers of victims seventeen years into the ICTY’s work: While still desperate for justice, 
many are deeply frustrated by how long it is taking. 
Nidžara Ahmetaševic´, who is in constant contact with victims of wartime atrocities, says 
she does not “believe anybody who says victims are tired of the whole process—they’re not.” Of 
course there are exceptions, she acknowledges. Yet every day, her office receives letters “from 
victims who want to tell their story.” Ahmetaševic´ says there are “thousands” of such people, 
who are “afraid they will die and take their stories with them.”25
Calling a crime by its proper name: genocide. If Bosnians cite a formidable list of disap-
pointments in the ICTY’s performance, these should not obscure the profound satisfaction 
many have derived from its work. For many Bosnians (particularly but not exclusively Bos-
18    INTRODUCTION
niaks), one achievement stands out above all—the ICTY’s determination in the Krstic´ case that 
the July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica was a genocide. The ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed 
in clarion terms the Trial Chamber’s determination that a genocide occurred in Srebrenica:
The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, 
the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper 
name: genocide. Those responsible will bear this stigma, and it will serve as a warning 
to those who may in future contemplate the commission of such a heinous act.26
As one Bosnian woman told us (and as many said in similar terms), the ICTY’s “find-
ing that what happened at Srebrenica was genocide is the most important achievement and 
without the ICTY this would not be possible.”27 It is “[o]nly based on this decision,” another 
person told us, that “the ICTY is successful.”28 
Gender justice. As others have noted, some victims in Bosnia continue to grieve for 
their losses and others, it is often said, are “used and misused” by Bosnian politicians. Yet 
the ICTY’s judgments have also helped empower many victims, including women who were 
among the thousands raped in the course of “ethnic cleansing.” 
Through their pathbreaking jurisprudence, the ICTY and its sister court, the ICTR, have 
brought crimes of sexual violence out of the shadows, recognizing that they can constitute 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide when other elements of these crimes are 
established. Reflecting on the significance of these legal milestones, law professor Jasna Bakšic´ 
Muftic´ told us that “ICTY judgments created a new kind of awareness that women had been 
used as a means of war. They became visible, personalized, and recognized as one kind of 
victim. This enabled them to become more active” in such matters as exercising their rights 
to obtain civil benefits.29
Yet as several recent studies have highlighted, the ICTY (along with other international 
tribunals) has not adequately followed through on its own achievements in this area.30 At 
times, the prosecutor has failed to include charges relating to sexual violence in indictments 
where these should have figured prominently, and judges have imposed comparatively high 
burdens of proof in relation to such charges.31
Bearing Witness
Although the vast majority of those who survived wartime violence in Bosnia will never set 
foot in The Hague, the ICTY has provided an inestimably important measure of justice for 
victims who testify in ICTY cases. Doing so is deeply important for reasons that are easily lost 
amid Bosnians’ long list of legitimate concerns about the ICTY. Their motivation is moral, 
not instrumental, and it sifts down to a deeply felt need to bear witness for those who did not 
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survive “ethnic cleansing.” Muharem Murselovic´, who was detained in the Omarska camp 
for the crime of being Muslim, has been a willing witness in several ICTY cases. Like many 
survivors, Murselovic´ testifies out of a deep sense of duty toward those who perished: “I am 
obliged to witness, to testify on behalf of hundreds of my friends who have been murdered in 
Prijedor whose guilt was the same as mine. I survived that hell and I never regretted for the 
fact that I witnessed.”32
In his study of ICTY witnesses, Eric Stover found that Murselovic´’s sentiment is com-
mon. A majority of ICTY witnesses interviewed by Stover “stressed the compelling need to 
tell their story. They had survived unspeakable crimes while others had perished; it was their 
‘moral duty’ to ensure that the truth about the death of family members, neighbors, and col-
leagues was duly recorded and acknowledged.”33
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Bosnians grieve for the country they lost, where it was commonplace for friendships to tran-
scend ethnic identity and where churches and mosques shared the same public space. The 
“grotesque intimacy”34 of the ethnic violence that consumed Bosnia in the 1990s was one 
of its signal and searing features. This dimension of wartime violence perhaps intensified 
many Bosnians’ hope that the judicial truth established in The Hague would open the way to 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing and expressions of remorse. More particularly, many hoped 
that, by establishing nightmarish facts through the crucible of trial, the ICTY would lead 
those who committed crimes, and those who averted their eyes when they were in a position 
to protest, to acknowledge what happened, condemn crimes committed in their name, and 
express remorse.
As we recount in Chapter V, Bosnia has seen only limited progress toward this goal. 
Leaders of all three major ethnic groups have treated convicted war criminals from their own 
ethnic group as war heroes, and most Bosnians experience justice through an ethnic lens. 
It seemed for a good part of the past decade that outright denial of crimes had given way to 
“mere” distortion, but even this development came into question in September 2009, when 
Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik argued that—contrary to the findings of the 
ICTY and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber—Bosnian Serb forces were not responsible for 
shelling incidents in Sarajevo and Tuzla in which scores of civilians had been killed. Dodik 
claimed that the Bosniak-dominated Bosnian Army staged the incidents to provoke NATO 
military action against Bosnian Serbs.35 
Although the ICTY’s judgments have not produced the type of widespread acknowl-
edgment that some hoped they would, many Bosnians believe that the ICTY’s unassailable 
conclusions are a form of justice in themselves. Commenting on the ICTY judgment in the 
Krstic´ genocide case, human rights campaigner Mirsad Tokacˇa told us: “After this decision, 
20    INTRODUCTION
there is no negation and refusing of the fact that genocide happened.” In a similar vein, a 
survivor from a detention camp near Prijedor, Muharem Murselovic´, has noted that “with th[e 
ICTY] documentation, with those verdicts … the truth about the situation in Prijedor has been 
established, and this is the largest, the major achievement of the ICTY.”36
The less-than-hoped-for impact of the ICTY in the realm of acknowledgment of crimes 
cannot fairly be attributed solely or even primarily to the Tribunal itself. Nor, however, was this 
aim helpfully advanced by the Tribunal’s failure to develop an outreach strategy in a timely 
and effective manner. Failure to undertake outreach at an early stage conceded the field of 
interpretation to nationalist leaders and the media that are their megaphones. An ICTY out-
reach program launched in 2004–05, Bridging the Gap, demonstrates the potential benefits 
of a well-devised outreach initiative: under the program, once trial proceedings are completed, 
ICTY officials and staff have met with local citizens and officials in the area where adjudicated 
crimes occurred to describe the case from the investigation to appellate stage. Ordinary citi-
zens have been able to learn the facts about the crimes and the work of the ICTY without fil-
tering by local political leaders and ethnic media. The effect of these programs has often been 
similar to that in Focˇa, where participants were shocked while listening to the accounts of the 
sexual crimes committed against Bosniak women from the area. More than a few commented, 
“You know, we really didn’t know this, it is a horrible crime.”37 Even with the best outreach 
efforts, however, it is unrealistic to expect the Tribunal to have singlehandedly overcome per-
sistent resistance among unapologetic politicians and unreformed media institutions. 
Impact on Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions
Among the hoped-for goals cited by the UN Security Council when it established the ICTY, 
there was no serious suggestion that the Tribunal in The Hague would strengthen the capacity 
of courts in Bosnia to prosecute war criminals.38 For a time, in fact, the ICTY was assigned a 
supervisory function vis-à-vis Bosnian courts, restraining them from exercising war crimes 
jurisdiction until prosecutors in The Hague determined there was proper cause for doing so. 
It was unforeseen, therefore, that the ICTY would eventually play a key role, along with the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), in launching a war crimes chamber in Bosnia’s 
then-new state court.39 
The principal impetus for this change was less visionary than pragmatic: Under pres-
sure to devise a strategy for completing its burgeoning caseload, ICTY judges determined that 
the Tribunal would focus on prosecuting senior suspects and transfer lower-level indictees to 
national courts. The Tribunal would not be able to do so, however, unless its judges were satis-
fied that transferred cases would be fairly tried before impartial courts. Strongly preferring to 
transfer appropriate cases to the countries where the crimes charged occurred, ICTY officials 
paid special attention to Bosnian courts. When they did, they concluded that the “shortcom-
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ings [of Bosnia’s judiciary were] too great for it to constitute a sufficiently solid judicial founda-
tion to try cases referred by the Tribunal.”40
A solution was found when the ICTY’s planning linked up with far-reaching judicial 
efforts spearheaded by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). By mid-2002, the two 
institutions formulated a joint plan of action, at the heart of which was a proposal to cre-
ate a war crimes chamber in Bosnia’s State Court, which would operate in accordance with 
international standards, and a Special Department for War Crimes (SDWC) within the state 
prosecutor’s office. The two institutions would be of a “hybrid” nature—international and 
national judges and prosecutors would serve together in prosecuting primarily international 
crimes. While the chamber would be eligible to receive cases transferred from The Hague, its 
writ would become much larger. 
Early in 2005, Bosnia’s War Crimes Chamber (BWCC) began operating. This report 
describes some of the chamber’s leading achievements and challenges,41 including the oppo-
sition of Bosnian Serb representatives to further involvement of international judges in the 
BWCC and international prosecutors in the SDWC beyond the original five-year plan. Despite 
these challenges, the BWCC and SDWC have generally received high marks for their perfor-
mance and are now cited as a model form of hybrid court. Reflecting on their achievements 
in July 2009, Mirsad Tokacˇa said: “They have produced really excellent results in a short 
period.”42 Many international observers agree. Journalist Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ goes even fur-
ther, describing the BWCC as one of “the strongest state institution[s] we have” in Bosnia.43
*  *  *
 
To a considerable degree this study focuses on criticisms of the ICTY’s work articulated by 
our Bosnian interlocutors. It is therefore important to bear in mind that these criticisms come 
from observers who on balance support the Tribunal and value the manifold contributions it 
has made. 
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II. Background
An overview of Bosnia’s relationship to the ICTY is a necessary foundation for the analysis 
that forms the heart of this report. This chapter provides essential background information, 
focusing on those aspects of the ICTY’s historical and evolving relationship to Bosnia that are 
relevant to our further analysis. As such, it is necessarily selective. 
A.  The Creation of the ICTY
A defining fact of the ICTY’s work in Bosnia and its relationship to the country is that the 
Security Council created the Tribunal when Bosnia was experiencing the full force of national-
ist fury. By the time the Council formally created the ICTY in May 1993,44 Bosnia had endured 
what were routinely described as “the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II,” grue-
somely reported in the daily media, for over a year.45 As Europe and the United States moved 
toward recognizing the independence of Bosnia in early April 1992, Bosnian Serbs supported 
by Serbia launched a war whose principal aim was to establish Serb control over parts of Bos-
nian territory, linking it to Serbia and Montenegro. While Croatian Serbs, backed by Belgrade, 
had similarly fought to prevent Croatia from seceding ten months earlier, the war in Bosnia 
would prove even fiercer.46 From the beginning of the war, Bosnian Serb forces carried out 
brutal policies of “ethnic cleansing”—the forcible removal of Bosniak and Croat populations 
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from territories under Serb control, primarily accomplished through deportation and perse-
cution—in order to create conditions for future separation of these areas from the rest of the 
country.47 One half of Bosnia’s prewar population was forced to leave their homes by fleeing 
the country or seeking protection in areas of Bosnia dominated by their own ethnic group. 
In this setting, many worried that the Security Council’s action in creating the Tribunal 
was a fig leaf for its failure to take more assertive steps to stanch the slaughter underway.48 
But the creation of an international war crimes court also enjoyed the enthusiastic support of 
human rights advocates, who believed that the atrocities underway warranted the founding 
of a Nuremberg-type tribunal. Their call for a tribunal “was electric within ex-Yugoslavia,” 
inspiring civil society organizations in Bosnia to begin the treacherous but essential task of 
documenting war crimes.49 
The predominantly Muslim government of Bosnia, too, welcomed the Security Coun-
cil’s historic effort to address atrocities. But it also had ample cause for concern: The resolu-
tions establishing the ICTY had been preceded by a blizzard of Security Council resolutions 
irresolutely addressing the Bosnian crisis.50 In this setting, Muslim leaders worried that the 
Council’s action in creating the ICTY might salve the conscience of countries that were still 
unprepared to take the action needed to stop the slaughter.51
B. Early Investigations and Indictments
On its side, the fledgling ICTY faced myriad challenges to its work in Bosnia. Judges were not 
in place until six months after the Tribunal was “created,”52 and it took much longer—fully 
14 months—to identify a candidate for prosecutor who would enjoy the support of a fractious 
Security Council53 (and who would remain on the job for more than a few days—the length 
of time the initial prosecutor stayed).54 The Tribunal’s investigators had to gather evidence of 
crimes committed in a zone of ongoing conflict, a challenge for which there was no playbook 
from the postwar prosecutions in Nuremberg and Tokyo that were the principal precursors of 
the ICTY.55 Establishing a financially secure foundation for its work was another huge chal-
lenge for the Tribunal, requiring endless attention by its senior officials.56 Not least impor-
tant, the Tribunal was (and remains) dependent on states and international forces to carry 
out arrests of those whom its prosecutor has indicted. While this has presented challenges 
throughout the ICTY’s work, they were especially daunting in wartime Bosnia.
In this setting, the ICTY’s early indictments were directed against individuals who, 
while responsible for chilling brutality, played minor roles in the overall architecture of mass 
destruction. The reasons for this had less to do with prosecutorial strategy than pragmatic 
pressures and constraints. Richard Goldstone, who was all but technically the first ICTY pros-
ecutor,57 explains in his memoir why the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) issued its first indict-
ment against Dragan Nikolic´, “a comparatively low-level” suspect.58 Going into his first budget 
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meeting at UN headquarters soon after taking up the post of prosecutor, Goldstone had “been 
informed ahead of time that at least one indictment had to be issued before the … meeting in 
order to demonstrate that the system was working and that the tribunal was worthy of finan-
cial support.”59 With the Tribunal starved for cash, the prosecutor indicted Nikolic´ because 
“he was the only person against whom we had sufficient evidence to justify an indictment” 
at that time.60
But this alone does not explain the early indictments. Why, after all, did the OTP have 
sufficient evidence against someone who played a comparatively minor role in the system 
of atrocities in Bosnia? A significant part of the answer stems from the fact that it is easier 
for a prosecutor to prove the guilt of direct perpetrators than that of individuals who are the 
chief architects of systemic atrocities but who did not carry out atrocities themselves and 
are often physically removed from the scenes of the crimes.61 At first, Goldstone pursued a 
pyramid theory of prosecution: Comparatively low-level suspects would provide evidence that 
establishes the responsibility of their superiors, and the ICTY prosecutors would follow the 
evidentiary leads upward until they reached the top of the pyramid.62 
Some responsibility for the patterns reflected in early indictments—which do not add 
up to a strategic vision—belongs to the Tribunal’s Investigation Division, which was respon-
sible for directing investigations until Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte put the direction of all 
investigations under the senior trial attorneys, who provided much-needed guidance. The way 
the OTP was initially structured brought further inefficiencies into a young institution that 
had to find its footing in the midst of extraordinary challenges. ICTY prosecutors would later 
acknowledge that some of their early indictments were weak, although they attributed this to 
yet another source of pressure: judges who were “impatient with the pace of indictments and 
deteriorating public confidence.”63
The same sort of pressures that led the prosecutor to indict Dragan Nikolic´ also led 
him to issue his second indictment against another low-level suspect, Dušan Tadic´. With the 
war in Bosnia very much underway during the ICTY’s first two and a half years, the Tribunal 
was hard-pressed to obtain custody of indicted suspects. Goldstone saw an opportunity when 
German authorities arrested Tadic´—whom Bosnian refugees from Prijedor had identified—in 
Munich, in February 1994. The ICTY immediately indicted Tadic´; two months later Germany 
transferred to the ICTY the first person to face trial before it. 
More than another year would go by before the prosecutor indicted individuals whom 
Bosnians would not consider “small fish”—Radovan Karadžic´ and Ratko Mladic´. Their indict-
ments marked a significant turning point for the Tribunal, significantly enhancing its cred-
ibility and viability. It would take another four years, however, before the ICTY prosecutor—by 
then Louise Arbour—would indict Yugoslav wartime leader Slobodan Miloševic´.
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C. Peace and Justice
If the ICTY faced daunting practical challenges in its early years, political challenges were 
just as formidable. From the outset of the Tribunal’s work, diplomats working to bring the 
conflict in Bosnia to a negotiated end feared that the ICTY might impede their efforts.64 As we 
explain in Chapter III, one of the principal justifications the Security Council cited in estab-
lishing the ICTY was its conviction that the Tribunal would help restore and maintain peace 
in a region still at war. But from the outset of his work, Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone 
had to address diplomats’ attraction to the idea of offering deals that might include promises 
of immunity to suspected war criminals in exchange for a peace agreement.65 After all, for a 
time the chief negotiator on behalf of Bosnian Serbs was Radovan Karadžic´, a man who risked 
indictment someday—and indeed is now on trial in The Hague—for his leadership role in 
“ethnic cleansing.”66 
A massacre that would surpass all others in the war brought this issue to a head. For 
several days in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces systematically executed more than 7,000 Mus-
lim males who, with their families, had been living in the eastern Bosnian town of Srebrenica. 
The final operation,67 which would later be judged a genocide by both the ICTY and the 
International Court of Justice, began on July 11, 1995. By July 25, 1995, the ICTY had issued 
an indictment charging wartime Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžic´ and Ratko Mladic´ 
with genocide and other crimes. This indictment did not include the July 1995 massacre in 
Srebrenica—the prosecutor had not yet had time to prepare an indictment for this—but it is 
widely thought that Goldstone rushed out an indictment already in the works to ensure a swift 
response to Srebrenica.68 While much of the world welcomed the long-awaited indictment, 
then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali later told Goldstone that, had the prosecu-
tor consulted him first, he would have advised against indicting Karadžic´ “before peace had 
been brokered in Bosnia.”69
Although long authorized to use military force to protect Srebrenica and other so-called 
“safe areas” in Bosnia, NATO had been reluctant to do so.70 But the Srebrenica massacre, 
soon followed by another in downtown Sarajevo, finally led NATO to use unprecedented fire-
power against Bosnian Serb forces in late August 1995.71 NATO’s intervention, along with the 
crippling effects of international sanctions against Serbia and a decisive Croatian offensive 
against Serb forces in the Croatian-Serb war, brought Serb leaders to the negotiating table, 
now under U.S. mediation. After years of inconclusive negotiations under European and then 
joint European-United Nations auspices, this time the Serbs were ready to reach an agreement 
to end the war.
Less than four months after the Srebrenica massacres, peace talks led by U.S. negotiator 
Richard Holbrooke got underway at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. 
In the lead-up to Dayton, U.S. officials were divided about whether Karadžic´ and Mladic´—now 
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ICTY indictees—could participate in peace talks, and at Holbrooke’s insistence the United 
States determined that it would deal with the Bosnian Serbs principally through Miloševic´, 
but the U.S. government did not rule out meeting with the indictees in the region and in 
fact did so in September 1995.72 Serbian President Slobodan Miloševic´, who would later face 
charges himself, represented the Bosnian Serbs in Dayton. If the indictment of Karadžic´ had 
any impact on the peace process, it was inadvertently facilitative: The Bosnian government’s 
then President Alija Izetbegovic´ would not have attended the peace talks if Karadžic´ had.73 
But there remained another challenge to the Tribunal, again grounded in a perceived 
trade-off between justice and peace: There appeared to be a real risk that the Tribunal’s work 
would be compromised by negotiators willing to offer amnesty as part of a peace package.74
At the beginning of the Dayton talks, the ICTY sent then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright a letter asking the United States to include in the peace accords a requirement that 
indicted war criminals be surrendered to the ICTY.75 Soon after, Goldstone issued a second set 
of indictments against Karadžic´ and Mladic´, this time charging them with genocide for their 
roles in Srebrenica. With these and other high profile indictments again in the headlines,76 
it would have been difficult but not impossible for diplomats to neutralize the indictments 
in Dayton. 
Still, the United States would not go as far as the Bosnian delegation hoped; the latter 
had wanted the Dayton accords to include detailed obligations to arrest ICTY indictees, with 
a robust mandate for the NATO-led implementation force, known by its acronym “IFOR,” to 
do so.77 There were also divisions between lead negotiator Holbrooke, who thought arresting 
war criminals would be vital to the peace, and the Pentagon, which wanted the NATO force to 
focus on what it considered core military missions. A compromise was reached: IFOR would 
be authorized but not required to arrest ICTY suspects.78 Moreover, parties to the agreement 
signed on to cooperate fully with the Tribunal, including by arresting those indicted by the 
ICTY.79 As we discuss shortly, whether IFOR would exercise its authority was another mat-
ter altogether. First, we briefly describe the governing structure that was finalized at Dayton.
D. Governance Structure
The peace agreement finalized in Dayton and officially signed in Paris in December 1995, 
formally called the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina but 
more widely known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), established two largely autono-
mous entities. Under the DPA, roughly 49 percent of Bosnia’s territory was assigned to the 
largely self-governing entity Republika Srpska (RS); approximately 51 percent became the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Federation”) entity. The Federation is divided into ten 
cantons: five with a Bosniak majority, three in which Croats are numerically predominant, 
and two (Central Bosnia Canton and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton) in which the two ethnic 
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groups are approximately the same size.80 In exchange for considerable autonomy in RS, the 
Serbs accepted in principle what they had for three and a half years fought against—a Bosnian 
State that included RS.
The Bosnian government found one aspect of the territorial division particularly hard to 
accept in Dayton: Srebrenica would remain under Serb control. Twelve years later, when the 
International Court of Justice ruled that the Serb assault on Srebrenica was a genocide, some 
Bosniak leaders urged that Srebrenica be wrested from RS. In their view, to maintain Serb 
control over an area they had acquired through genocide was morally indefensible.81
This issue was emblematic of a broader moral quandary at the heart of Dayton: Although 
Serbs were awarded final control over less territory than that which they had acquired in war 
(roughly 70 percent of Bosnian territory), the Serb entity by its nature seemed to ratify the 
results of “ethnic cleansing.” To avoid this, Dayton assures all Bosnians the right to return to 
their original homes. In Chapter IV, we address the question of whether and how arrests of 
ICTY suspects might have affected implementation of this right.
The DPA also created an international governing structure, the Office of the High Rep-
resentative (OHR), that would be responsible for implementing the civilian provisions of the 
peace accords. The OHR, acting under the authority of the Peace Implementation Council, 
an international body guiding the peace process in Bosnia,82 now also represents the Euro-
pean Union.83 Initially envisaged as a transitional structure that could be withdrawn when 
the previously warring factions reconstructed a national government, the OHR mandate was 
strengthened in 199784 and has been repeatedly extended in the face of strong ethnic division 
in Bosnia.85 
E. The Post Dayton Peace
The history of post-Dayton Bosnia could have been very different if Karadžic´ and Mladic´ had 
been brought to trial in The Hague.86
Although IFOR was authorized to arrest individuals indicted by the ICTY and provide support 
for other aspects of the civilian dimensions of the DPA, its commander resolved to avoid any 
such missions, however compelling the need.87 Officially, NATO’s policy was that its Bosnia 
force would arrest those indicted by the ICTY if it came across them while carrying out its 
duties but would not seek out suspects.88 Several months into the peace operation, a U.S. 
defense official told the New York Times: “We will take these people into custody if they sur-
render to us, preferably with their hands up over their heads, or maybe if they’re turned in 
by someone else.” But, he said, “I can’t imagine it would happen any other way … [W]e have 
a much bigger mission in Bosnia.”89 In practice, IFOR went out of its way to avoid arresting 
suspects, reportedly waving Karadžic´ and other suspects through NATO checkpoints.
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The policy of avoidance was partly driven by the specter of Somalia, where 18 U.S. sol-
diers died in late 1993 when they tried to arrest a Somali warlord.90 But it also reflected NATO 
countries’ concern that arresting indicted war criminals could destabilize the fragile peace. 
In the view of Richard Holbrooke and many others, however, arresting Karadžic´ was one 
of “the most important … things necessary to achieve” Dayton’s goals in Bosnia.91 “Karadžic´ 
at large was certain to mean Dayton deferred or defeated,” Holbrooke wrote.92 In September 
1997, the New York Times reported that, “By refusing to arrest Karadžic´ and deliver him to 
The Hague, the NATO forces have enabled him to remain the shadow commander and mafia 
king of the Bosnian Serb republic from his mountain home in Pale.”94 That Karadžic´ was not 
arrested until thirteen years after his first indictment enabled him to “rebuild his position” in 
Bosnia,94 rallying nationalist Serbs and opposing inter-ethnic cooperation.95
The fact that Karadžic´ was under indictment and, pursuant to Dayton, unable to hold 
official office nonetheless served to marginalize him as well as Mladic´.96 Yet in myriad ways, 
as Human Rights Watch observes, “ongoing concerns about continuing ethnic divisions in 
Bosnia can be traced back, in part, to the early failure to purge the Republika Srpska of lead-
ers implicated in war crimes.”97 As we note later, many Bosnians believe that the time lost 
while top suspects remained at large brought costs that transcend the toll of justice delayed—
although that, too, has been a heavy burden for victims. 
It remains to be noted that several years after the DPA entered into force, the Stabiliza-
tion Force (IFOR’s successor, known by its acronym SFOR)98 began arresting ICTY indict-
ees in July 1997. The newly minted government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who 
assumed office in early May 1997, led the way, under the banner of Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook’s “ethical foreign policy.”99 Blair had pledged that his government would track down 
war crimes suspects in Bosnia, and it was British forces who mounted a watershed arrest 
operation in July 1997 in which one indictee was apprehended and another killed when he 
resisted arrest.100 In December 1999, the New York Times reported, “the British military has 
aggressively pursued suspects in western Bosnia. Eleven suspects have been arrested in the 
British sector; another was killed in a shootout with peacekeepers.”101 
The ICTY itself shamed SFOR into action through an arrest of a Croatian Serb indictee 
in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia). In June 1997, a joint action by the ICTY and the United Nations 
Translational Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) 
secured the suspect’s arrest.102
Ultimately, SFOR “brought 39 war-crimes suspects to the [ICTY]” and also “provided 
security and logistical support to ICTY investigative teams as well as surveillance of and 
ground patrolling around alleged mass graves”103 according to the NATO Web site.104
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F. Cooperation by Bosnian Authorities
While multinational forces have arrested large numbers of ICTY suspects, others have been 
arrested or persuaded to surrender by national authorities. The Bosniak-dominated govern-
ment of BiH was the first to transfer to the Tribunal indictees from the ethnic group that 
constituted its majority. The government of Bosnia arrested Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landžo, 
indicted for crimes committed at the Cˇelebic´i prison camp in 1992, in May 1996 and trans-
ferred them to the Tribunal the following month.105 But while Bosniak officials were from the 
outset cooperative with the ICTY, most of its suspects were in Republika Srpska or, even more 
often, in Serbia, where for years they were granted citizenship and protection. In the early post-
war period, RS authorities openly opposed surrender of Bosnian Serbs to the Tribunal. With 
Serbs unwilling—and the central Bosnian government unable—to arrest most Serb indictees, 
and with the NATO forces hesitant for several years to make arrests, the Tribunal suffered a 
crisis of credibility. Two developments brought a crucial turnaround in the ICTY’s fortunes: 
the July 1997 SFOR action in Prijedor, in which ICTY indictee Simo Drljacˇa was killed while 
resisting arrest, and the surrenders of ten Bosnian Croats in October 1997, the product of 
months of intense negotiations between the United States and Croatia.106 
During the first tenure of RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik (Jan. 1998–Jan. 2001), 
RS policy toward the ICTY softened. Dodik allowed the Tribunal to open an office in Banja 
Luka, asserting that the public mood had shifted to a degree that surrendering Serbs to the 
Tribunal was no longer seen as the “act of a traitor” but instead as a courageous step.107 More-
over the terms of Republika Srpska’s new cooperation were controversial: In late 2004, ICTY 
officials criticized Bosnian Serbs for offering financial rewards to war crimes suspects who 
surrendered.108 
Republika Srpska for the first time transferred war crimes indictees to the ICTY soon 
after introducing the new “trading” approach.109 During 2005 and 2006, RS authorities also 
forwarded documents to the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor as well as to the Prosecutor’s 
Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.110 In late December 2006, RS appointed a working group 
on cooperation with the ICTY.111
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III. Victims’ Justice
Despite the beauty [of Bosnia and Herzegovina], the pain of the war is still very raw in people’s 
hearts. You see, the enemy who took your father to a concentration camp was your neighbor, 
the rapist of your wife, daughter or mother was your colleague, and the sniper who killed your 
child was a relative. That’s difficult to overcome; difficult to forget.112
My mind is very overburdened with sad things… We just trust in God and justice. I am glad 
there is justice….113
Justice will never be reached—just a little satisfaction.114
In the lead-up to Serbs’ armed attack against Bosnian Muslims in April 1992, Muslim resi-
dents’ homes in Focˇa “were being set on fire,” an ICTY Trial Chamber would later record.115 
A Tribunal witness identified as FWS-75 was among those who, unable to leave the region, hid 
“in the woods for fear of being burned in their houses while they were sleeping.”116 Approach-
ing forces shot at the Muslim villagers as they tried to flee, hitting FWS-75 and killing her 
mother.117 With other women and girls who survived the assault, FWS-75 was taken captive. 
The ICTY’s trial judgment in the Kunarac case describes what happened next:
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Women [who were captured by Serb soldiers] were kept in various houses, apartments, 
gymnasiums or schools. Even prior to their being brought to those detention centres, 
some witnesses who testified before the Trial Chamber said that they had been physi-
cally abused or raped by the soldiers who had captured them. Thus, FWS-50, FWS-48, 
FWS-75 and FWS-87 stated that they were raped at Buk Bijela, a settlement south of 
Focˇa where they had been taken after their capture. FWS-75 was taken away from the 
group by a man of 40–50 years who proceeded to rape her. She was subsequently raped 
in this very same room by approximately 10 other men. She fainted after the tenth 
man.118
This was just the beginning of a months-long period of continuous gang rapes during 
what was legally judged to be the crime against humanity of enslavement and rape, essentially 
constituting what would now be regarded as sexual slavery had this crime been within the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY. The trial judgment provides a glimpse of what FWS-75 and other 
captives endured throughout this period in its account of a two-week period that was hardly 
unique: After spending a week in the apartment of one of the defendants in the Kunarac case, 
Radomir Kovacˇ, FWS-75 and another captive, twelve-year old A.B., were taken to another apart-
ment where “[t]he two girls stayed … for about 15 days, during which they were constantly 
raped by at least ten or fifteen Serb soldiers.”119 Serb soldiers then took the girls to another 
apartment, where they stayed “for about 7-10 days, during which time they continued to be 
raped.”120 Radomir Kovacˇ ultimately sold 12-year-old A.B. and FWS-87 to two Montenegrin 
soldiers for 500 Deutschmarks each.121
On December 25, 1992, Kovacˇ handed FWS-75 over to another soldier “in the almost 
certain knowledge that [she] would be raped again.”122 By then, there were virtually no Bosniaks 
left in Focˇa, 51 percent of whose residents were Bosniaks in 1991.123
*  *  *
Bosnia and Herzegovina is filled with individuals who survived harrowing crimes—and with 
the graves of those who did not.124 No measure of justice can restore what victims have lost 
forever, and many of the survivors we interviewed are acutely aware of this. For most survivors, 
moreover, specific crimes that forever changed their lives are part of a broader canvas of endur-
ing trauma, of deeply felt injustices that cannot be redeemed by criminal prosecutions—the 
haunting remembrance that it took years before the international community took action to 
end their suffering; the post-conflict division of their country under terms that Bosniak vic-
tims see as the rewarding and ratification of ethnic cleansing; the daily injustice of exile from 
homes in which generations of their families lived.
But if trials cannot heal victims’ wounds, many “desperately need justice.”125 Asta Zimbo, 
who worked with survivors’ groups on behalf of the International Center for Missing Persons, 
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makes the point this way: “They weren’t just hit by a bus. Someone did terrible things many 
times over.… People don’t expect perfect justice but they want some kind of justice.”126 In this 
chapter we explore the kind of justice Bosnians hoped to receive when the ICTY was estab-
lished, as well as their evolving expectations of justice from The Hague some seventeen years 
after the Tribunal was created. For the most part, we defer until later chapters our assessment 
of the degree to which their expectations have been met and the underlying reasons.127 To a 
limited extent, however, our discussion in this chapter reflects not only the goals that Bosnians 
associate with ICTY success but also their views of how well the ICTY has achieved the goals 
they consider important. In general, this follows from the way in which many expectations 
were presented during interviews: Often, our Bosnian interlocutors implicitly conveyed their 
views of what the ICTY should have achieved by commenting on how well it has achieved 
those goals. With respect to one of the goals to which many attached great hope—the ICTY’s 
ability to prevent further atrocities—this chapter provides a somewhat more extended discus-
sion of Bosnians’ perceptions of the ICTY’s record. 
While this chapter identifies several distinct justifying aims of the ICTY that emerged 
in interviews as important to Bosnians, these do not fall neatly into separate categories. For 
example, as the discussion that follows makes clear, some Bosnians’ conception of reconcilia-
tion as a byproduct of prosecution shades into others’ notion of acknowledgment as one of the 
most important hoped-for consequences of ICTY verdicts. Some of the positions set forth in 
this chapter could reasonably be cited to illustrate several different positions—that the ICTY 
serves an expressive function or that it serves a preventive role, for instance. To the extent 
possible, we have tried to capture and reflect speakers’ conceptions of the ICTY’s contribu-
tions and/or unachieved goals in their own terms rather than in terms that are widely used 
in academic literature.
Although we interviewed victims from all three major ethnic groups in Bosnia, the expe-
riences of Bosniak victims loom especially large in this chapter and the next because—as even 
many Serbs we interviewed acknowledge128—Bosniaks suffered the vast majority of atrocities 
during the 1990s war and were especially supportive of the Security Council’s action in creat-
ing the ICTY.129 This is not to say that Bosniaks are the only citizens who believe the ICTY’s 
work to be important. We interviewed individuals of all ethnicities in Bosnia who believe the 
work of the ICTY to be important (if imperfectly realized), and this chapter reflects their views 
as well as those of Bosniaks. (And as our discussion in Chapter IV makes clear, we also inter-
viewed individuals across ethnic lines who are highly critical of the Tribunal’s achievements.) 
While significant, ethnicity is by no means the only meaningful difference among Bos-
nian victims. As our analysis makes clear, a victim’s experience of justice is a function of his 
or her individual personality and personal experiences. Also relevant, as this chapter and 
others reflect, are differences in victims’ educational level. In general we found that highly 
educated urban Bosnians are more likely than rural victims to value the symbolic importance 
of the ICTY’s work—or at any rate, they were more likely to verbalize the importance of the 
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Tribunal’s expressive function in abstract terms, to situate the Tribunal’s accomplishments 
in a larger context than Bosnia, and to understand the reasons behind ICTY practices. While 
these individuals often refer to other, less educated, Bosnians as “ordinary people” or “direct 
victims,” many if not most of the urban intellectuals interviewed for this study also endured 
harrowing war crimes.130
A. “That Someone Guilty Be Punished”131
The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else …. Hence, to the question most 
commonly asked about the Eichmann trial: What good does it do?, there is but one possible 
answer: It will do justice.132
Today, it is commonplace outside of Bosnia to ask in relation to international tribunals much 
the same question that, in Hannah Arendt’s words, was “most commonly asked about the 
Eichmann trial” almost half a century ago: What good does it do?133 Yet for many survivors of 
Bosnia’s wartime atrocities, the question answers itself.
Sadik Trako, who heads the Association of Victims and Missing Persons in Lašva Valley 
in central Bosnia, said all that he thought necessary on the point: “For me, the Hague Tribu-
nal is an extremely important institution because it is that court which is going to punish the 
perpetrators.”134 Like many survivors, Mirsad Duratovic´, who was 17 when he was detained in 
the notorious concentration camp in Omarska and who lost more than 60 relatives during 
the Serb takeover of Prijedor, is perplexed when asked to explain why he supports the ICTY 
despite myriad disappointments in its performance. “What I have gone through,” he explains, 
“I think whoever was in my shoes would actually like to see some justice being done.” If the 
interviewer ever went through what he did, Duratovic´ continued, “then it would be clear to 
you … why you want [ justice].”135
Although often overlooked in the literature on the ICTY, the UN Security Council rec-
ognized the importance of what some of our interlocutors call “justice for its own sake”136 
when it established the Tribunal. In the resolution creating the ICTY, the Council cited its 
determination not only to deter further atrocities but also “to take effective measures to bring 
to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”137 In the ICTY’s first annual report to the 
UN General Assembly and Security Council, then ICTY President Antonio Cassese described 
this aim with elegant simplicity—“to do justice.”138
More than any other justifying aim of the ICTY, bringing those responsible to justice 
seems to have special resonance for victims in Bosnia. As law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ 
noted, “After all kinds of war crimes and genocide, the people need some sort of satisfaction 
… that someone guilty be punished.”139 Reflecting on many victims’ continuing support for the 
ICTY in the face of widespread disappointment in its sentences, Mirsad Tokacˇa, who has met 
countless victims while documenting wartime atrocities, captured the essential point: “Simply, 
they desperately need justice. It’s some kind of satisfaction, moral satisfaction.”140 Kada Hotic´, 
a leader of Mothers of Srebrenica and Žepa Enclave, described the positive contributions of 
the ICTY this way: “If the court were not established at all, it would be very difficult to reach 
any sentence [ for the crimes committed during the war]. That’s a little piece of justice.”141
Studies by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reflect the importance 
of justice for Bosnians across ethnic lines. A 2005 UNDP field mission report observed that 
“Bosnians overwhelmingly identify criminal justice as the most legitimate response to crime, 
if not the only one. At all levels of society and in every part of the country, putting war criminals 
on trial is seen as a necessity, with no serious alternative.”142 (The last part of this observation 
probably means that most respondents rejected the prospect of amnesty, not that they rejected 
transitional justice processes complementary to prosecutions; a 2005 UNDP poll also found 
considerable support for a truth and reconciliation process across ethnic communities.)143
Believing that many expected the Tribunal to perform too many roles, Nerma Jelacˇic´ 
insisted that “its primary role needs to be establishing individual responsibility and finding 
facts, prosecuting defendants and ensuring that they get their due for what they did in the war. 
That’s huge already.”144 Establishing individual responsibility is especially important, many of 
our interlocutors emphasized, in respect of those who played leading roles in wartime atroci-
ties, including but not limited to Bosnian Serb wartime leaders Ratko Mladic´ and Radovan 
Karadžic´.145 Journalist Nidžara Ahmetaševic´, who at seventeen was wounded when Serb snip-
ers shot at her Sarajevo home in May 1992,146 describes the moral message a verdict against 
Mladic´ and Karadžic´ would send: “The whole world will say, ‘these people committed that 
and that and we are here to say, it’s not good to do that[;] you cannot do that and go around 
unpunished.’”147 
Ahmetaševic´’s conception of justice is evocative of the ICTY’s notion of retribution, 
one of the two most important guiding principles (along with deterrence) of the Tribunal’s 
sentencing.148 Although its judgments have not always used the term “retribution” in a con-
sistent manner, ICTY chambers have emphasized that the concept “is not to be understood 
as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international com-
munity at these crimes.”149 
Hatidža Mehmedovic´, who lost her husband, two teenage sons, brothers, parents, and 
scores of other relatives during the Srebrenica genocide, described her disappointments in 
the ICTY at some length when we interviewed her in July 2009.150 Yet she concluded our 
interview this way:
My opinion is that it is good that the Hague Tribunal was established and that the Hague 
Tribunal exists simply because of the point that if the court was not established, no 
instance would be able to issue … verdicts in the case of these crimes.151
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We found this view to be nearly universal among those we interviewed. Almost all of 
our Bosnian interlocutors believe, in the words of Sinan Alic´, that “it was absolutely neces-
sary to establish the ICTY,”152 however imperfect its performance. For if the crimes Bosnians 
endured demanded justice, the “only possibility”153 for justice during and in the aftermath of 
the inter-ethnic violence that consumed Bosnia was through “a neutral, impartial institution”154 
like the ICTY.155
B. Prevention: No One Is above the Law
Simply, it’s a message for people that crime will never be accepted… There is a strong mes-
sage to society that there is not anybody who committed a crime who can stay untouched, 
unpunished.156
If doing justice was itself a key rationale for creating the ICTY, another—and perhaps the 
most important for the Security Council—was its conviction that the Tribunal would help “put 
an end” to the “widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” then 
underway in Bosnia and contribute to ensuring that they “are halted.”157 As noted already, ICTY 
judgments routinely cite deterrence, along with retribution, as two key aims that should guide 
judges’ determination of sentences. As then ICTY President Antonio Cassese noted in his 
first report to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, “[o]ne of the main aims” of the 
Security Council when it established the Tribunal “was to establish a judicial process capable 
of dissuading the parties to the conflict from perpetrating further crimes.”158 “In short,” he 
wrote, “the Tribunal is intended to act as a powerful deterrent to all parties against continued 
participation in inhuman acts.”159
The July 1995 slaughter of well over 7,000 Muslims in Srebrenica is haunting testa-
ment that the Tribunal’s creation did not put an end to atrocities. Nura Begovic´, a leader of the 
organization Women of Srebrenica, holds the ICTY responsible, noting that it was established 
two years “before this tragedy occurred” in Srebrenica. “This court should have been active 
even in this period,” she insists, noting that the July 1995 genocide did not come suddenly but 
was instead the culmination of a siege that had lasted three years.160 ICTY prosecutors should 
have pressed charges sooner, she insists. But “they didn’t do it.”161 Nor did the ICTY prevent 
Serbia from committing serious violations of humanitarian law in Kosovo—abuses that led 
NATO forces to intervene in 1999.
That atrocious crimes occurred after the ICTY was established does not close the book, 
as some have suggested,162 on the question of whether international tribunals can exert a 
deterrent impact or even whether the ICTY has deterred some crimes that would have been 
committed but for its operation. The ICTY was still in its institutional infancy when the July 
1995 massacre took place in Srebrenica. The prosecutor had by then indicted only fourteen 
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suspects, all in the eight months before July 1995, and had managed to secure custody of 
only one.163 Perhaps even more significantly, the sole defendant in ICTY custody at the time 
of the Srebrenica massacre had been transferred from Germany, leaving intact the impunity 
indictees still enjoyed in the Balkans.164
The situation had improved, but not nearly enough, by the time abuses in Kosovo inten-
sified in 1998–99. In the ICTY’s annual report to the Security Council in 1997, then President 
Cassese noted that the Tribunal’s mandate of “putting an end” to international crimes “has not 
yet been properly fulfilled because the vast majority of persons indicted by the Tribunal are still 
at liberty, ignoring their indictments with seeming impunity.”165 Two years later, the Tribunal’s 
annual report, which covered the period in which abuses in Kosovo reached their zenith, noted 
that 35 of the Tribunal’s publicly indicted suspects were still at large;166 these included Ratko 
Mladic´ and Radovan Karadžic´, by then twice indicted on genocide and other charges.
Despite the crimes that were not prevented by the mere fact of the ICTY’s existence, 
many of our Bosnian interlocutors believe the Tribunal has prevented some crimes and that 
its operation over time has served to prevent future crimes. While acknowledging that perpe-
trators, “thinking they were untouchable,” were not deterred simply by the ICTY’s creation, 
Professor Smail Cˇekic´ added: “They thought the court would never become what it actually 
has become.”167 Even Begovic´ (who, as noted earlier, faults the ICTY for failing to prevent 
the Srebrenica genocide) believes that, as a result of the Tribunal’s existence, “some of those 
criminals were a bit afraid.” Despite her frustrations with the ICTY, therefore, she believes “it’s 
good to have the Hague Tribunal in existence.”168 In a similar vein, Keraterm camp survivor 
Edin Ramulic´ said that as long as the ICTY was still investigating new cases, unindicted war 
criminals in Prijedor “were a little bit afraid of the ICTY.”169 
Emsuda Mujagic´, who leads a non-governmental organization in Kozarac, places par-
ticular hope in the long-awaited trials of two men whom Bosniak victims consider most 
responsible for their suffering. As the trial of Radovan Karadžic´ approached, she told us that 
his trial and “I hope [that of Ratko] Mladic´ … means that even in the future, others would be 
thinking twice before committing such crimes.”170 Dino Djipa believes the ICTY has already 
had such an effect. In his view, “the most useful” impact of the ICTY is that it has helped make 
“people … aware that war crimes are wrong” and, in consequence, “in the event of a future 
war, everyone would be so careful about not committing war crimes because of the work of 
the ICTY.”171 ICTY judges, too, hope the Tribunal’s achievements will have a deterrent impact 
beyond its own writ, “the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”172 Addressing the question of gen-
eral deterrence, ICTY Judge Wolfgang Schomburg told us he is “convinced that in the future” 
potential perpetrators will be deterred from committing atrocities as a result of the work of 
contemporary international tribunals. Noting that the leaders who instigate campaigns of 
atrocity include “highly intelligent people,” he believes that “when confronted with ... whether 
to commit crimes, they will see a real risk of being convicted, being brought to prison.”173 
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Branko Todorovic´, who heads the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Republika 
Srpska, believes that “the best thing the Tribunal in The Hague has done is not related to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina only or to Kosovo or Rwanda. It has to do with the world as such and the 
message is clear: ‘Think before you commit a crime. You could certainly be held responsible 
for what you did.’”174 Todorovic´ is convinced that, despite the crimes that were not deterred, 
if the ICTY had not been created “some very bad crimes would have been committed” in the 
region.175
Establishing that the ICTY has helped deter crimes that might have been committed but 
for its prosecutions is of course inherently difficult, if not impossible. As noted, for that reason 
we do not separately address how well the Tribunal has succeeded in deterring war crimes. Yet 
in one respect the ICTY has made an unambiguously important contribution to the broader 
framework of prevention: As we discuss at some length in Chapter VI, the Tribunal helped 
launch a war crimes chamber within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through its work, 
Bosnia has developed an increasingly effective capacity to prosecute war crimes itself. Reflect-
ing on this chamber as well as on war crimes prosecutions in Serbia and Croatia, Bosnian 
lawyer Edina Rešidovic´ observes: “And all of this for sure would not have happened without 
the influence of the ICTY.”176
C. Restoring and Maintaining Peace
The third and legally necessary justification cited by the Security Council for establishing the 
ICTY was its conviction that the Tribunal’s establishment and the prosecution of those respon-
sible for atrocities then underway “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.”177 Historian Smail Cˇekic´ recalled that when the Tribunal was created, many Bosnians’ 
“expectation was … that the aggressor states … will stop or at least reduce their aggression-
related activities simply for the fact that they are now aware of such a UN-organized inter-
national tribunal.”178 But perhaps in part because Bosnia remained a cauldron of conflict for 
another two and a half years after this resolution was adopted, few other Bosnians interviewed 
for this study even recalled having set much store in the notion that the Tribunal would help 
end the war.
Damir Arnaut, now a government official in the party of Haris Silajžic´, recalled that 
while the government of Bosnia “was very much in favor of the Tribunal,” its establishment 
“was not on the top of [its] agenda” in 1993. Its top priority instead was “lifting the siege of 
Sarajevo.” Some were concerned, in fact, that establishing the Tribunal “was a way to skirt the 
issue” of ending the siege.179 Looking back on what transpired in the years after the ICTY was 
established, Emir Suljagic´ says that one of the lessons to be learned from the ICTY experience 
is “let us finish our wars…. Do not start wars and pretend that a tribunal can actually do what 
a just end to war would actually do.” Suljagic´ went on to say he believes that “tribunals are 
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good, generally speaking, but they are only good after you have militarily defeated the ideology 
behind the crimes that you want to prosecute or judge in those tribunals.”180
There may be another reason why Bosniaks in particular do not set store in the “justice 
for peace” rationale set forth in the Security Council resolution creating the ICTY. Despite the 
Council’s professed belief that the ICTY would help restore and maintain peace in Bosnia, 
states acted on much the opposite premise during the early years of the ICTY. Of particular 
relevance to Bosniaks’ perceptions of the ICTY’s achievements, NATO forces operating in 
Bosnia in the early postwar years went out of their way to avoid arresting two masterminds of 
“ethnic cleansing”—Ratko Mladic´ and Radovan Karadžic´—believing that their arrest could be 
destabilizing.181 This, as we note in Chapter IV, is widely seen as one of the greatest failures 
of the international community associated with the ICTY’s work, and one that many believe 
has significantly diminished its impact.
D. Reconciliation
The word “reconciliation” is not used in the Security Council resolution establishing the 
ICTY,182 nor is it included in the goals of the Tribunal set forth on its own Web site.183 Even 
so, many have assumed that the Security Council’s determination that creating the ICTY 
would contribute to peace includes the notion of reconciliation—a view that has at times been 
reflected in ICTY judgments184 and reports.185 Senior ICTY officials have repeatedly empha-
sized a notion they consider central to the Tribunal’s mission (though not a concern of judges 
when performing their work)—that by prosecuting individuals one by one, the Tribunal would 
avoid the taint of collective responsibility that might fuel future conflicts. Then ICTY President 
Cassese made the point this way in his first report to the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council:
Far from being a vehicle for revenge, [the ICTY] is a tool for promoting reconciliation 
and restoring true peace. If responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the for-
mer Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups 
will be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal. In other words, 
“collective responsibility”—a primitive and archaic concept—will gain the upper hand; 
eventually whole groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, 
the wanton destruction of cities and villages. The history of the region clearly shows 
that clinging to feelings of “collective responsibility” easily degenerates into resentment, 
hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further violence and new crimes.
…Thus the establishment of the Tribunal should undoubtedly be regarded as a mea-
sure designed to promote peace by meting out justice in a manner conducive to the 
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full establishment of healthy and cooperative relations among the various national and 
ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.
Many of our Bosnian interlocutors addressed the Tribunal’s impact on reconciliation 
when asked to assess its performance and achievements against original expectations. As we 
explain below, we found a wide range of views among them about whether it is appropriate 
even to expect a criminal court to contribute to reconciliation; what reconciliation means in 
this context; and what else must happen, including the passage of time, to see the fruits of 
the ICTY’s work in terms of its impact on reconciliation among Bosnia’s ethnic communities. 
At the time of our last set of interviews in July 2009 in particular, nationalist rhetoric 
among Bosnian political elites was on the rise and Bosnia was veering toward constitutional 
crisis.186 As with other issues of public concern, reactions to verdicts from The Hague divided 
along ethnic lines. In this setting, some of our interlocutors believe that Bosnia’s ethnically 
fractured polity defies any plausible claim that the ICTY has contributed to reconciliation—or 
ever could. 
Saying that “one of the key ideas about setting up this court was exactly reconciliation,” 
Dani editor Ivan Lovrenovic´ continued: “So far it has proved to be the case that the court 
has achieved exactly the opposite.”187 With all three major ethnic groups in Bosnia unable 
or unwilling “to face [their] own crimes or victims,” each views the ICTY through an ethnic 
prism, which Lovrenovic´ evokes this way: “It’s good when it prosecutes war crimes from the 
other ethnic groups and it’s bad when it reaches a verdict from our ethnic group. This is, 
roughly speaking, where the complete perceptions of The Hague is exhausted.”188 Lovrenovic´’s 
assessment echoed that of another prominent journalist, Gojko Beric´. He, too, recalled that 
one of the Tribunal’s “objectives was to establish reconciliation among people.” But, Beric´ con-
tinued, once Tribunal officials realized how ICTY verdicts were being reflected among Bosnian 
people, “the Tribunal gave up that very objective silently … So they retreated before reality.”189 
Others, like Nerma Jelacˇic´, caution that “It was always wrong to expect the Tribunal to have 
a direct impact in reconciliation. Its work,” she continued, “is only one of many things that 
have to happen.”190 Law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ has a somewhat different emphasis. She 
believes that “justice is of course necessary to create good inter-ethnic relations and stability in 
the region”191 after the type of atrocities that Bosnians endured at the hands of their neighbors, 
even if the task of social repair has barely begin. While this does not mean that reconciliation 
follows justice inexorably or easily, it means that without justice it will be impossible to recon-
stitute the civic bonds between ethnic groups that have been violently torn apart. 
Professor Bakšic´ Muftic´ recalls Yugoslavia’s postwar experience, when ethnic violence 
committed during World War II “was minimized and put under the carpet.” Without a seri-
ous process of national reckoning, “a double history” developed. Official textbooks omitted 
discussion of wartime atrocities, which then became part of a “secret history” within families. 
Those who lost loved ones at the hands of ethnic slaughter endured a “double trauma—that 
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it happened, and that you couldn’t talk about what happened.” The secret history that festered 
beneath the surface of the official history “completely opened up in the last conflict. All the 
people know what happened in the Second World War and there was sort of a revenge in the 
1990s war.”192
Focusing on the effects of the 1990s conflict itself, civil society leader Srd¯an Dizdarevic´ 
made an impassioned case for justice as “the key pillar of reconciliation” in Bosnia. Whatever 
the reasons for the 1990s conflict, Dizdarevic´ continued, it created “hatred” and “disturbed 
the traditional, existing relationships” among Bosnia’s ethnic groups. In this setting, he said, 
“justice will bring a part of the solution.” Although other mechanisms are also needed to 
“rebuild trust,” he believes, “justice is the starting point, the basic point.”193
Several individuals articulated a conception of the ICTY’s contribution to reconciliation 
in which its verdicts help reconstitute the basic values that unite a diverse society and make 
it possible to live together after members of one group have sought to destroy members of 
another. We interviewed Tarik Jusic´ one week after Stanislav Galic´ received a sentence of life 
in prison for commanding the siege of Sarajevo from September 1992 to August 1994.194 
Reflecting on the significance of the sentence, Jusic´ told us: “It’s very important for me. … It 
re-establishes the basic preconditions for society as such. It cannot be that someone bombs 
you for four years and it’s fine. … It’s a re-establishing of basic, underlying values of civiliza-
tion and society.”195 One of the underlying values Jusic´ considers important is a commitment 
to the notion of individualized crimes. Echoing the ICTY’s oft-repeated approach, he said: “It’s 
really essential that the guilt is individual,” he says. “They [i.e., members of an ethnic group] 
didn’t all commit these crimes.”196
Although Sevima Sali-Terzic´ wonders whether the international community has placed 
more importance on reconciliation than on the fundamental goal of bringing war criminals to 
justice, she offered a definition of reconciliation that captures a point of deep importance for 
many Bosnian victims, which we address further in the section that follows. Noting that people 
have different conceptions of the term, Sali-Terzic´ said the “best meaning” of reconciliation 
is “we have to know what happened and we have to reconcile with that.”197 She continued:
People here have different understandings of the same facts and all are blaming others. 
And the real thing is to know what your people did and to reconcile with that. And then 
you can live with each other. A lot of Serbs do not accept [that Serbs committed genocide 
in] Srebrenica. Unless you accept that, you cannot reconcile with the past in order to live 
with your neighbors. For example, people here [i.e., Bosniaks] do not accept that Serbs 
were killed in Srebrenica. … The point is that I understand that somebody allegedly in 
my name killed people and I say ‘I don’t like this, and they should be punished.’ Only 
then can there be reconciliation. 
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Sali-Teržic´ believes that justice is needed for reconciliation, and continues: “If you just 
push it under the carpet it will grow and be a real problem.”198
E. The Truth 
People can always say it didn’t happen but now there are documents.199
We still had the hope that establishing this court will help to reveal the truth so that justice 
will be reached.200
Apart from “justice for its own sake,” the theme that emerged most often as Bosnians described 
what they consider important about the Tribunal’s work is that it can establish “the truth.” 
At the broadest level, Bosniaks attach considerable value to the Tribunal’s ability to establish 
through the rigors of an impartial judicial process the fundamental facts of what was done to 
them, who was responsible, and the nature of the crimes committed. 
While the rest of this section focuses on the broader truth that many count on the ICTY 
to establish, survivors often place special importance on a more personal truth. Those who 
have not yet learned the fate of loved ones hope that the work of the ICTY (and, now, of the 
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber) can help answer questions that consume them: What hap-
pened to their sons, husbands, brothers, parents? Where are their relatives’ bodies buried? For 
some, the ICTY holds the promise of answering a fundamentally different but also haunting 
question: Why did their lifelong neighbors turn against them, hunting them down like ani-
mals? And for victims who testify before the ICTY, its trials can offer the “chance to tell their 
personal history and to have it officially recognized.”201
F. “The Hague Has Made It Harder To Deny 
Abuses”202
The most salient quality of prevailing Serb responses to massive and systemic atrocities com-
mitted by Serbs against other ethnic groups has been denial or distortion of the truth about 
past crimes:203 They argue that what Serbs did was a “gesture of revenge”204 for what Muslims 
had already done to Serbs, and that it takes at least “two sides to fight.”205
In the Justice Initiative’s 2008 report on the ICTY’s impact in Serbia, we noted that one 
of the foremost reasons cited by the Serbians citizens who support the ICTY on principled 
rather than pragmatic grounds is that they hope the Tribunal’s judgments can help dispel their 
society’s pervasive denial of the nature and extent of wartime offenses committed by Serbs and 
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of the role of Serbian institutions in backing atrocities perpetrated in large part by Bosnian 
and Croatian Serb forces and that, having acknowledged the truth, members of Serbian society 
will condemn criminal actions by Serbian officials committed in their name.206 As discussed 
further in Chapter V, there have been recent indications of limited progress in this regard 
(alongside several notable instances of enduring denial). Similar considerations loom large for 
Bosnian Serbs who support the ICTY’s work, some of whom have worked tirelessly to educate 
other Bosnian Serbs about the facts confirmed in ICTY judgments. But for Bosniak victims in 
particular, the ICTY’s role in piercing denial is a matter of justice. 
For many, Bosnian Serbs’ acceptance of and expressed remorse about the truth is an 
essential condition of social repair. Edin Ramulic´, who survived internment in Keraterm but 
whose brother did not, says that for him, reconciliation means “above all” that the Serbs who 
were responsible for these abominations “admit what was committed.”207 Kada Hotic´, whose 
husband and brother were among those murdered in Srebrenica,208 recalls that “when the 
Hague Tribunal was established it gave us a big hope, not only to convict criminals…but 
we expected to have the truth in this country revealed and proved, because we have a big 
problem here regarding acknowledgement of the truth.”209 But in the absence of such acknowl-
edgment, many Bosniaks believe it matters enormously that the ICTY has at least produced 
“the evidence and proof that will someday make [Bosnian Serbs] understand they lied to 
themselves.”210
While the importance of Serbs’ acknowledgement of atrocities committed by Serbs 
loomed large in our interviews, Bosnian intellectuals also pointed to the importance of Bosniak 
and Croat acknowledgement of crimes committed by members of their own ethnic groups as 
an important benchmark of the success of the ICTY’s work. As one person pointed out, just as 
many Serbs have been unwilling to acknowledge the extent and nature of crimes committed 
by Serbs, many Bosniaks have been unwilling to condemn abuses committed by the Bosnian 
Army against Serbs and Croats, concerned that “this could be seen as equalizing guilt.”211 
Implicitly, then, these individuals measure the Tribunal’s accomplishments in part by the 
degree to which each ethnic group in Bosnia is able to acknowledge and condemn atrocities 
committed by members of its own group.
A number of our Bosnian interlocutors recognized that there is some measure of ten-
sion between the importance they attach to this type of acknowledgment and another principle 
they associate with the ICTY, which they also consider important. Across ethnic lines our inter-
locutors in Bosnia expressed support for the proposition that criminal guilt is individual—a 
point that ICTY officials have been at pains to emphasize from the outset of the Tribunal’s 
work. To suggest that Serbs should acknowledge the guilt of Serb defendants, a number of 
our interlocutors noted, may reinforce the all-too-prevalent ethnicization of Bosnian discourse 
about war crimes. Yet many who made this point also stressed the importance they attach to 
the goal of widespread acknowledgment within each ethnic group that members of their group 
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committed war crimes, a notion that implies a form of collective responsibility—what Karl 
Jaspers called “political guilt.”212 
For example, Dobrila Govedarica noted the importance of transcending the perspective, 
which still prevails in the former Yugoslavia, of viewing war crimes in ethnic terms. Instead, 
she said, “individualizing guilt is important” and it is important to “think of war crimes as 
something that should not be done against anybody.” Even so, she said, while “someone who 
belongs to an ethnic group should not be stigmatized” because of the guilt of others, 
It was not just individuals who were responsible by directly perpetrating crimes—there 
were witnesses who were silent. They weren’t accomplices but they were silent. Some 
who opposed crimes committed by members of their ethnic group were punished, but 
how come they’re still silent? … It was impossible not to see that your neighbor was tor-
tured just because he belonged to an ethnic group. So you shouldn’t stigmatize an entire 
group but maybe there should be an acceptance of political responsibility. … These indi-
viduals didn’t come from nowhere. There had to be either an overall political/societal 
climate that supported such acts or there had not been awareness that it was wrong.213
G. Affirming Core Values of International Law
As noted earlier, international lawyers and others have long recognized the ICTY’s rich con-
tributions to international humanitarian law. Many Bosniaks, too, value these contributions. 
Not surprisingly, this theme was especially likely to arise during our interviews with Bosniak 
intellectuals.
For example, law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ said that among the reasons why the 
ICTY’s work is important, its judgments have “confirmed minimum” standards, set forth in 
treaties like the 1949 Geneva Conventions on armed conflict and the 1948 Genocide Conven-
tion, whose breach may result in prosecution even of senior officials like former Yugoslav 
president Slobodan Miloševic´. Among the Tribunal’s signal achievements, she believes, is its 
explicit recognition of crimes of sexual violence. As we elaborate somewhat in Chapter IV, 
Professor Bakšic´ Muftic´ believes that the attention the ICTY has paid to this issue “has created 
a new kind of awareness that women had been used” as a means of warfare. In consequence, 
“they became visible, personalized, recognized as one kind of victim.”214 This recognition has 
significance far beyond the regions and the crimes committed in Bosnia; it has helped gener-
ate awareness globally that various forms of sexual violence may constitute war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and instruments of genocide. 
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H. Removing Dangerous People
Although our Bosnian interlocutors did not identify incapacitation and/or removal of danger-
ous individuals as a goal they hoped the ICTY would achieve, many implied as much. As we 
discuss in Chapter IV, a common criticism of the ICTY is that it left people who were responsi-
ble for harrowing crimes in positions of influence. Conversely, in at least one notable instance, 
the removal of individuals indicted by the ICTY was seen as a contributing factor behind 
individuals’ willingness to return to homes from which they had been “ethnically cleansed.”215
Another recent study of Bosnian views found that criticisms of the Tribunal on the 
ground that it had failed to bring about the removal of war criminals were especially likely to 
be voiced by those “who had particularly suffered.” The author of this study writes that these 
individuals had expected the ICTY “to severely punish all war criminals with harsh prison 
sentences and to have a significant impact at the level of their communities; they had expected 
to be able to go about their daily lives without encountering people whom they claim are guilty 
of war crimes.”216
I. Spurring the Creation of a Domestic War Crimes 
Chamber
At the time the ICTY was created, no one conceived of it as an institution whose core aims 
would include strengthening local capacity to prosecute war crimes trials. As we note in Chap-
ter VI, the very creation of the Tribunal “inevitably represented a judgment by the international 
community that local courts in the Balkans were largely unable to mount credible prosecu-
tions of wartime atrocities,” and for years efforts to secure justice focused almost entirely on 
the ICTY.
Yet developing a strong domestic partner in the project of establishing criminal account-
ability for wartime atrocities later became a key goal of the ICTY.217 In partnership with the 
Office of the High Representative, the ICTY played a major role in planning for a specialized 
war crimes chamber in the new Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in 2005. Against 
this backdrop, even though Bosnians did not initially look to the ICTY to help enhance their 
domestic capacity to prosecute war crimes, today its contribution in this regard is widely cited 
as one of the Tribunal’s “major achievements.”218 
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J.  “Justice Isn’t Just in Legal Terms”219
As we turn now to a fuller assessment of how well the ICTY has met victims’ expectations and 
why, it is important to bear in mind the broader context in which the Tribunal is perceived. 
While many in Bosnia consider the ICTY’s mission to be profoundly important, criminal jus-
tice is hardly the sole concern of Bosnian victims; for many, it is not even the most important.
Many Bosnians who lost loved ones during the war want above all to identify the 
remains of loved ones and provide a proper burial; to the extent possible, many also want 
to learn what happened to their relatives during their final weeks, days, and hours.220 Some, 
including individuals who believe the work of the ICTY to be of utmost importance, have 
devoted themselves to reversing the effects of “ethnic cleansing,” encouraging other Muslims 
to return to their prewar homes and trying to counter laws that discriminate against members 
of their ethnic group.221 According to the most recent assessment by the European Commis-
sion of Bosnia’s progress toward E.U. membership, “returnees still face discrimination in 
employment, access to health care, education, pensions and social rights—especially when 
returning to areas where they are in a minority position. This remains the biggest obstacle to 
a sustainable return.”222 
In short, victims and survivors in Bosnia have a raft of needs that are not the province of 
the ICTY (though many looked to the ICTY itself to address them). While Bosnians’ experience 
of the ICTY is the subject of this study, our focus on this topic should not be read to imply that 
this is the sole, or even the most urgently important, issue for Bosnians.223 
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IV. Achievements, Failures, and 
Performance
People do not have a bad opinion of the ICTY here. They have some bad opinions of what 
they have done.224
My complaints are all about the methods of work, but this is not the essence.225
As far as the Hague Tribunal, I’m not happy with its work. But the great thing was to have 
it established. It was excellent that it was established.226
[A]ll of us would have expected to see much more.227
 
When the ICTY was created, many victims in Bosnia had “great, great expectations of interna-
tional justice.”228 Seventeen years later, Bosnians’ expectations are only “partially” fulfilled.229 
As civil society activist Dobrila Govedarica noted, Bosnians generally recognize “some posi-
tive developments” as a result of the ICTY’s work, “but all of us would have expected to see 
much more.”230
The degree to which Bosnians interviewed for this study believe that the ICTY has 
achieved its goals ranges widely. At one end of the spectrum are Tribunal supporters like 
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Vehid Šehic´, who believes the ICTY has “absolutely” achieved what he hoped it would within 
the limits of its judicial role,231 and Mirsad Tokacˇa, who says he is “80 percent satisfied” with 
what the ICTY has achieved.232 At the other end are citizens like Fadil Budnjo, who says that so 
many years after the ICTY was established, “very little is left of what we could have expected.”233 
Like others who described their disappointed hopes, however, Budnjo added: “All in all, we 
still believe it was positive to have it established.”234 
In this chapter, we assess the extent to which Bosnians perceive the ICTY as having 
achieved many of the goals identified in the previous chapter. We separately address (in Chap-
ter V) the degree to which the ICTY’s judgments have contributed to acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing by members of each of Bosnia’s ethnic communities. We also separately address 
the ICTY’s role in contributing to Bosnian capacity to prosecute war crimes.235 
To the extent possible, we have tried to link reported perceptions of ICTY successes, 
partial successes, and failures to specific aspects of the Tribunal’s performance. In doing so, 
we do not mean to imply that the ICTY was invariably at fault in the manner suggested by our 
Bosnian interlocutors. In some instances, we describe widespread perceptions that the ICTY 
has erred even when the source of concern may involve actions that lie beyond the control 
of an international court or that are compelled by international standards of fair process. We 
nonetheless believe that it is helpful for those involved in making policy determinations bear-
ing on international justice—whether prosecutors, judges, or the diplomatic community—to 
understand how the actions of a tribunal like the ICTY are perceived by populations most 
affected by its work. If nothing else, this may usefully shape public outreach efforts of inter-
national courts.
A. Ethnic Fault Lines
As we have suggested elsewhere in this report, many Bosnians continue to embody the mul-
tiethnic society for which Bosnia was known before the 1990s conflict, in which bonds of 
affinity were neither determined by nor defined in terms of ethnicity. In our interviews in 
Bosnia, particularly in Sarajevo, we would be hard-pressed to surmise many of our interlocu-
tors’ ethnic identity from their observations about the ICTY. Thus any general claims about 
different perceptions of the ICTY among Bosnia’s ethnic groups would be overgeneralizations 
if not appropriately qualified.
Yet for many Bosnians, overall perceptions of the ICTY are at least in significant part 
a function of the ethnic group to which they belong.236 In a 2006 interview, Bosnian lawyer 
Dubravka Piotrovski characterized the perceptions of the country’s three major ethnic groups 
regarding the work of the ICTY this way: “It seems that Bosniaks are more or less satisfied, 
Croats somewhat, and Serbs not at all.”237 While others might characterize the degree of each 
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group’s satisfaction somewhat differently, Piotrovski’s observation captures in broad brush the 
fundamentally different overall assessment of each group’s members.
With one exception noted below, various surveys of public attitudes toward the ICTY 
have found that Bosniaks have the most positive attitude toward the Tribunal, Serbs have the 
most negative views of the ICTY, and Croats are somewhere between these two. Broadly speak-
ing, positive attitudes toward the ICTY have tended to correlate with the degree to which the 
ICTY has prosecuted perpetrators who committed atrocities against members of the survey 
respondents’ own ethnic communities and to correlate negatively with the degree to which 
suspects prosecuted by the ICTY come from respondents’ ethnic group.238
The largest majority of perpetrators indicted by the ICTY (roughly two-thirds) are eth-
nically Serb, and residents of the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS) have the lowest 
regard for the Tribunal in Bosnia.239 A 2002 survey found that 3.6 percent of those surveyed in 
Republika Srpska trusted the ICTY,240 while 50.5 percent of those surveyed in the Federation 
trusted the Tribunal.241 When results within RS are broken down by ethnicity, the relevance 
of this factor to the survey results is even more dramatic: 1.8 percent of the RS respondents 
who identified themselves as Serb said they trusted the ICTY; 42.2 percent of RS respondents 
who identified themselves as “other” (non-Serb) said they trusted the Tribunal. Within the 
Federation, there was significantly higher trust in the ICTY among respondents who identi-
fied themselves as Muslim (70.2 percent) than those who identified themselves as Croat (14.4 
percent).242
Surveys undertaken by PRISM Research every several months from April 2001 to May 
2004 show a significantly different breakdown when the survey question is “To what degree 
do you support the work of the ICTY?,” but the ethnic division remains clear: Over a period 
from April 2001 to May 2004, the percentage of Serbs who said they support the Tribunal’s 
work ranged from 17.60 percent to 32.90 percent; the percentage of Bosniaks who said they 
support its work ranged from 89.10 percent to 92.50 percent; while the percentage of Croats 
who said they support the Tribunal’s work ranged from 47.80 percent to 68.70 percent.243
One survey, which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) commis-
sioned in 2005, produced a somewhat different picture: While it, too, found that the percent-
age of respondents who had a positive attitude toward the ICTY was significantly higher in the 
Federation than in RS, a higher percentage of Croat respondents (31.9 percent) than Bosniak 
respondents (24 percent) said they thought the ICTY “has done a good job and justified its 
existence.” As usual, Serb respondents came in lowest, with 18.8 percent responding affirma-
tively.244 A different pattern of responses emerged when the question asked was whether the 
ICTY has “not done a good job, but is necessary.” On this, 46.4 percent of Bosniak respon-
dents, 22.2 percent of Croat respondents, and 29.8 percent of Serb respondents responded 
affirmatively.245 The disparity between Bosniaks’ responses to these two questions may suggest 
that many Bosniaks still see the ICTY as necessary in principle but are growing increasingly 
disappointed in its performance.
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Because our own research did not include a statistical survey of public attitudes, we are 
not in a position to draw broad conclusions about public attitudes toward the ICTY. But our 
general impression, which is consistent with the overall thrust of most of the surveys others 
have undertaken, is that many Bosniaks have a fundamental commitment to the ICTY in prin-
ciple but are disappointed in many aspects of its performance, often deeply so, and apparently 
increasingly so.246 Because the largest portion of ICTY cases has involved crimes committed 
against Bosniak victims, their views figure prominently in our assessment of the degree to 
which Bosnians more broadly are satisfied in the justice provided by the Hague Tribunal.
We believe the perspectives of many Serbs to be more difficult to characterize than sur-
vey results alone suggest. In our interviews with Serbs who lost relatives at the hands of mem-
bers of other ethnic groups, we heard of their own keen desire for justice. Dušanka Lalovic´ 
echoed the words of many of our interviewees when she said she is “absolutely trying to get 
justice” for crimes committed against her relatives and that “the Hague Tribunal should try our 
case too.”247 Yet there is a broader perception among Serbs in Republika Srpska, in Piotrovski’s 
words, “that the ICTY was organized more or less for them.”248 We heard this view often in our 
interviews with Serbs in RS. For example Lalovic´’s colleague, Josip Davidovic´, told us: “We … 
stand on the position that The Hague [Tribunal] was established to bring Serbs before trial…. 
We also stand on the opinion that The Hague is a political court.”249 In a setting in which this 
position is widely espoused by political leaders and media in Republika Srpska,250 it is possible 
that many individual Serbs are somewhat conflicted, on the one hand wanting their suffering, 
too, to be recognized by the ICTY but on the other hand wanting (and under social pressure) to 
ensure that they do not contribute to the Tribunal’s legitimization. As we describe in Chapter 
VI, moreover, even in RS it is commonplace to hear people say that war criminals should be 
prosecuted and that establishing the ICTY was correct in principle.
After several visits to Bosnia, we find it difficult to characterize prevailing attitudes 
toward the ICTY among the country’s Croats even in impressionistic terms. We have inter-
viewed Croats like Srec´ko Miškovic´, who told us that his “personal opinion” is “we simply don’t 
trust the Hague Tribunal.”251 And we have met others, like Josip Drežnjak and Drago Zadro, 
who, while deeply disappointed in the outcome of a particular case in the ICTY, nonetheless 
placed their hopes in the Tribunal to render justice.252 Dino Djipa, whose organization PRISM 
Research undertakes public opinion polls, provided his own insights about what lies behind 
Bosnian Croats’ “in between” responses in various surveys about attitudes toward the ICTY. 
First describing Bosnian Croats as “indifferent,” Djipa speculated that their attitudes to the 
ICTY are a function of their position within Bosnia more generally and the sense of “political 
disorientation” many feel.253
We return in Chapter V to a fuller discussion of how prevailing views toward the ICTY 
within each ethnic group, influenced in large measure by political leaders and local media, 
shape individuals’ perceptions of the Tribunal. This chapter tries to capture perceptions of how 
well the ICTY has performed in terms of the criteria offered by those interviewed for this study.
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B. Sentences
We who survived these tortures believe that all of those convicted have gotten insignificant or 
small punishments.254
For most victims we interviewed in Bosnia, justice is not experienced as indivisible, some-
thing a trial either provides or does not. Instead, the ICTY’s guilty judgments provide some 
measure of justice, often experienced as flawed and sometimes deeply so, yet still preferable 
to no justice at all. Not surprisingly, victims of crimes that were prosecuted before the ICTY 
and resulted in judgments of acquittal were deeply disappointed in the outcome, though some 
said the fact that a suspect was made to answer charges against him provided a measure of 
satisfaction.255
Our research in Bosnia suggests that one of the most important factors affecting the 
quality of justice that victims experience is the sense that there should be a just proportion 
of the sentence imposed to the gravity of a perpetrator’s crime.256 Thus Sabahudin Garibovic´, 
who lost his brother to “ethnic cleansing,” believes that “anyone who for ethnic or religious 
purposes has killed or participated in killing … should be sentenced to life in prison without 
a possibility of release.”257 
By this measure, ICTY sentences have on the whole been cause for profound disap-
pointment and often anger. Mirsad Tokacˇa, who as noted earlier describes himself as “80 
percent satisfied” with the ICTY’s performance, cites “a lot of problems with sentencing” 
when asked to explain the other 20 percent (as noted below, however, this was not the sole 
concern he cited). In some instances, Tokacˇa says, sentences for unspeakable crimes have been 
“reduced to a level that is absurd” in recognition of defendants’ remorse and cooperation.258 
Dani editor Senad Pecˇanin, too, finds the ICTY’s “punishment criteria” to be “very doubt-
ful,” particularly when compared to local sentencing criteria in Bosnia. Pec´anin describes the 
ICTY’s approach to sentencing as “really senseless,” adding: “Here, you could get more years 
for killing someone in traffic” than the ICTY imposes for war crimes.259 (We note, however, 
that while dissatisfaction with ICTY sentences is widespread, they have often been longer 
than those pronounced by domestic courts in war crimes cases, although the Court of BiH 
has imposed several prison sentences of around 30 years.260)
In regions that experienced the worst ravages of ethnic cleansing, victims often describe 
ICTY sentencing practices with a mixture of incredulity and anger. Crimes in Focˇa, the eastern 
town that became notorious for “rape camps,” resulted in a legally path-breaking judgment 
in the Kunarac case.261 Yet Fadil Budnjo, who leads an association of survivors from the Focˇa 
region, is appalled by the quality of justice dispensed by the ICTY, characterizing the Tribunal’s 
sentences as “basically nothing.”262 The three men convicted in Kunarac for mass rapes in Focˇa 
received sentences of 12, 20, and 28 years in prison respectively; when the 15-year sentences 
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imposed on two other perpetrators convicted of crimes in Focˇa are included in the tally,263 the 
average sentence imposed against five of the men who shattered Budnjo’s universe is 18 years’ 
imprisonment. (We note that the figures differ only slightly from those reflecting the case law 
of the Court of BiH. As of February 2009, the war crimes chamber of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had convicted six individuals of crimes against humanity committed in Focˇa, four 
of them for sexual crimes; the average sentence was 17.5 years.264) 
A substantial number of defendants indicted by the ICTY were charged with atrocities 
committed in the northwest Bosnian municipality of Prijedor, where nondescript warehouses 
became nightmarish detention centers that evoked Nazi concentration camps.265 Despite the 
attention paid to Prijedor crimes, however, Keraterm camp survivor Edin Ramulic´ observed: 
“In Prijedor generally speaking people aren’t satisfied with Hague sentencing policy”266—and 
small wonder. Individuals found criminally responsibility for atrocities in the Omarska and 
Keraterm camps have received sentences as light as three,267 five,268 six,269 seven,270 and eight271 
years’ imprisonment. (While these sentences have provoked deep disappointment, we note 
that the ICTY has at times imposed more stringent penalties in connection with crimes com-
mitted in Omarska and Keraterm, including 25 years in prison for Zoran Žigic´, 20 years for 
Mlad¯o Radic´, and 15 years for Duško Sikirica.272) 
Even short sentences typically are not served in full. Under Article 28 of the ICTY’s 
Statute, the president of the Tribunal may grant early release to a convicted person when he 
or she becomes eligible under the law of the State where s/he is serving her/his sentence.273 
Reflecting the standard practice in Europe, where most ICTY defendants are serving their 
sentences, it has been “a consistent practice” of the ICTY to grant early release to defendants 
who have served two-thirds of their sentences,274 with the ICTY president regularly citing 
rehabilitation as a relevant consideration.275 Noting that most of the Prijedor defendants who 
received short sentences were soon released—all received credit for time served before they 
were sentenced, and most did not serve their full sentences—Edin Ramulic´ wonders, “What 
message do you think that sends here, to the local Serb community?”276 
While many Bosnians (as well as many international commentators) fault the Tribunal 
for imposing sentences that are not commensurate with the gravity of the crimes committed, 
short sentences have a more tangible impact on many survivors: Individuals who committed 
grotesque crimes against them have been released from prison and are now back in their com-
munities. The experience of Nusreta Sivac, who has testified before the ICTY in several cases, 
exemplifies this point. Sivac, who served as a judge in Prijedor when the conflict began, was 
one of 36 women who were detained in the Omarska camp. Every morning for two months, 
she began the day by counting the bodies of inmates killed during the night, “mostly of tor-
ture.”277 But “[t]he worst were the nights for women because the guards would come to the 
rooms and take us somewhere in the camp and rape. That happened on a regular basis.”278 In 
2002, Sivac returned to Prijedor to reclaim her apartment, which had been given to a former 
Serb colleague.279 One of her neighbors was Miroslav Kvocˇka—a defendant against whom 
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Sivac had testified in The Hague. Sentenced to serve seven years for his crimes, Kvocˇka was 
granted early release in March 2005. Until Kvocˇka sold his apartment in 2008, Sivac encoun-
tered him almost daily. Recounting this, Fatima Fazlic´ said: “And that is only one example, 
and there are hundreds of those.”280
The intensity of victims’ dissatisfaction with ICTY sentences varies, but all whom we 
interviewed in the municipality of Prijedor were disappointed. Recalling that “Bosnians had 
big hopes, major expectations from the fact that the Hague Tribunal was established,” Emsuda 
Mujagic´ says that “in a certain way, the victims feel to be even more offended and damaged 
very often by those sentences issued by the court in the Hague in relation to what they have 
originally expected from the Hague.”281 Muharem Murselovic´, a survivor of the Omarska con-
centration camp who has testified in several ICTY trials, describes the overall attitude of 
Muslims from Prijedor this way: “We had a very positive attitude towards those trials in The 
Hague, always very welcome. But we have always been disappointed with the sentences.”282 
Another Omarska survivor, Mirsad Duratovic´, does not have a “very positive attitude” about the 
justice dispensed in The Hague. Saying that individuals can be charged “for over 400 years” 
for committing murder in the United States, he finds sentences for mass murderers imposed 
by the ICTY painfully short.283
It has been said that victims of unspeakable crimes “are always dissatisfied” with sen-
tences imposed by a court. Nidžara Ahmetaševic´, who was wounded by Serb snipers early in 
the years-long siege of Sarajevo, tried to demonstrate the point by describing her own response 
when Stanislav Galic´ received the maximum ICTY sentence for his role commanding the 
siege: “I’m from Sarajevo, and I’m really disappointed with the life sentence for Galic´. You’re 
always unsatisfied.”284 (As noted below, however, many who lived through the siege were 
deeply gratified by the life sentence imposed on Galic´.) Hatidža Mehmedovic´, who lost her 
husband, brothers, teenage sons, parents, and scores of extended family members during the 
Srebrenica genocide, evinces a similar self-awareness when she describes survivors’ views of 
ICTY sentencing: “[W]e are … not happy with the sentences, with the verdicts, because what 
would be the verdict that would be convenient for a crime committed here in Srebrenica of 
which you have seen the consequences?”285 So, too, does Sead Golic´, who told us his brother 
was shot at close range and buried in a mass grave in Brcˇko. “No matter how strict or serious 
or high [a sentence] would be, no verdict would replace my brother or some other victim.”286 
Yet we found that many victims are discriminating in their assessment of ICTY sentences; 
those who condemned short sentences readily acknowledged their satisfaction when the ICTY 
imposed sentences that seemed commensurate with the defendant’s crimes. For example, 
while highly critical of the short sentences that sent some defendants back to Prijedor soon 
after judgment was pronounced, Edin Ramulic´ described a very different reaction when 
another Prijedor defendant, Milomir Stakic´, received a more substantial sentence. At trial, 
Stakic´ received a sentence of life in prison, and this “was very important for us symbolically,” 
Ramulic´ recalled. Although Stakic´’s sentence was reduced to 40 years on appeal, Ramulic´ had 
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feared it would be reduced to half that amount and was relieved and philosophical about the 
reduced sentence.287
Some of our interviews took place during the week that the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
raised the sentence of Stanislav Galic´, whom a trial chamber had sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment, to life in prison. The sentence was a milestone; this was the first time that a 
life sentence emerged following exhaustion of the appeals process at the ICTY. Many victims 
of the siege he had commanded were deeply gratified, and spontaneously expressed this dur-
ing conversations and more formal interviews.288 In their view, the sentence provided some 
measure of redemption for the terror that stalked them for three and a half years.289
We observed a similar reaction to another set of sentences handed down while we were 
in Bosnia: On July 20, 2009, Trial Chamber III sentenced Milan Lukic´ to life in prison and 
his cousin, Sredoje Lukic´, to 30 years’ imprisonment for their roles in horrific crimes commit-
ted in Višegrad.290 Although, as noted below, victims were disappointed that the case against 
these two did not include rape charges, many Bosnians nonetheless found their sentences to 
be appropriately severe.291
For many, the satisfaction that comes with verdicts of guilt partially offsets their disap-
pointment in the lengths of sentences. Sadik Trako, president of the Association of Victims 
and Missing Persons in Lašva Valley, recalled that he and others in Lašva Valley “were really 
pleased” when an ICTY Trial Chamber sentenced Tihomir Blaškic´ to 45 years in prison. But 
based on the combined effects of errors by the Trial Chamber and newly acquired evidence, 
the Appeals Chamber reduced Blaškic´’s sentence to nine years and immediately granted him 
early release.292 Trako recalled, “We were very sad” when this happened. But while he “could 
not accept” the court’s reasons for reducing Blaškic´’s sentence, Trako said he was “still very 
glad that the court pronounced him guilty” of war crimes.293 Law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muf-
tic´ made a similar point in general terms. Describing her reaction to ICTY sentences, Bakšic´ 
Muftic´ told us: “Though sometimes I am disappointed in [defendants’] punishment, I am 
glad to see their punishment, which is more important [than the sentence they receive]. This 
brings some sense of justice. In public, on TV, all of us can hear who did what. The whole 
story has been heard.”294 
Just as Bosniaks widely condemn ICTY sentences of Serb and Croat perpetrators on the 
ground that they are too lenient, many Serbs say that the sentences the ICTY has imposed on 
“Bosniaks are so small compared to [the penalty imposed on] Serbs,”295 and that in general, 
the Tribunal has been overly harsh in sentencing Serb defendants. Thus while Fadil Budnjo is 
frustrated by the low sentences imposed on Bosnian Serbs who ethnically cleansed Focˇa, Serbs 
there “say that the [same] sentences are too high,” according to Josip Davidovic´.296 
At times, even the Tribunal’s strong supporters have questioned its lenient sentencing 
of Bosniak defendants. In particular, many cite the case of Naser Oric´, a Bosniak commander 
initially sentenced to two years for war crimes committed against Serb detainees in Srebren-
ica and later acquitted on appeal,297 to illustrate what they consider the ICTY’s inconsistent 
THAT SOMEONE GUILTY  BE  PUNISHED   5 5
approach. On June 30, 2006, an ICTY Trial Chamber imposed the two-year sentence on 
Oric´,298 who was released immediately based on credit for time already served in detention. 
During interviews in Bosnia before Oric´’s subsequent acquittal on appeal, we heard repeatedly 
that the ICTY’s approach had undercut its standing across ethnic lines. Branko Todorovic´, a 
Bosnian Serb who has worked tirelessly to educate Bosnians, including other Serbs, about the 
ICTY’s judgments, found it hard to explain the Tribunal’s two-year sentence of Oric´: “There is 
no one here in Republika Srpska who is able to explain to a person here that the verdict in the 
Naser Oric´ case was justified. … [T]he type of verdict he got was almost icing on the cake for 
those who were claiming the worst things” about the ICTY, Todorovic´ observed.299
Dani editor Senad Pec´anin had a similar reaction. While highly critical of the ICTY for 
imposing, in his view, inappropriately short sentences on Serb defendants, Pec´anin thought 
the Tribunal’s two-year sentence for Oric´ unreasonably short. “It’s really funny, two years,” 
Pec´anin said. “He should be either [ found] innocent or seriously punished. For most people, 
that’s nothing, that’s no solution at all—a guy who was indicted for terrible crimes and then 
you have two years. What does it mean? … That decision in my view discredited the authority 
of the Tribunal.”300 
We heard similar complaints from Bosnian Croats. Fabijan Barac´, president of the 
Association for Tracking of Killed and Missing Croats of Central Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
said that Croats in central Bosnia “are generally very mad with the Hague Tribunal” and cited 
the short sentences imposed against the few Muslim defendants tried before the ICTY for 
crimes against Croats compared to harsher sentences imposed on Bosnian Croat defendants 
for crimes against Muslim victims.301 His colleague Srec´ko Miškovic´, who identified himself as 
the administrative secretary of War Veterans of Travnik, described the short sentences imposed 
against two Muslim defendants for crimes against Bosnian Croats as “shameful.”302
Our own review of sentencing patterns, taking into account only term sentences final-
ized by the Appeals Chamber or uncontested by defendants who pleaded guilty as of Sep-
tember 2009, found that sentences imposed by the ICTY against Bosniak defendants who 
were not acquitted have ranged from two to 18 years, and average 9.5 years’ imprisonment. 
Sentences imposed on Bosnian Serbs have ranged from three years to life, averaging 17.03 
years’ imprisonment.303 Bosnian Croats’ sentences have ranged from six to 25 years, averaging 
14.5 years.304 We have not undertaken an analysis of what factors have accounted for overall 
differences in sentence lengths but one study that assessed ICTY sentencing up to 2001 found 
that there was “no correlation between ethnicity and sentence length.”305 Instead, differences 
in sentence length were a function of factors such as the nature of the crime charged306 and 
the level of responsibility of the convicted defendant.307
For many victims, frustration with sentences is compounded by the length of the trial 
proceedings, a subject we address later in this chapter. Sevima Sali-Terzic´, senior legal counsel 
for the Constitutional Court of Bosnia, described a common perception: “People don’t under-
stand why you have people sitting in jail for years and then the sentences are too short.”308 
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Enumerating victims’ frustrations with the ICTY, Hatidža Mehmedovic´ singled out “the fact 
that those court proceedings, those trials are taking so long,” and then, come judgment day, 
“we are also not happy with the sentences.”309
Beyond concerns about inappropriately light sentences for serious crimes, many are 
highly critical of seeming inconsistency in ICTY sentences. Dobrila Govedarica makes the 
point this way: “You can’t say this person will get 45 years, the other 25 years [ for essen-
tially similar crimes]. … They applied really different sentences depending on Trial Chamber 
judges.” In her view, this is “about the law,” and “the law shouldn’t be a matter of free judg-
ment of judges. Not absolutely free.”310 Mirsad Tokacˇa makes the same point, noting that on 
the one hand Momcˇilo Krajišnik, a Bosnian Serb leader who bore substantial responsibility for 
the crimes of ethnic cleansing, was sentenced to only 20 years in prison while “some small 
fish” from “Krajina” was sentenced to 40 years in prison.311
In this, as with other concerns noted above, our Bosnian interlocutors’ perceptions are 
in line with those of many legal commentators who have studied ICTY sentencing practices. 
Commentators who have scrutinized the sentencing practices of the ICTY and its sister tribu-
nal for Rwanda describe them as “erratic,”312 and find “troubling disparities” among ICTY sen-
tences.313 (As noted earlier, however, a relatively early study did not find a correlation between 
a defendant’s ethnicity and the sentence imposed.)
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has acknowledged that “[o]ne of the fundamental elements 
in any rational and fair system of criminal justice is consistency in punishment.”314 But it has 
eschewed proposals by the prosecutor and others that it adopt “basic sentencing principles” 
aimed at ensuring sentencing consistency,315 in large part on the ground that such efforts 
would run counter to its duty to individualize penalties.316 Assessing this approach against 
the “lack of consistency” in the Tribunal’s sentencing, legal scholar Mark Drumbl concludes: 
“In the end, although individualizing the penalty certainly is desirable, the benefits thereof 
dissipate when there is no coherent framework in which to predictably consider the factors 
germane to, or the goals of, sentencing.”317 
There has been one striking exception to the ICTY’s general reluctance to adhere to a 
principle of consistency in sentencing practices. When making determinations about early 
release from prison, the ICTY president has often accorded substantial weight to the fact 
that early release has routinely been granted to other defendants.318 In the case of Biljana 
Plavšic´, for example, ICTY President Patrick Robinson apparently thought that the Tribunal’s 
routine practice of early release outweighed the gravity of the crimes for which the defendant 
was convicted. While acknowledging the “gravity of her crimes,” Judge Robinson wrote: 
“Considering that other convicted persons similarly-situated have been eligible for early 
release after serving two-thirds of their sentences, this factor supports her eligibility for early 
release.”319
As noted, this practice has compounded victims’ frustration, particularly when applied 
to a sentence that was already short. Beyond this, we note our own questions about whether 
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the ICTY undermines the principles it has emphasized as being primary considerations at the 
front end of sentencing, of which the two most important have been deterrence and retribu-
tion, when rehabilitation and consistency of practice become driving considerations at the back 
end of its sentencing practices.
 
C. Plea Agreements and Confessions
Beyond their general concern about ICTY sentences, many Bosnians expressed particular 
unease with steep reductions in sentences the Tribunal has sometimes accorded to defendants 
who pleaded guilty,320 as well as the reasons provided by ICTY trial chambers when sentencing 
confessed war criminals. Although these concerns are closely related to the broader concerns 
addressed in the preceding section, we believe this subject merits separate attention for several 
reasons. 
First, for many victims the fact that an admitted war criminal received a reduced sen-
tence by “bargaining” for a discount is itself distressing.321 Until about six years ago, criminal 
procedure codes used in Bosnia’s two entities did not provide for plea agreements,322 and the 
very notion of what Zdravko Grebo called a “legal bargain”323 sits uneasily with many Bosnians’ 
conceptions of justice (and, reportedly, among some lawyers from civil law systems within the 
ICTY itself).324 When one of the parties to a plea agreement is an acknowledged war criminal, 
the affront seems much worse. Srebrenica survivor Hajra Cˇatic´ expressed a sentiment we 
heard from a number of Bosnians this way: “In the case of some sentences, [the ICTY was] like 
bargaining as people do in marketplaces—‘admit some, we will forgive the rest.’”325 A survey 
of attitudes toward the ICTY among Sarajevans, taken several years ago, found that only six 
percent of respondents approved of the Tribunal’s use of plea bargaining.326
Second, regarding pleas that lead to substantially lower sentences than a war crimi-
nal would otherwise receive, the ICTY’s own understanding of its contributions to the Bal-
kan region can at times seem profoundly at odds with the way its sentencing judgments are 
perceived there. As we make clear below, the ICTY as well as some of its supporters have 
expressed the hope and at times the conviction that the confession associated with perpetra-
tors’ guilty pleas is itself a milestone on the path to reconciliation.327 To be sure, this is not the 
only reason why the ICTY has in recent years encouraged plea bargaining. Under pressure 
to complete its work, the Tribunal is spared the time and expense of a trial when a defendant 
pleads guilty.328 Given the cost and complexity of typical ICTY cases, the resulting savings is 
considerable. In addition, some defendants who have agreed to cooperate with the prosecutor 
as part of their plea agreements have provided “vital new evidence, as in the case of … two 
Bosnian Serb officers who pleaded guilty to playing a role in the Srebrenica massacre and 
provided the first high-level account of how and by whom it was planned.”329 But the reconcili-
ation rationale has often figured prominently in sentencing judgments following guilty pleas. 
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While some of our Bosnian interlocutors agree with the ICTY’s reasoning, many victims find 
this very claim insensitive to their suffering.
As of September 2009, 20 defendants had pleaded guilty before the ICTY. Because two 
plea arrangements loomed especially large in our interviews, we address Bosnians’ perceptions 
of those two cases before broadening our discussion.
1. Dražen Erdemovic´
In February 1996, a young Bosnian Croat who had served with Bosnian Serb forces during the 
1990s war, Dražen Erdemovic´, told ABC News and Le Figaro that he had participated in the 
execution of some 1,200 Muslim male civilians in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica. By 
his own account, Erdemovic´ personally killed approximately 70 of the victims at the Branjevo 
farm near Pilica on July 16, 1995.330 On March 2, 1996, Erdemovic´ was arrested by Yugoslav 
authorities; soon after, he was indicted by the ICTY prosecutor. The day after his indictment, 
Erdemovic´ became the only ICTY suspect transferred by Yugoslav authorities to The Hague 
during the regime of Slobodan Miloševic´.331
At his initial appearance before the ICTY on May 31, 1996, Erdemovic´ also became the 
first suspect to enter a guilty plea, in this case pleading guilty to the count of murder as a 
crime against humanity. Six weeks later, he testified in proceedings against Ratko Mladic´ and 
Radovan Karadžic´, and would later provide testimony that was important to other prosecutions 
of senior suspects.332 At his sentencing hearing in November 1996, Erdemovic´ expressed his 
profound remorse: “I wish to say that I feel sorry for all the victims, not only for the ones who 
were killed at that farm, I feel sorry for all the victims in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina 
regardless of their nationality.”333 
On November 29, 1996, ICTY Trial Chamber I sentenced Erdemovic´ to ten years in 
prison, taking into account that “the accused surrendered voluntarily to the International Tri-
bunal, confessed, pleaded guilty, showed sincere and genuine remorse or contrition and stated 
his willingness to supply evidence with probative value against other individuals for crimes 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal.”334 After ruling that Erdemovic´’s 
plea had not been fully informed, the Appeals Chamber remanded his case to a different trial 
chamber.335 Erdemovic´ entered a new guilty plea, and was sentenced to five years’ imprison-
ment.336 While recognizing that a key responsibility of the ICTY is to express the international 
community’s outrage at the kind of crimes in which Erdemovic´ participated, Trial Chamber II 
noted countervailing considerations in this case:
It is in the interests of international criminal justice and the purposes of the Interna-
tional Tribunal to give appropriate weight to the cooperative attitude of the accused. He 
truthfully confessed his involvement in the massacre at a time when no authority was 
seeking to prosecute him in connection therewith, knowing that he would most prob-
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ably face prosecution as a result. Understanding of the situation of those who surrender 
to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal and who confess their guilt is important 
for encouraging other suspects or unknown perpetrators to come forward. The Interna-
tional Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judicial functions, 
to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and 
establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discovering 
the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to rec-
onciliation: for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins 
the healing process. The International Tribunal must demonstrate that those who have 
the honesty to confess are treated fairly as part of a process underpinned by principles 
of justice, fair trial and protection of the fundamental rights of the individual.337
Despite Erdemovic´’s remorse and cooperation, many in Bosnia found his sentence inde-
fensibly short. Kada Hotic´, a leader of Mothers of Srebrenica and Žepa Enclave, had Erdemovic´ 
in mind when she voiced her concern about the ICTY’s plea bargains. Describing a sentence 
of five years for participating in the murder of over 1,000 people as “ridiculous,” Hotic´ said: 
“I believe that each crime has its price, regardless of [a defendant’s] further cooperation.”338
When we spoke to several other Srebrenica survivors in Potoc´ari, where thousands of 
victims of the Srebrenica genocide are buried, they became more agitated about Erdemovic´’s 
plea arrangement than any other subject we discussed. Saying they found no comfort in the 
fact that Erdemovic´ had provided evidence against other perpetrators, the women asked, “Why 
didn’t he turn down the orders to kill? If I’m ordered to kill you I would rather ask them to kill 
me. He should have turned down the order from those who ordered him to kill.”339
As we have noted, on a number of subjects urban intellectuals had a somewhat different 
reaction to ICTY practices than that of rural victims. But on this matter, many Bosnian intel-
lectuals reacted to Erdemovic´’s sentence in much the same way as less educated Bosnians. 
Noting his general discomfort with the ICTY’s plea bargaining in cases involving serious war 
crimes, Professor Zdravko Grebo characterized Erdemovic´’s sentence as “unacceptable.”340 
Mirsad Tokacˇa described the ICTY’s plea bargain in this case as “ridiculous,” “unacceptable,” 
and so short “it’s like a blanket forgiving of a crime.” “Without appropriate reason,” he said, 
the ICTY reduced Erdemovic´’s sentence to “a level that’s absurd.”341
Yet this reaction to the Erdemovic´ case was not universal. Journalist Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ 
believes that Erdemovic´’s plea “was groundbreaking.” Not only was Erdemovic´ the first Sre-
brenica perpetrator to come forward and confess, “He is still coming to the ICTY as a witness” 
against other defendants, Ahmetaševic´ noted.342
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2. Biljana Plavšic´ 
On October 2, 2002, Biljana Plavšic´, who had served as a member of the Bosnian Serbs’ Presi-
dency during the war, pleaded guilty to the crime against humanity of persecution.343 Although 
seven defendants had by then entered guilty pleas before the ICTY, this was the first time that 
such a high-ranking Serb official had done so and, perhaps more important, had expressed 
remorse.344 When she entered her plea, Plavšic´ said:
To achieve any reconciliation or lasting peace in BH, serious violations of humanitarian 
law during the war must be acknowledged by those who bear responsibility—regardless 
of their ethnic group. This acknowledgement is an essential first step.345
Many believed that Plavšic´’s confession could have a catalytic effect on “the process of 
reconciliation” in Bosnia, as one observer put it.346 The Humanitarian Law Center, a leading 
NGO in Serbia, welcomed the confession, noting that it “opens the way to the reconciliation of 
individuals and ethnic groups, and to restoring the dignity of the victims.”347 At her sentencing 
hearing two and one-half months later, an extraordinary line-up of witnesses, ranging from 
former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel, hailed the 
potential significance of her plea as a gesture of acknowledgement that could advance recon-
ciliation.348 So, too, did the prosecutor. As the Trial Chamber noted, “The Prosecution states 
that ‘it accepts that Mrs. Plavšic´’s plea of guilty and acceptance of responsibility represents an 
unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the 
advancement of reconciliation.’”349
In Bosnia, reactions to the courtroom proceeding “ranged from pleasant surprise to 
suspicion that the tribunal somehow compromised its values by making a deal” with Plavšic´.350 
While some agreed with expert witnesses who testified that Plavšic´’s confession could be a 
watershed, others doubted her sincerity. Srebrenica survivor Munira Subašic´ thought Plavšic´ 
had confessed “so she can get a lighter sentence”351 (a suspicion later confirmed by Plavšic´ 
herself ). Another survivor, Sabra Kolenovic´, noted that Plavšic´ had stopped short of actually 
apologizing.352 Emir Suljagic´, who spent much of the war in Srebrenica, did not detect even a 
“note of apology” in Plavšic´’s words.353 Carla Del Ponte, who was the ICTY prosecutor at the 
time of this hearing, would later write that she, too, was horrified when she heard Plavšic´’s 
confession. Del Ponte described the courtroom scene this way:
[Plavšic´] got up during her sentencing hearing and read out a statement full of gener-
alistic mea culpas but lacking compelling detail. I listened to her admissions in horror, 
knowing she was saying nothing.354
Two months after the hearing, the court issued its sentencing judgment. Despite her 
senior leadership role in extremely grave crimes—factors the Trial Chamber recognized 
as aggravating circumstances355—Plavšic´ was sentenced to only 11 years’ imprisonment.356 
(Because she was granted early release, she will end up serving only 2/3 of this sentence).357 
Without explaining how it reached this precise sentence, the Trial Chamber gave substantial 
weight to the views of witnesses who had testified about the potential value the defendant’s 
guilty plea “could have for the reconciliation process in the region.”358 
One factor that the chamber did not take into account when it determined Plavšic´’s sen-
tence was her unwillingness to cooperate with the prosecutor by providing testimony in other 
defendants’ cases, as Erdemovic´ has done.359 (Later, however, she testified under court order 
in the case of Momcˇilo Krajišnik.)360 Noting that the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
explicitly mention “the substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person”361 
as the only example of a mitigating factor in sentencing, the Trial Chamber said “it does not 
follow that failure to do so is an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the accused’s unwill-
ingness to give evidence is not a factor to be taken into account in determining sentence.”362
In Bosnia, many victims were astonished by the sentence, which Mujesira Memisevic´ 
described as “outrageously low.” Memisevic´, whose husband, children and other relatives were 
slaughtered, told a reporter, “I am speechless. I cannot talk at all. I am shivering, I am com-
pletely shaken.”363 Muharem Murselovic´, a survivor of Omarska, commented: “Eleven years 
for all those lives, for all the sufferings is only a drop in the ocean and we, the former camp 
inmates, cannot be satisfied with that.”364 When we interviewed Nerma Jelacˇic´, then the Bos-
nia director of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, in December 2006, she reflected: 
“There was no impact of Biljana Plavšic´’s confession [on victims]. It got lost in the injustice 
they saw with the sentence given.”365 Commenting on Plavšic´’s sentence, Sevima Sali-Terzic´, 
legal advisor to the Bosnian Constitutional Court, said: “It doesn’t really look like an institu-
tion that can bring justice.”366
While many Bosniaks felt betrayed by Plavšic´’s sentence, some Bosnian Serb politicians 
condemned the sentence as too harsh. Milorad Dodik, at the time the former prime minister of 
Republika Srpska (and since re-elected to the same post), told a reporter: “I am very depressed 
by this sentence and think that international justice was unjust to Biljana Plavšic´.”367 
Despite their disappointment, for some victims Plavšic´’s “guilty plea and call to other 
leaders to follow her example” outweighed their disappointment in her sentence.368 But in 
the face of Bosnian Serbs’ failure to follow her lead in acknowledging responsibility, some 
who initially placed hope in Plavšic´’s confession have been disappointed. Interviewed more 
than three years after Plavšic´ was sentenced, attorney Edina Rešidovic´ recalled, “We somehow 
were expecting the others [i.e., other Bosnian Serbs] to realize what was going on but we were 
wrong. Serbs proclaimed her as a traitor and victims thought it was her way to get out with a 
short term of imprisonment.”369
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Others interviewed during the same period, like civil society activist Srd¯an Dizdarevic´, 
said they did not believe that the situation in Bosnia was “mature enough” to benefit from 
Plavšic´’s confession, but nonetheless considered her confession “an enormous qualitative 
step forward.”370 Another civil society activist, Dobrila Govedarica, likewise saw something 
positive in Plavšic´’s confession even while wishing Bosnian Serb leaders would build upon it. 
In a late 2006 interview, Govedarica observed: “Plavšic´ verbally made herself guilty. That was 
one of the most important things that happened in the ICTY. A high official really confessed 
and found herself guilty.”371
By the time of our most recent visit to Bosnia in July 2009, however, it was harder to 
sustain a positive assessment of Biljana Plavšic´’s guilty plea. In January 2009, Plavšic´ dis-
avowed her confession during an interview with a Swedish magazine.372 Claiming she had 
pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity to avoid facing a lengthy trial on other charges, 
which included genocide, Plavšic´ insisted “I have done nothing wrong.”373
Later that year, we interviewed Mirsad Tokacˇa, who had testified at Plavšic´’s sentenc-
ing hearing that her admission of guilt was “an extremely courageous, brave, and important 
gesture,” about how he now viewed her confession. Referring to his testimony at Plavšic´’s 
sentencing hearing, Tokacˇa said: “Now we see it was also my mistake. I believed she would 
confess sincerely and others would follow.” But the results instead have been “absolutely dis-
appointing.” As for Plavšic´’s more recent remarks, Tokacˇa noted, “She negated everything.” 
But the mistake, Tokacˇa made clear, was not only his. He thought that the ICTY had made a 
“big mistake” in failing to require Plavšic´ to testify in several other cases as a precondition to 
accepting the plea agreement reached with the prosecutor.374 Del Ponte agrees: In her memoir, 
she wrote that she had made a “fundamental error” by “not obliging [Plavšic´] to agree on paper 
to testify against the other accused. I accepted verbal assurances and was deceived.”375 When 
we interviewed Emir Suljagic´ after Plavšic´ had recanted her testimony, he reflected: “That was 
the worst plea agreement I’ve ever seen in my entire life.” (He noted, however, that he had 
thought the agreement “terrible” from the outset.) In cases like that of Plavšic´—“we’re talk-
ing genocide,” he said—a plea agreement is “not acceptable” unless the defendant agrees to 
provide testimony against others. Suljagic´ added: “Another thing that really hurt was the long 
line of international officials willing to testify in her defense.”376
Others have more positive views of the plea even after Biljana Plavšic´’s disavowal of 
her confession. When we interviewed him in July 2009, Dani Editor-in-Chief Ivan Lovrenovic´ 
recalled Plavšic´’s guilty plea as “one of those strong moments that would have never happened 
if the Hague Tribunal were not established.”377 Two months later, many victims’ concerns about 
lenient treatment of Plavšic´ were compounded once more when the ICTY president decided 
in mid-September 2009 to grant Plavšic´ early release.378
3. Other confessions; general reactions
Although Emir Suljagic´ rued the plea agreement reached with Biljana Plavšic´, he had been 
more hopeful that a series of subsequent guilty pleas could contribute to reconciliation in 
Bosnia. In the summer and fall of 2003, the ICTY saw a cascade of detailed confessions by 
Bosnian Serb perpetrators, including several relatively senior commanders involved in the Sre-
brenica massacre;379 some provided crucial information not previously available as evidence.380 
Suljagic´ recalled that he had thought at the time these confessions were made that they would 
finally pierce Bosnian Serbs’ wall of denial: “If you punched that wall, I thought the rest would 
fall like dominoes. … I was really hopeful: ‘This is it, it’s happened now.’”381 
Suljagic´ hoped the detailed confessions of those who played commanding roles in the 
Srebrenica massacre would “open up a space in the media that was not there before for oth-
ers to admit to wrongdoing; that [the confessions] would make it easier for Serbs who were 
not complicit in crimes to talk to their non-Serb neighbors.” But, he continued, “it was not 
that simple[;] obviously I was way too naïve.”382 Still, the confessions had a profound personal 
impact, even if their broader repercussions did not live up to Suljagic´’s expectations. Soon 
after one of the Srebrenica defendants pleaded guilty, Suljagic´ told a reporter: “I was crying in 
court. When [the defendant] said, ‘I plead guilty,’ I ran upstairs and locked myself in the toilet 
and cried my eyes out. It was a genuine relief to hear someone like him saying, ‘Yes, we killed 
seven thousand or eight thousand people.’”383
Looking beyond specific cases in which defendants entered into plea agreements, we 
found a range of views about the practice. Some of our Bosnian interlocutors emphasized that 
defendants who committed crimes of singular gravity should get a sentence commensurate 
with the crime, and that this moral minimum must be honored regardless of whether defen-
dants confess and cooperate with the prosecution. Zdravko Grebo expressed a variation on this 
theme when he said, whatever utility plea agreements may have in ordinary criminal cases, 
they are “questionable, both from a legal and moral point of view,” in war crimes cases. “Can 
you bargain about war crimes?,” he wondered.384 Sead Golic´, whose brother was killed during 
the conflict, said simply: “We, the families of the victims, are not satisfied. We are not pleased 
with bargaining between the court and the perpetrators. It doesn’t give us any satisfaction.”385 
Others emphasized specific aspects of the ICTY’s approach to guilty pleas that they 
have found especially problematic. Just as Emir Suljagic´ was pained by the distinguished 
witnesses who testified in apparent support of Biljana Plavšic´,386 Omarska survivor Mirsad 
Duratovic´ said that in addition to excessively lenient sentences, what “is very offensive to me” 
is that defendants who plead guilty in The Hague—people who have committed unspeakable 
atrocities—“get praised by the court for being very cooperative.”387
Duratovic´ cited another concern that is of particular importance to many survivors. 
Darko Mrd¯a, one of the ICTY defendants who pleaded guilty in the summer of 2003, was 
among those who bore major responsibility for one of the more notorious wartime mass 
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executions, the execution in Koric´anske Stijene of some 200 non-Serbs transferred from Pri-
jedor in August 1992. Yet according to Duratovic´, Mrd¯a did not reveal in court “where the 
bodies are.”388 And for victims, “that was the most important thing.”389 A couple of years after 
our interview with Duratovic´, the war crimes chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(see Chapter VI) was able to do what the ICTY had not done—identify the remains of victims 
of the Koric´anske Stijene massacre through the testimony of defendants who pleaded guilty to 
charges relating to their involvement.390 Commenting on this achievement, journalist Nidžara 
Ahmetaševic´ said that what is important about defendants’ admissions of guilt is that “that’s 
how you will find out about the destiny of some of your relatives. And what is very important,” 
she continued, is that the defendants’ testimony before the Court of Bosnia has led to the 
discovery of mass graves.391
On occasion this has happened at the ICTY, too. An ICTY prosecutor recalls one 
moment when a perpetrator’s confession provided the answer to a question that had burned 
deep in the heart of a Muslim woman whose two sons had been killed:
[I]n September 2003, Dragan Nikolic´, the warden of the notorious Sušica prison camp 
in the Republika Srpska, confessed to his responsibility for atrocities committed against 
detainees. At his sentencing hearing…, an extraordinary event occurred when a Pros-
ecution witness, the mother of two Bosnian Muslim men who disappeared from the 
Sušica prison camp during the war, asked Mr. Nikolic´ if he could provide her with any 
information about the fate of her lost sons. Mr. Nikolic´ explained to the witness that 11 
years earlier, … Bosnian Serb forces murdered her two children. It will be difficult to 
find another example of courtroom testimony that so powerfully and quickly advanced 
the process of truth-seeking and (hopefully) reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.392
The ICTY Web site highlights this moment, and indicates that Nikolic´ provided infor-
mation that might lead to the identification of the graves of the witness’s sons.393 But as a 
former staff member of the International Commission on Missing Persons observed, “The 
Tribunal has not always asked, ‘where did you put the bodies?’”394
More generally, some of the Bosnians we interviewed believe, in the words of Dani 
Editor-in-Chief Ivan Lovrenovic´, that the “tens of confessions saying in an unambiguous way 
that war crimes have been committed” has been an important achievement. In Lovrenovic´’s 
view, such confessions help counter attempts by many to equalize crimes committed during 
the 1990s war, which have had the effect of “dehumanizing victims’ suffering.” Through the 
detailed confirmation of specific atrocities that comes with defendants’ guilty pleas, Lovrenovic´ 
believes, the ICTY is “taking our attention back to the concrete problem which is most impor-
tant here, which is the misery that victims have been through.”395
Many of the victims we interviewed, moreover, indicated that expressions of remorse 
that appear to be genuine can be important to their healing processes. For example, Sadik 
Trako told us that victims in the Lašva Valley region were gratified when Tihomir Blaškic´, one 
of the defendants convicted for those crimes, contacted them upon his release from prison. 
According to Trako, Blaškic´ wanted to meet with the victims’ organization that Trako leads “to 
apologize to the families of victims.” Although Trako thought it too early for a meeting and 
told Blaškic´ as much, he recalled that he was “still glad Blaškic´ apologized.”396 Blaškic´ did not 
benefit from a plea agreement, and it may be the case that victims are more likely to perceive 
an apology as insincere when a reduced sentence is secured. But our interviews suggest that 
victims often do find meaningful differences among defendants who express remorse based 
on their apparent sincerity. And as one commentator has noted, “guilty pleas that seem to be 
motivated by sincere remorse and a genuine acknowledgement of wrongdoing are much more 
likely to encourage dialogue and forgiveness than guilty pleas that appear motivated solely by 
sentencing concessions.”397
In any event and as noted earlier, the victims we interviewed generally believe that, 
even in the context of a plea agreement, there must be a just relationship between the sen-
tence imposed and the crime for which guilt is acknowledged—and that this has not been 
reflected in most sentences imposed following guilty pleas. Moreover the Plavšic´ case points 
up the importance of ensuring that perpetrators undertake to cooperate with the prosecu-
tion in exchange for a reduced sentence. Thus it is noteworthy that, after the Plavšic´ plea, all 
defendants who pleaded guilty before the ICTY agreed to testify in other proceedings.398, 399 
Particularly when a defendant is willing to confess, victims’ needs would be better served if 
the ICTY routinely sought to ensure full disclosure about the fate of victims. It may also be 
important for judges, when sentencing defendants who have shown remorse, to be mindful 
of how words of praise come across to victims who experienced hellish crimes at the hands 
of the defendant. 
Finally, redoubled efforts to educate the Bosnian public about the nature of plea agree-
ments—what information the defendant provided in exchange for reduced charges, for exam-
ple—may be an especially important area of the ICTY’s outreach efforts. After stating that 
Biljana Plavšic´’s confession had had no positive impact, journalist Nerma Jelacˇic´, who later 
became an ICTY spokesperson, noted: “Maybe [the ICTY’s Outreach Programme] should 
have been doing something with the confessions.”400 Although her comment focused on the 
confession of Plavšic´, it could well apply to plea agreements generally.401 
One of the victims we interviewed, who was highly critical of plea agreements, indicated 
that if the ICTY Outreach Programme were more forthcoming about the value of plea agree-
ments, it might indeed take some of the sting out of the practice. “It would mean a lot, by 
all means, yes, if we knew that the defendant’s cooperation [with the prosecutor] led to mass 
graves or the conviction of others who were even more responsible.”402 Even so, he made clear, 
someone who committed atrocious crimes deserves commensurate punishment. 
THAT SOMEONE GUILTY  BE  PUNISHED   65
6 6    ACHIEVEMENTS,  FAILURES ,  AND PERFORMANCE
D. Significant Verdicts, Other Rulings, and 
Jurisprudence
1. Calling a massacre by its proper name: genocide
While many in Bosnia are disappointed in sentences imposed by the ICTY, some deeply so, 
the Tribunal’s judgments of guilt have at times provided profound gratification. One stands 
out for its signal importance in this regard: the ICTY’s determination, first reached in the case 
against Radislav Krstic´, that “Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide” in Srebrenica.403 In 
clarion terms, the ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s determination that a 
genocide occurred in Srebrenica:
The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, 
the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper 
name: genocide. Those responsible will bear this stigma, and it will serve as a warning 
to those who may in future contemplate the commission of such a heinous act.404
In a context of pervasive Serb denial that Serbs committed genocide in Srebrenica, Tarik 
Jusic´ believes that the Krstic´ judgment was indeed “very important” in the sense the Appeals 
Chamber meant. In Jusic´’s words: “It is important that things are named as they are. If it is 
a genocide, historically it’s important that this is said by an independent body that’s 3,000 
kilometers from here.”405 Journalist Senad Pec´anin also sees this determination as crucial, 
emphasizing Bosnian society’s inability to reach a consensus judgment about responsibility 
for Srebrenica: “Without the ICTY, who knows? We would have to wait decades to know who 
was responsible. That’s a really important prosecution.”406
 Like many we interviewed, Dobrila Govedarica believes that “clarifying that Srebrenica 
was a genocide” was the Tribunal’s “most important achievement and without the ICTY it 
wouldn’t be possible.” She explained the judgment’s significance this way: “For history and 
for the future, you can never question that … and that’s definitely important for victims.”407 
Mirsad Tokacˇa made a similar point. Describing Krstic´ as “one of the most important” accom-
plishments of the ICTY, Tokacˇa said: “Only based on this decision, the ICTY is successful.” 
In his view, the Tribunal’s determination of genocide is important not only “theoretically [and] 
in terms of judicial practice,” but also “for Bosnian society. Finally there is no dilemma. … 
After this decision, there is no negation and refusing of the fact that genocide happened.”408
Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ also believes it was “very important to find that genocide was com-
mitted in Srebrenica,” and describes what this has meant to the mothers who lost their sons 
there. Rural and largely uneducated, many of these women became deeply “engaged as moth-
ers” in trying to find justice. In Bakšic´ Muftic´’s view, their daily protesting would have deep-
ened their suffering if their goals remained unfulfilled: “You’re always waiting for, waiting for, 
waiting for; this is the way to madness.” But once the ICTY ruled that some 7–8,000 Muslim 
men were victims of genocide, “their family members were recognized, named. They got a 
sense of life; [they were able] to start life again.”409
In our own interviews with mothers from Srebrenica, we found widespread appre-
ciation for the ICTY’s judgment of genocide, even as we heard concerns about many other 
aspects of the Tribunal’s performance. For example, after describing her concerns about the 
ICTY, Hatidža Mehmedovic´ added: “Despite [these concerns,] we have to be honest and say the 
Hague [Tribunal] was the one who sentenced and reached the verdict of Krstic´ for the … crime 
of genocide committed here in Srebrenica. This is what matters to us, this is what is the most 
important to us, to the families, to the victims, that justice is reached.”410 More than five years 
after the ICTY Trial Chamber first ruled the massacre at Srebrenica to be a genocide, journal-
ist Nerma Jelacˇic´ observed: “It’s still important—this is a huge judgment to this day. [Krstic´ 
is] probably the only one that gave victims a sense of the most complete thing to justice.”411
Yet Emir Suljagic´, who along with thousands of other Muslims had sought refuge in 
Srebrenica before it became the most dangerous place on earth, has a “problem with this 
whole Srebrenica thing. This whole thing started as genocide in Bosnia and it ended with 
genocide in Srebrenica and it’s so unfair to those tens of thousands of people” who died 
before the July 1995 massacre that their extermination is left outside the ICTY’s judgment of 
genocide in Krstic´.412 Even so, Suljagic´ came to realize how much the judgment meant to him, 
too, when he read the Appeals Chamber’s 2004 judgment in Krstic´.413 “That was the moment 
I realized, my god, we are in that select group of nations whose existence has been brought 
into question, literally, physically, and that’s when the importance of this judgment—that’s 
when I realized it.”414
2. Absence of genocide convictions in other cases
Suljagic´ is not alone in hoping that the ICTY will eventually rule that genocide was committed 
not only in Srebrenica, but throughout Bosnia. Mirsad Tokacˇa, who has developed an extensive 
database of confirmed victims, believes his data show that “genocide happened in 1992”—i.e., 
well before July 1995.415 
To date, however, the ICTY has not rendered any judgments finding that genocide 
occurred in Bosnia other than in Srebrenica and for a variety of reasons has not convicted any-
one other than Radislav Krštic´ of genocide in relation to Srebrenica. In some instances, indi-
viduals indicted on genocide-related charges elsewhere in Bosnia have died before they could 
be prosecuted to final judgment;416 in others, including the case against Biljana Plavšic´,417 a 
plea agreement led to the prosecutor’s agreement to drop genocide-related charges or the 
defendant was acquitted of genocide-related charges following his trial.418 One of the small 
number of ICTY defendants charged with genocide, Radovan Karadžic´, eluded capture for 
some fourteen years and is now on trial but the trial judgment in his case is not expected until 
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at least 2012; another, Ratko Mladic´, remains at large. Particularly in light of the tiny number 
of remaining cases in which it is even theoretically possible that the ICTY will judge there to 
have been a genocide outside the context of Srebrenica,419 many Bosniaks are disappointed in 
the Tribunal’s failure to sustain genocide-related charges in the few cases where genocide was 
charged and which resulted in a verdict.
One of the most important of these is the case against Momcˇilo Krajišnik, a senior 
member of the Bosnian Serb leadership during the war. On September 27, 2006, ICTY Trial 
Chamber I found the defendant responsible for “the killing, through murder or extermination, 
of approximately 3,000 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats” in 30 Bosnian municipalities 
during the period of the indictment.420 It also found that “the perpetrators of the killings chose 
their victims on the basis of their Muslim and Croat identity.”421 Yet, perhaps in part due to the 
limited timeframe charging genocide solely for the early stages of the conflict, the chamber did 
not find that the prosecutor had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “any of these acts were 
committed with the intent to destroy, in part, the Bosnian-Muslim or Bosnian-Croat ethnic 
group, as such,”422 a key element of the crime of genocide.423
Interviewed several months after the trial judgment was issued, Nerma Jelacˇic´ said it 
was “a huge thing” for victims that Krajišnik “wasn’t found guilty of genocide.”424 Comment-
ing on the Krajišnik judgment several years later, historian Smail Cˇekic´ said, “I am completely 
disappointed. … For all of us investigators and victims of genocide, this is like a shock, like 
a major hit. ... [They] proved the existence of the actus reus of the crime of genocide but they 
failed in proving the intention of the crime.”425 Srebrenica survivor Kada Hotic´ found it “ridicu-
lous, silly” that Krajišnik was acquitted of the genocide-related charges “when there was so 
much evidence” against him.426
Others were not so much shocked as disappointed. When asked to describe the public 
reaction when Krajišnik was acquitted of genocide-related charges, Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ said: 
“People didn’t even expect that Krajišnik would be convicted of genocide. People don’t … trust 
that people will finally recognize that we survived genocide. … In a way, people expected that 
decision because they just lost confidence in international justice.”427 
3. Non-disclosure of evidence in the Miloševic´  case
It goes without saying that ICTY chambers must be satisfied that the prosecutor has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of genocide—including the mental ele-
ment of specific intent—before it may convict defendants of this charge, however disappointed 
victims may find an acquittal. The way that such acquittals are misused by political leaders 
is a serious problem, which we address in Chapter V, but it is not one that falls to judges to 
anticipate and address through their evaluation of evidence. Yet one aspect of the ICTY’s con-
duct has caused widespread concern, both within Bosnia and elsewhere: Its Appeals Chamber 
allowed evidence that might have established Serbia’s responsibility for genocide and other 
international crimes in Bosnia to remain under seal for reasons that have been widely called 
into question.
Among the most important documents sought by then Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte in 
the Miloševic´ case were wartime records of the Supreme Defense Council of the then Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which “the prosecution team knew would 
be crucial to establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the links between Miloševic´ and the rest 
of the political leadership in Belgrade with the war crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo.”428 Serbian authorities repeatedly said they would provide the cru-
cial evidence only if it were kept under protective order. The reason, Serbian officials made 
clear, was that they feared these documents would be the proverbial nail in the coffin of their 
defense to a genocide case that Bosnia had filed against Serbia in 1993 before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), which after many years was heading toward judgment.429
Del Ponte recalls: “The Serbs were ready to provide records in a way that would help 
us sink Miloševic´ with the millstone of genocide tied around his neck. If we did not seize 
this break in the political cloud cover, the Office of the Prosecutor might not acquire these 
documents for months or years.”430 Yet the Tribunal’s rules allowed for evidence of this sort 
to be kept secret only to protect legitimate “national security interests,”431 not to protect a state 
from a genocide verdict in another court. In a decision for which she has been criticized,432 
the prosecutor resolved this dilemma by agreeing to support in general terms Serbia’s applica-
tion for protective measures on the understanding that the application and measures would 
be “reasonable” and that it “shall take into consideration the interest of transparency of the 
court proceedings.”433 
Although the Trial and Appeals Chambers’ rulings on this request remain sealed, it has 
been widely reported that the Trial Chamber agreed not to disclose the crucial evidence on a 
broad reading of Serbia’s “vital national interest,” a standard not contemplated in the ICTY’s 
own rules of procedure. When the Appeals Chamber eventually had the opportunity to rule 
on this issue, it found that the Trial Chamber had erred in applying this standard. Even so, 
and even though Serbia “made no secret” that the reason it sought the protective order was 
to shield itself from a genocide ruling in the ICJ case,434 the Appeals Chamber ruled in two 
confidential decisions that because Serbia had relied on the Trial Chamber’s ruling when it 
provided the documents—documents it is legally required to provide in any case—it was 
entitled to the earlier protection afforded by the Trial Chamber. 
The Trial Chamber itself could still see the full documents for purposes of assessing 
Miloševic´’s guilt, and so the principal effect of this ruling would be to shield Serbia from 
liability in the ICJ case. But the ICTY did not have a chance to reach judgment in the Miloševic´ 
case—the defendant’s death brought the trial to a premature end. 
As for the ICJ case, on February 26, 2007, the Court ruled that genocide was committed 
in Srebrenica,435 that Serbia bore responsibility for failing to prevent that genocide,436 but that 
Bosnia had not proved that the conduct of Bosnian Serb forces constituting genocide itself 
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could be legally attributed to Serbia.437 Crucially, the ICJ had refused Bosnia’s request that it 
request the full documents from Serbia—and it did not ask the ICTY to consider modifying 
its protective measures so that it could obtain access to the un-redacted documents from the 
Tribunal. The ICJ nonetheless “observe[d] that the Applicant has extensive documentation and 
other evidence available to it, especially from the readily accessible ICTY records”438—which 
of course did not include the very documents at issue.
It is impossible to know whether the undisclosed evidence would have produced a dif-
ferent outcome. What is clear is that Serbia thought it would, and for that reason mounted an 
all-out effort to ensure that this evidence remained secret.439 It is also clear that the conduct 
of the ICTY and ICJ has tarnished both courts in the eyes of many Bosnians. Emir Suljagic´ 
wondered, “How could [ICTY] judges accept that hiding of evidence of participation in geno-
cide is a legitimate national interest? How in the world could hiding evidence of genocide be 
construed as a national interest? What’s worse, the ICJ never asked [ for the redacted docu-
ments]! … Good god!”440 Zdravko Grebo described the ICTY’s action in “intentionally hid[ing] 
some documents” and thereby “influenc[ing]” the outcome in the ICJ case as “scandalous.”441 
Saša Madacki, who directs the Human Rights Centre at the University of Sarajevo, noted 
that he considers the ICTY to be “essential.” Yet, he added, “sometimes we are not able to 
understand the decisions of the Tribunal,” particularly those relating to the Supreme Defense 
Council. “This is something that’s not understandable.”442 
Omarska survivor Muharem Murselovic´, who has testified in several cases before the 
ICTY, cites the Tribunal’s action in this matter as a source of acute disappointment: “What 
especially upsets people here in Bosnia and Herzegovina and hurts them,” he told us, “is that 
some information proving the direct involvement of Serbia has been hidden in agreement 
with the government of Serbia[;] The Hague Tribunal protected the State of Serbia by hiding 
documentation of the involvement of Serbia in the conflict in Bosnia. So this creates a certain 
mistrust, a suspicion of its good intentions.”443 
For many Bosnians, their “mistrust … of [the ICTY’s] intentions” was compounded by 
the ICTY’s recent action against a former employee, Florence Hartmann. Hartmann, who 
had served as spokesperson for then Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte from 2000 to 2006, later 
wrote of the Appeals Chamber’s two key rulings in the Miloševic´ case authorizing protective 
measures for the Supreme Defence Council documents provided by Serbia.444 On September 
14, 2009, a Special Chamber of the ICTY found Hartmann guilty of “knowingly and wilfully 
interfering with the Tribunal’s administration of justice”445 for having disclosed the “contents 
and purported effect”446 of two Appeals Chambers decisions in breach of the chamber’s orders 
that they remain confidential, and knowing that the disclosure violated a Tribunal order.447 
Hartmann was fined €7,000.448
While a number of our interlocutors found Hartmann’s own conduct troubling, either 
because they thought she should have gone public sooner or because they thought her disclo-
sure to involve conduct unbecoming senior court staff, victims’ associations were aggrieved 
by her prosecution. Several Bosniak victims sought unsuccessfully to be heard at her trial so 
that they could tell the Special Panel that its action could “destabilize relations in the region, 
inflame victims’ frustrations, [and] endanger the founding principles of the work of the [tribu-
nal].”449 As a result of the ICTY’s action, they wrote, “Trust in the [tribunal] and international 
justice might be lost.”450 (At the Tribunal itself, many believe that because Hartmann violated 
the court’s protection orders, the ICTY had a duty to prosecute that violation, as it has in sev-
eral other contempt proceedings.)
Hartmann’s prosecution marked a low point in perceptions of the ICTY among many of 
its strongest supporters. Following her conviction, many Serbs—both Serbian and Bosnian—
who have worked to support the ICTY denounced the Tribunal’s action, saying they “now have 
serious worries about what is happening there.”451
4. “Women became visible, personalized, recognized as one kind of victim”
With rare exception, when wartime atrocities occur on a large scale they include crimes of 
sexual violence. But while there should be no doubt that they constitute war crimes, genocide 
and/or crimes against humanity when other elements of these offenses are established, these 
offenses historically have remained in the shadows of postwar prosecutions.452 The work of 
the ICTY and the ICTR changed that, bringing crimes of sexual violence out of the shadows 
and building a rich jurisprudence recognizing that these crimes are among those meriting the 
strongest condemnation of the international community. 
The attention paid to these violations by the ICTY from the outset was in no small mea-
sure due to the courage of rape survivors in Bosnia and the support they forged with women’s 
human rights advocates around the world. Indeed, major impetus for the ICTY’s creation 
came from global advocacy efforts aimed at seeking justice for crimes of sexual violence that 
shocked global conscience.
Speaking to a foreign reporter about a year after the war ended, Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ rec-
ognized the historic nature of victims’ cooperation with ICTY investigators. “This could be the 
first time in history that women are coming forward right after a war to talk about rape,” she 
said. “It could be a very important milestone for war crime prosecutors.”453 Reflecting on the 
ICTY’s achievements and failures more than a decade later, Bakšic´ Muftic´ said that through 
its judgments, the ICTY had “created a new kind of awareness that women had been used as 
a means” of warfare. “They became visible, personalized, recognized as one kind of victim.”454 
It is often said that many victims in Bosnia have had a hard time moving forward. But Bakšic´ 
Muftic´ has a different perspective. In her view, the recognition provided by the ICTY’s judg-
ments enabled rape survivors in Bosnia “to become more active” in asserting their rights.
One such woman is Bakira Hasecˇic´, a rape survivor who “is becoming the Bosnian Wie-
senthal”455—that is, she has been active and effective in identifying evidence against wartime 
rapists and submitting it to prosecutors.456 As Balkan Insight has reported, the organization 
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Hasecˇic´ leads, the Association of Women Victims of War, “rallies rape victims across Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and has provided key testimonies in rape and sexual abuse trials linked to 
the conflict.”457
Yet Hasecˇic´’s own case points up the limits of justice that victims of sexual violence 
have received in The Hague. On July 20, 2009, ICTY Trial Chamber convicted the man who 
raped her, Milan Lukic´, and his cousin Sredoje Lukic´ for their roles in sadistic atrocities com-
mitted in Višegrad during the war. As noted earlier, Milan Lukic´ became one of a handful of 
defendants before the ICTY sentenced to life in prison; his cousin received 30 years.458 But 
while the mass rapes associated with the cousins have received international attention for over 
a decade, rape-related charges needlessly were left out of their indictment. 
A month before the case went to trial, the ICTY prosecution filed a motion seeking leave 
to amend the indictment in this case, but the Trial Chamber denied this “on the ground that 
the Prosecution had not acted with the required diligence in submitting the motion in a timely 
manner so as to provide adequate notice to the Accused.”459 Despite the fact that the judgment 
is replete with testimony of women describing multiple rapes by the defendants—testimony 
they provided to refute the accused’s alibi defense that he was not in town that day—the Trial 
Chamber made clear that it could not make “any determination of guilt in relation to these 
non-indicted crimes.”460
The prosecution’s failure to pursue diligently rape charges in Lukic´ was unfortunately 
not unprecedented. Even as the ICTY and other international courts have highlighted crimes 
of sexual violence in some cases, others “continue to be plagued by prosecutorial omissions 
and errors as well as by a tendency on the part of the judges to require that the prosecution 
meet higher evidentiary standards in these cases than in other types of cases.”461 Further, in 
many instances where sex crime charges were warranted, they were absent from indictments, 
often for strategic reasons related to expediting trials and completing the Tribunal’s work. Thus 
here, as in other aspects of the ICTY’s work, its contributions have at once been incalculable 
and have fallen short of what many victims hoped for.. 
E. Length and Complexity of ICTY Proceedings
It’s only that these trials took too long, way too long. And I also think these whole proceedings 
are too complicated.462
The ICTY seems a distant, complicated machinery. It has complicated procedures, its processes 
last forever.463
Along with what many see as lenient sentencing, the length of trial proceedings in the ICTY 
is cause for widespread frustration in Bosnia and has been criticized internationally.464 As 
former ICTY liaison officer Matias Hellman noted: “Proceedings take so long—three to eight 
years from arrest until final judgment.”465Sometimes years go by after the ICTY gains custody 
of a defendant before his or her trial even begins;466 then, the trial typically lasts over a year.467 
Although trials lasting years are rare (so far only five have lasted more than two years), they 
have made an enduring impression.
In the subsections that follow, we address the impact of trial length on many Bosnians’ 
experience of justice. But this is not the only concern that lengthy ICTY processes pose. Many 
Serbs—notably including individuals who support the ICTY—emphasize another problem: 
The length of time that some defendants have spent awaiting trial, many in detention, is seen 
as a violation of defendants’ right to a speedy trial.468 (This is true even though defendants 
themselves have often sought delays so they can better prepare for trial.)469 
As the Justice Initiative noted in its report on the ICTY’s impact in Serbia, “[m]any 
Serbians can readily tick off how long some high-profile defendants had to await trial once the 
ICTY obtained custody of them,”470 and the same patterns are grounds for criticism among 
Serbs in Bosnia.471 While this alone hardly accounts for Bosnian Serbs’ antipathy toward the 
ICTY, the practice, which has also raised concerns among international lawyers, provides 
further grist for Serb nationalists’ efforts to sustain anti-Hague sentiment.472 Moreover “[e]
xcessively long trials” themselves can “carry significant risks of unfairness to the accused,”473 
particularly when he represents himself at trial. To be sure, the ICTY is hardly unique in taking 
a long time to investigate and prosecute war criminals. As this study highlights, a key area in 
which internationalized tribunals or domestic courts trying mass atrocities would benefit from 
improvement is in expediting trial proceedings without short-changing justice.
1. The trial without end: Slobodan Miloševic´
A lot of victims felt cheated when he died.474
If they made a huge mistake it was the Miloševic´ case.475
For many, the marathon trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloševic´ is at once 
emblematic of a pervasive problem at the ICTY—trials whose length extends beyond tolerable 
limits—and a cautionary tale. After more than four years, the trial was within weeks of end-
ing476 when the defendant died in his detention cell in March 2006.477
As legal commentators have noted, “[t]he most ardent criticism of [the Miloševic´] 
trial was that it was simply allowed to go on for too long.”478 On this point, there is no day-
light between the views of commentators outside Bosnia and of Bosnian citizens. Nidžara 
Ahmetaševic´ recalled that in the early months of Miloševic´’s trial, “everybody watched it” 
on television. “But it lasted so long.” And “by the end, only my father was still watching.”479 
Columnist Gojko Beric´ reflected the views of many when he said, “the pace of the proceed-
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ings … went before any expectations. This was really too much.”480 Another journalist, Ivan 
Lovrenovic´, cites the Miloševic´ trial as the prime example of “extreme inefficiency” on the part 
of the ICTY. The “whole thing turned into a bureaucratic labyrinth” and, in the end, “we had 
no appropriate verdict.”481 Even a lawyer, Sevima Sali-Terzic´, had a hard time “understand[ing] 
why the Miloševic´ trial lasted so long.”482 
There is now a rich literature of lessons learned from the Miloševic´ trial, and this study 
does not revisit ground that has been well plowed by others who have closely analyzed the case. 
But in view of the special impact the trial has had on the ICTY’s standing in Bosnia, we note 
here several further themes that arose often in our interviews with Bosnians. 
While the need to accommodate the defendant’s precarious health situation was a major 
factor behind the trial’s length,483 many in Bosnia fault the Tribunal’s prosecutor and judges. 
Beric´ believes the “main responsibility” for “prolonging this process for so long … should 
be placed on [ former Prosecutor Carla] Del Ponte.” In Beric´’s view, Del Ponte tried to prove 
too much, and in the end lost the chance to prove anything: She “wrote an indictment that 
is a novel, meaning she made a novel of this indictment. It’s too extensive, unnecessarily.”484 
While we found this view to be widely held among the Bosnian intellectuals we interviewed, 
there may be a counterpoint when it comes to Bosnians’ expectations: Bosnian victims have 
rallied in protest against ICTY efforts to apply “lessons learned from the Miloševic´ case” by 
trimming the number of charges or crime scenes to be proved in the trial of Bosnian Serb 
wartime leader Radovan Karadžic´.485 
Whatever the precise causes of the trial’s length, that Miloševic´ died before judgment 
has left Bosnians vexed by a sense that a streamlined case would have yielded a verdict. “Maybe 
if the case had been shorter,” Dobrila Govedarica speculates,” [Miloševic´] would have lived to 
judgment.”486 Others think the point is clear. Srebrenica survivor Hatidža Mehmetovic´ said the 
trial of Miloševic´ went on “for too long, way too long, so that he was not in a position to even 
live long enough to be faced with a verdict.” She continued: “This was a huge price for not 
only victims of … crimes committed in Srebrenica but for all of Bosnia as such.”487 Tarik Jusic´ 
implicitly links Miloševic´’s death to the unwarranted length of the ICTY’s trials,488 which he 
describes as the “weakest” dimension of its work. Like Mehmetovic´, Jusic´ believes the costs of 
Miloševic´’s death without judgment to be huge, describing this as the “most negative” aspect 
of the ICTY’s record.489
Saying “this case should have been completed,” Srebrenica survivor Kada Hotic´ evokes 
what she believes was lost by the death of Miloševic´. “Truth be told,” she said, it was not the 
goal of any victim “to have defendants suffer, but simply to have them serve their sentences so 
this whole story becomes a part of the truth of everything that happened.”490 With his death, 
Miloševic´’s role in Bosnia’s tragedy would not become part of the judicial truth. 
By this measure, Miloševic´’s death before judgment was an incalculable loss. The pros-
ecution’s case placed Miloševic´ at the epicenter of the violence that engulfed the Balkans in 
the 1990s, encompassing crimes committed in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia. Of particular 
importance for many Bosniak victims, the charges against Miloševic´ included genocide—and 
not just for Srebrenica. Moreover, because the prosecution’s case aimed to prove that Belgrade 
institutions provided crucial support to Bosnian Serb forces, a verdict that sustained this claim 
would establish “that Serbia and Montenegro made an aggression,”491 as Hatidža Mehmedovic´ 
put it.492
2. The collateral damage of self-representation
One issue that both contributed to the length of the Miloševic´ trial and was cause for deep 
concern in itself was the way the Tribunal handled—or many would say, mishandled—the 
challenges presented by Miloševic´’s self-representation. Defendants before the ICTY are 
legally entitled to represent themselves,493 and Slobodan Miloševic´ famously exploited this 
right, “transforming the courtroom into his political platform.”494 As has often been noted, 
Miloševic´’s insistence on representing himself “posed a profound challenge to the conduct 
of [his] trial.”495 
This subject, too, has received extensive analysis by others, and the Justice Initiative 
has recently published a report devoted exclusively to the challenges presented by political 
leaders who represent themselves in war crimes trials.496 Again, we do not revisit this subject 
in depth here but briefly try to capture the impact of self-defending suspects’ behavior on 
Bosnians’ experience of justice and, even more briefly, their perceptions of responsibility for 
the problems presented in these cases.
For many Bosnians it was excruciating to watch Miloševic´ mock the court, treat-
ing judges “without respect.”497 Virtually everyone we interviewed in Bosnia believes that 
Miloševic´’s ability to use his trial as a platform for Serb nationalism “could have been avoided” 
if ICTY judges had exercised proper control of the courtroom.498 Along with many attorneys 
both within and outside Bosnia, Damir Arnaut, a senior advisor to the Bosniak member of 
the Presidency, believes that the ICTY could have found better ways to handle the challenges 
presented by Miloševic´ without compromising his rights.499
Many worry that the Miloševic´ case established a model for others in which high-profile 
defendants have abused their right to self-representation, stringing out trial proceedings and 
mocking justice. Describing the ongoing trial of Vojislav Šešelj who, like Miloševic´, chose to 
represent himself, Mirsad Tokacˇa noted the unnerving similarity and added: “The Tribunal is 
now the strongest weapon in Šešelj’s hands.”500 Savima Sali-Terzic´ wonders “why Šešelj has 
all the power to mock the court and the judges just sit there in all their dignity. He offends the 
victims again. The procedure is terrible. I’m a lawyer and I just don’t understand.”501 
Saying he planned to challenge everything but whether it was “sunny outside or rain-
ing,” Radovan Karadžic´—whose case we discuss further below and who, like Miloševic´, chose 
to represent himself—told ICTY judges that his trial would be “far greater than any before 
it.”502 Seeing a cascade effect from Miloševic´ to Šešelj “and Krajišnik and now Karadžic´,” Sre-
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brenica survivor Kada Hotic´ describes cases in which high-profile ICTY defendants have rep-
resented themselves as proceedings in which “a defendant simply makes a circus of this court 
whenever they are willing.”503 (The “circus” metaphor arose often in our interviews in Bosnia 
on this topic.) As Radovan Karadžic´ seemed to tie the ICTY up in a blizzard of motions before 
his trial even began, Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ noted, Bosnians were “really disappointed because 
the court is letting him do that. People are losing confidence in the ICTY because of that.”504
3. Beyond Miloševic´
Concerns about the length of trial proceedings in specific cases shade into a growing sense 
that the ICTY is taking far too long to provide justice in the broader sense of its work. Saša 
Madacki, who directs the Human Rights Centre at the University of Sarajevo, described a 
widely held view among Bosnians: “Ordinary people will ask you how Nuremberg took one 
year and this [process] is taking 20 years.” As for his own view, Madacki said: “I am very sup-
portive of the work of the Tribunal, though I strongly believe improvements [should be made 
in speeding up its] procedures.” Like many who made this point, Madacki added: “I’m not 
saying there should be a three-day trial and then hang somebody outside of the Tribunal.”505
It would be difficult to exaggerate the cumulative effect of the length and complexity of 
ICTY procedures. It can seem a staggering weight, dragging public confidence downward as it 
grows heavier with the passage of years. While the length of trial proceedings alone does not 
account for the lengthiness of the Tribunal’s work, many in Bosnia believe that the Tribunal’s 
slow pace has blunted its contributions and compounded the challenges associated with delays 
in arresting indictees. 
For example, Sevima Sali-Teržic´ points out the high costs of delayed justice on political 
progress and social repair in Bosnia. “In the beginning,” she said, “it was possible to have 
improvements with justice.” Citing the international community’s failure to arrest Radovan 
Karadžic´, who at the time of our interview with Sali-Teržic´ in late 2006 was still a fugitive from 
justice, and Ratko Mladic´, she wondered if “it’s too late. Our ethnic relations are terrible…. Too 
much time was given to those who began the war to be in power after the war … to pretend 
that we have working ethnic relations.”506
Even at the outset, ICTY supporters had to contend with an overwhelming sense of the 
ICTY as a heavy bureaucratic machine that was out of step with their country’s urgent need 
for justice. Branko Todorovic´ evoked this when he contrasted the toxic chokehold of many 
wartime Bosnian Serb leaders with the lumbering bureaucracy he encountered in The Hague: 
I want to tell you that in my opinion they made a first mistake: the majority of people 
working there are most probably the highest ranking in the judicial profession, but at 
the same time they are a high-ranking supreme bureaucracy, too. They have bylaws 
of the court, documents of the court, “we have certain international standards and of 
course we are backed up with the United Nations and we’ll do our job the best we know 
based on justice, law.” And to them it must have seemed pretty perfect. At the same time 
here there were people who were running the country in high political circles who were 
the people who committed the crimes.507
The burden of time is also taking a toll on victims. Particularly during our most recent 
visit to Bosnia in July 2009, we heard repeatedly of witness fatigue. Although the subject arose 
principally in the context of challenges facing Bosnia’s relatively new war crimes chamber,508 
it points up the dilemma many victims feel sixteen years into the ICTY’s work: While still 
desperate for justice, many are deeply frustrated by how long it is taking; growing numbers 
are weary of participating in trials.
Describing the challenges that Bosnia’s war crimes chamber faces, Vehid Šehic´ noted 
that some who are in a position to provide eyewitness testimony, though willing to do so ten 
years ago, are growing reluctant to do so after beginning new lives as refugees abroad or as 
returnees in Bosnia. Šehic´ told us that the former often say: “I started a new life here, I don’t 
want to spoil my future with that terrible past.” Those who have returned to towns that were 
“ethnically cleansed” similarly fear that “something bad may happen if they testify.” Yet Šehic´ 
adds: “It’s not that they don’t want to see justice satisfied; they do.” But they fear that testifying 
“could spoil their future.”509
As a journalist who covers war crimes prosecutions, Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ sees the 
other side of the coin. She says, “I don’t believe anybody who says victims are tired of the 
whole process. They’re not, they want to talk.” Of course there are exceptions, Ahmetaševic´ 
acknowledges. Yet every day, her office receives letters “from victims who want to tell their 
story.” Ahmetaševic´ says there are “thousands” of such people, who are “afraid they will die 
and take their stories with them.”510 (In light of these concerns, it may be worth noting that 
some recent trials have been better managed.)511 
4. The extended impunity of Radovan Karadžic´ and Ratko Mladic´
As noted earlier, for a variety of reasons Radovan Karadžic´ and Ratko Mladic´, the Bosnian 
Serbs’ wartime political and military leaders, respectively, loom especially large in Bosnians’ 
assessment of the ICTY’s performance. Here, we focus on the symbolic impact of their 
extended impunity, describing how their ability to elude capture for over a decade512 has colored 
Bosnians’ broader perceptions of the ICTY. Then, we consider how Bosnians have reacted to 
the belated capture of Karadžic´ in July 2008.
During our first sets of interviews for this study in November–December 2006 and 
June 2007, when both suspects were still fugitives from justice, we heard repeatedly that their 
continued at-large status threatened to overshadow whatever the Tribunal had accomplished. 
As law professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ put it, “The ICTY has done so many good things but 
THAT SOMEONE GUILTY  BE  PUNISHED   77
7 8    ACHIEVEMENTS,  FAILURES ,  AND PERFORMANCE
they are in the shadow of Karadžic´ and Mladic´. Many ordinary people can’t see the good things 
the ICTY has done” with these two men still at large.513 Jasminka Džumhur made much the 
same point when we interviewed her in June 2007. Noting that it is not the ICTY’s fault that 
Karadžic´ and Mladic´ were then still at large, she said that its inability to gain custody of the 
two men would “reflect on the whole work of the Hague Tribunal. People will forget all other 
prosecutions” if the ICTY were to close without trying these two.514 Reflecting on the ICTY’s 
overall record, Mirsad Tokacˇa put the point even more strongly: “They didn’t finish a lot of 
things because of Karadžic´ and Mladic´. Without these two persons it was a total failure…. What 
was the purpose, why [did] we spend such a lot of money for the Tribunal, if we haven’t been 
able to bring the main people to justice?”515
Sevima Sali-Terzic´ suggested (as many international commentators have) that the fact 
that the two fugitives “don’t live freely, they have to hide” is “one of the biggest positive things” 
the ICTY has achieved. Despite “all those flaws and problems,” she explained, this showed 
that “somebody knew the crimes and can shame those who committed them.”516 Yet, she 
continued, the delay in arresting them had significantly impaired the ICTY’s potential for 
contributing to reconciliation, perhaps irreparably: “In the beginning, it was possible to have 
improvements with justice. But ten years after the failure to arrest Karadžic´ and Mladic´, it’s 
too late. Our ethnic relations are terrible.”517 (Sali-Terzic´ added that this state of affairs is not 
solely due to the failure to arrest Karadžic´ and Mladic´, however.) Many of our interlocutors 
recognized that the ICTY itself is not to blame for the failure of others to arrest these men. 
Yet the fact that they were able to elude apprehension is widely seen to have “diminishe[d] the 
effects of the ICTY.”518
5. The arrest of Radovan Karadžic´
During our final visit to Bosnia in July 2009, we tried to understand how far the arrest of 
Radovan Karadžic´ one year earlier had gone in redeeming this failure. For many, the long 
overdue arrest produced a jumble of mixed emotions. Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ recalled the rush 
of emotions many experienced upon learning of his capture:
People were very happy and at the same time very sad. In the first moment people 
were on the streets celebrating. In the second moment, when reality hit them, people 
became really sad because they had to wait so long. There were many who cried that 
day, because, okay, it was so easy to do that [yet] he was free all that time. So it was very 
mixed.519
When asked how she felt when she learned of Karadžic´’s arrest, Srebrenica survivor 
Hatidža Mehmedovic´ replied: “We were sad, even then, for the fact that he was rewarded by 
being able to live as a free person for so long despite the fact that our families were murdered 
and killed.” Adding to her sadness, she said, was the realization that “Serbia and Montenegro 
and a significant portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina knew where he was hiding [all along]. 
It was simply the politics that decided the moment he would be arrested.”520 Many victims, 
too, were offended by media coverage, which focused far more on Karadžic´’s life on the run 
than on the crimes that robbed them of their loved ones.521 But if actions speak louder than 
words, many victims reached a new plateau in their ascent from the deepest abyss of loss 
and grief: they traveled to The Hague to see Karadžic´ in the dock. Ahmetaševic´ characterized 
victims’ reactions this way: “Okay, he’s there and now you know he will never come out again; 
now I feel much better.”522 For many, the trial of Radovan Karadžic´ holds forth a promise of 
accomplishing what they had hoped a judgment in the Miloševic´ case would: rounding out the 
judicial record of genocide in Bosnia. 
6. The continuing impunity of Ratko Mladic´
But however important a judgment in the Karadžic´ case, Bosniaks almost universally say that 
justice will not be served if the ICTY fails to gain custody over Ratko Mladic´, who is widely 
seen to be even more culpable than Karadžic´. Though an eloquent wordsmith, Emir Suljagic´ 
says “it’s really hard to verbalize” why he feels it so important to see Mladic´—whom he met 
while serving as a UN translator in Srebrenica—brought before the bar of justice.523 Suljagic´ 
does not expect any court, including the ICTY, to provide “catharsis.” But when Mladic´ is 
brought to justice, he says, “I’m going to camp in The Hague for however long it takes. … [T]
his guy just needs to be removed from this society. This guy does not deserve to share this 
world with us. It’s that simple for me. He doesn’t deserve to share this world with us. That’s 
it. End of story.”524
F. Impact on Returns
During interviews with ICTY officials in The Hague, several mentioned reports they had 
received to the effect that the work of the Tribunal had had an impact on many individuals’ 
willingness to return to homes from which they had been “ethnically cleansed” during the 
1990s, particularly in Prijedor. Only through an interpretive leap (one that our ICTY sources 
did not make themselves) could this be seen as an intended aim of the ICTY.525 Although the 
right of return was enshrined in the Dayton Peace Accord,526 lead responsibility for facilitating 
the return of refugees and internally displaced persons was entrusted to the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees.527
But while contributing to the return of persons forcibly displaced from their homes was 
not an aim of the Tribunal, our sources in The Hague speculated that, if the accounts they had 
heard were correct, the ICTY’s work might have contributed to such returns in two respects. 
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First, individuals who had been forced to flee their homes felt “psychologically safer because 
the world was watching.”528 Second, some individuals known to have been responsible for 
horrific crimes were no longer in a position to deter returns.
Several journalists, too, have reported that in some respects ICTY prosecutions—more 
particularly, the arrests and consequent removal of ICTY suspects—have facilitated the return 
of individuals forcibly displaced by “ethnic cleansing.” In a 2004 article in the New York Review 
of Books, Tim Judah wrote of the remarkable change he saw in Kozarac, a town in the north-
west Bosnian municipality of Prijedor that had been thoroughly “cleansed” of non-Serbs in 
1992. By 2004, Judah wrote, “half the original population [had] returned.” Noting that “the 
rate of return in Kozarac and some nearby towns has been exceptionally high,” Judah offered 
this explanation:
…Bosniaks tell you that far fewer people would have returned had it not been for the 
Hague Tribunal. Nineteen of the local killers and organizers of wartime ethnic cleans-
ing have been indicted, arrested, or effectively removed; as a result people have felt it 
was safe to return home. In eastern Bosnia, where fewer people have been indicted or 
arrested, the rate of return is far lower. This is just one example of the way the court 
affects the region.529
While we did not undertake a comprehensive study of this subject, the reports we 
heard prompted us to include questions about the relationship between ICTY prosecutions 
and returns in our interviews with Bosnians who had returned to their original homes in 
northwest Prijedor and the northern city of Brcˇko. Their responses were broadly consistent 
with several studies that have touched on this issue. We begin by briefly describing key con-
clusions of the latter.
1. Returnees in Prijedor
Out of an estimated prewar population of 4.4 million people, an estimated 2.2 to 2.3 million 
Bosnians were forcibly displaced during and immediately after the war.530 Over a million are 
estimated to have become internally displaced, while the rest became refugees.531 
Despite Dayton’s commitment to the right of return, political scientist Roberto Belloni 
recounts in his study of post-conflict Bosnia, international actors were ambivalent about pro-
moting this right in the early years of peace. Concerned about the security of returnees and 
fearing a potential backlash during the fragile postwar peace, international agencies did not 
ramp up their efforts in this area until a few years after Dayton took effect, and NATO forces 
“insisted that they had no mandate to assist returnees to go home and ensure their safety” 
during the first two years of peace.532 Yet international agencies did not want to permanently 
relocate displaced Bosnians either, lest this consolidate the effects of “ethnic cleansing.”533 
Beyond security concerns, the right of return faced a raft of formidable challenges, not least 
the “dire housing conditions at the end of the war.”534 
While Belloni thus recognizes several formidable barriers to the return of “ethnically 
cleansed” Bosnians to their prewar homes, he identifies the presence of war criminals as a 
contributing factor. In his words, “Post-war initial reluctance to prosecute indicted war crimi-
nals and the lack of gender and ethnic balance of local police forces created additional hurdles 
for women’s return.”535
Eventually, the picture changed and displaced Bosnians began to reclaim their homes 
in substantial numbers.536 Against all odds, returns were most striking in the municipality of 
Prijedor, a place many considered the least likely place for large scale returns.537 As Isabelle 
Wesselingh and Arnaud Vaulerin have written, Prijedor had been “purged of virtually its entire 
non-Serb population during the war, more than forty thousand Muslims and five thousand 
Croats.”538 Yet a decade later, Prijedor was cited as “an exemplary success in achieving the 
‘return of minorities’ not just in Republika Srpska but in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.”539 
What, then, accounts for the turnaround?
Any responsible answer would have to reflect the myriad factors that converged to draw 
displaced persons back to Prijedor. One factor that was essential but not sufficient was that by 
the late 1990s, key international actors devoted substantial “financial, juridical and political” 
efforts to achieve the goal of return.540 Another factor that likely contributed to the high num-
ber of returns to Prijedor is that large numbers of displaced Bosniaks had relocated to Sanski 
Most, which was nearby in Federation territory.541 These displaced persons were more likely 
to return home than those who had started new lives farther away. Moreover, at the time of 
large scale returns, the city of Prijedor had a relatively moderate mayor, who created a climate 
that was supportive of returns.542
Among the most important reasons for the flow of Bosniaks back to Prijedor was the 
dedicated efforts and sheer competence of individuals who were determined not to accept the 
results of “ethnic cleansing.”543 Wesselingh and Vaulerin place particular importance on the 
roles of “two Bosniak leaders, Muharem Murselovic´ and Sead Jakupovic´, who have made a 
crucial contribution to the return of such large numbers of refugees.” The writers note that the 
UNHCR itself had recognized in its 2002 report on Prijedor that “the refugees’ organizational 
capacity and the courage of their leaders are ‘essential elements’ in promoting their return to 
difficult zones.”544
Yet like Belloni, Wesselingh and Vaulerin recognize one other factor—the arrests of 
war criminals in Prijedor, which then ICTY Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt characterized 
as “fairly satisfactory and anyway superior to the level in other zones.”545 It was in British-
patrolled Prijedor that NATO forces made their first arrest of ICTY suspects, and others would 
soon follow.546 Wesselingh, Vaulerin, Belloni and others cite British troops’ action in July 
1997 against two Serbs sought by the ICTY as especially important to Bosnians who had been 
displaced by “ethnic cleansing” in Prijedor. On July 10, 1997, British troops arrested Milan 
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Kovacˇevic´, who was under indictment on genocide and other charges, and shot dead another 
suspect, Simo Drljacˇa, when he resisted arrest. The wartime chief of police in Prijedor, Drljacˇa 
inspired acute fear among displaced Bosniaks, and with good reason. He had “personally 
obstruct[ed] the return of refugees and displaced persons” after the war “by giving weapons 
to the local [Serb] population so that it could threaten anyone who came back.”547 Belloni 
describes the impact of this action:
The July 1997 events had a profound impact. Following SFOR’s overdue activism, [war-
time Prijedor leader] Milomir Stakic´, fearing the possibility that ICTY had issued a 
secret indictment for his arrest, went ‘on permanent vacation’. Instead of the feared 
backlash against international peacekeepers, local authorities switched allegiance from 
the hard line wartime leader Radovan Karadžic´ to the more moderate leadership of 
Biljana Plavšic´ … These changes gave Bosniak potential returnees a sufficient sense of 
security seriously to consider returning.548
The following spring, some 10,000 Bosniaks returned to Kozarac, and others returned 
to the city of Prijedor itself.549 In the view of the International Crisis Group, “The lesson is 
clear: the removal of suspects indicted for war crimes … has a ripple effect that can fundamen-
tally alter the disposition of an area towards [Dayton Peace Agreement] implementation.”550
Our interviews in Prijedor a dozen years later suggest that the arrest of several key 
figures, notably Drljacˇa, probably were crucial to displaced persons’ willingness to return to 
Prijedor. Moreover, the arrests of several other Prijedor suspects helped create a more con-
ducive atmosphere for returns if only because they led other war criminals in Prijedor to lie 
low, fearing they might be next. Yet we repeatedly heard that the impact of the ICTY in this 
respect was limited given the large number of war criminals who remained unindicted and 
in positions of influence in Prijedor. We recount these views in the subsection that follows. 
First, however, it is helpful to understand the view from Prijedor concerning who was, and 
who was not, indicted by the ICTY.
2. The unindicted
Of course, Bosnia is full of crimes that no one has been prosecuted for.551
The Trial Judgment in the case of Milomir Stakic´, the most senior person from Prijedor to 
face trial before the ICTY, describes in passing how Radovan Vokic´ arranged for the transfer 
on two buses of some 120 Muslim men from Keraterm, a detention camp to which they had 
been taken from their homes in Prijedor the day before, to the Omarska camp. One of the 
trial witnesses had compiled a list of “about 60 people he knew personally who were taken 
away on those buses and killed.”552 The corpses of some of the victims were found buried in 
mass graves of men who were killed by gunshot.553 One of the victims was the brother of Edin 
Ramulic´, who was also detained in Keraterm.554
Despite this finding, the ICTY never indicted Vokic´. As we spoke to Edin Ramulic´ at his 
small office in downtown Prijedor in December 2006, he gestured toward his window and 
noted that Vokic´ worked in a small boutique “only 30 meters from here.”555 Ramulic´ asked, 
“And what do you think it is like for me that I have an opportunity to see him on a daily basis? 
I truly hope that one day he will face justice.”556 With the ICTY now winding up its work, 
Ramulic´ said, his efforts to find justice now focus on Bosnia’s State Court.
While Ramulic´ wants to see the man who coordinated his brother’s execution brought 
to justice, he is at least equally passionate about more senior war criminals who were never 
indicted by the ICTY nor removed from office through vetting programs.557 Ramulic´ notes that 
the ICTY indicted only three of the eight members of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor, the Bosnian 
Serb wartime governing structure which helped coordinate the “ethnic cleansing” of Prijedor. 
Just as the Stakic´ trial judgment recorded evidence of Radovan Vokic´’s criminal responsibility, 
it identified five Prijedor Crisis Staff members who were never indicted by the ICTY.558 In con-
sequence, these five—men who, in Ramulic´’s words, were among those “deciding who would 
live and who would die” in Prijedor—were “freely walking around town.”559 More troubling, 
according to Ramulic´, some of them have held positions of influence in Prijedor’s municipal 
government or in publicly owned companies.560 
In light of the pervasive presence of unindicted wartime leaders in Prijedor, Ramulic´ 
believes it would be hard to credit the ICTY with the willingness of displaced persons to return 
to Prijedor. But then, upon reflection, he modified his response: “We cannot say the Hague 
Tribunal did not contribute to the returns at all. In case Simo Drljacˇa wasn’t killed on arrest, 
people would not dare to come back if he was still head of police department… It helped in his 
case.” Moreover, like others we interviewed Ramulic´ observed: “Indirectly, those who commit-
ted war crimes [but were not indicted] got a little bit afraid of justice and the Hague Tribunal, 
but this was the case just in the first years after the war.” 
We asked Muharem Murselovic´, one of the two Bosniaks who played a leading role 
in organizing returns to Prijedor, what if any role ICTY arrests had played in the returns he 
helped mobilize.561 Murselovic´ replied that they had had an influence, but “not too much.” 
He explained: “We should rather say we got hope and expectations” from the arrests of ICTY 
indictees that were carried out. Like others in the region, Murselovic´ noted that many individu-
als who had played more significant roles than the “concentration camp guards” prosecuted 
by the ICTY remained unindicted and in positions of influence in Prijedor. (Still, Murselovic´ 
did not return to Prijedor himself until after Drljacˇa was killed.)
Emsuda Mujagic´, who found refuge in Zagreb during the war and later returned to 
Kozarac, responded this way when asked whether ICTY arrests were a factor in her willingness 
and that of others to return: “It certainly helped some people, it certainly helped.” Yet she, too, 
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says it was “not the major reason for them to come back because we are aware of the fact that 
[the ICTY] has not come up with the results as originally envisaged.”562
Sabahudin Garibovic´, one of only a dozen survivors of a convoy that brought some two 
hundred victims to the site of an infamous mass execution in Koricˇanski Stijene, returned 
to Kozarac in 2000 and now assists others who have returned there. Garibovic´ believes that 
“the fact that some of the war criminals from Prijedor have been prosecuted before the Hague 
Tribunal was a helping factor in people returning here.” He explains the dynamic this way: 
“Basically it helped them to feel more free when they first returned [in the late 1990s] because 
others who were not yet prosecuted were hiding for awhile.” During the period when NATO 
forces were aggressively arresting ICTY suspects in Prijedor, those who were not yet indicted 
or feared that they were under secret indictment kept a low profile, and did not harass return-
ees. But when the ICTY’s completion strategy prevented it from opening new cases, the unin-
dicted war criminals “started walking freely” again “because they probably thought that justice 
will never get them.”563 
3. Brcˇko
Another place where significant numbers of displaced persons have returned is the autono-
mous district of Brcˇko.564 Many, including former ICTY liaison officer in Sarajevo Matias 
Hellman, attribute this primarily to economic conditions in Brcˇko,565 which are more favor-
able than in many other parts of Bosnia.566 But Ferid Omerhodžic´, who was among the first 
Bosniaks to return to Brcˇko, believes that ICTY arrests of two key war criminals were a “huge” 
factor in displaced persons’ willingness to return there.567 The two defendants, Goran Jelisic´ 
and Ranko Cˇešic´, are notorious in the region for their brutality.
Omerhodžic´ himself returned to Brcˇko in 1996 soon after the Dayton Peace Agreement 
entered into effect, before either of these men was arrested. But he says most other displaced 
persons were too afraid to do so at that time. According to Omerhodžic´, 
It was like a huge, major relief knowing those two major perpetrators who committed 
the cruelest war crimes have been arrested. This … gave us a feeling of greater security. 
Now we felt much safer. … Ninety percent of Bosniaks had left [Brcˇko] at the beginning 
of the war; returns were significant after [these two] were arrested. Right after these two 
were arrested we felt a major relief. We started thinking differently. We began to feel 
safer so people began to think about returning.
Omerhodžic´ himself has actively encouraged his former neighbors to return home, 
and found that “it was absolutely harder” to persuade them to do so “before these two were 
arrested.” Even then, “it took lots of energy persuading them” to return since “there were also 
many others on the streets. But still, it was easier after these [two] arrests.”568
Our interviews on the relationship between arrests of ICTY indictees and returns of 
displaced Bosnians were limited, and our concluding observations must accordingly be mod-
est and preliminary. The studies and interviews summarized in this section suggest that when 
combined with other favorable factors, the removal of notorious war criminals can contribute 
to displaced persons’ willingness to return home and probably has had this effect, albeit to a 
limited extent. It seems unlikely, for example, that returns to Prijedor would have been as high 
as they have been if Simo Drjlacˇa were still police chief there. Arrests of other ICTY indictees 
seem to have played only a limited part in easing the climate of intimidation in Prijedor, as 
large numbers of unindicted suspects remained in positions of influence. In a 2005 report, the 
UNHCR identified this as a key factor preventing many from exercising their right of return: 
The presence of suspected war criminals and failure to arrest and prosecute them con-
stitutes an important obstacle to return and affects the sense of security of many return-
ees. Moreover, it is not only that the local police has often not been able to arrest war 
criminals, but the continued presence of suspected war criminals in the local adminis-
tration which hampers trust of the local population and particularly returnees in[] the 
justice system.569
As one of our interlocutors in Sarajevo noted in relation to this issue, “the ICTY of 
course could not solve all these problems.”570 Other organizations have been responsible for 
vetting the Bosnian police and judiciary.571 Finally, our interviews with returnees, who noted 
the large numbers of unindicted perpetrators at large, may once again point up the need to 
ensure that victims and other citizens of countries where an international court has become 
engaged have realistic expectations of what the tribunal can and cannot accomplish.
 
G. Bearing Witness
While we heard extensive criticisms of the ICTY during our research interviews in Bosnia, 
it bears noting that many of the fiercest criticisms came from representatives of victims’ 
associations whose members have repeatedly served as witnesses in ICTY cases and which, 
organizationally, have helped the ICTY identify potential witnesses. Perhaps as much as any 
other recurring pattern in our interviews, this paradox seemed to capture many Bosnians’ 
conflicted attitudes toward the Tribunal. Saša Madacki evokes Bosnians’ ambivalence this way: 
“I hate the Tribunal but I need the Tribunal.”572
Yet to note that many victims remain committed to testifying as witnesses in The Hague 
is not to say that their experiences as witnesses have been pleasant. As Eric Stover chronicled 
in his 2005 book about people who have testified at the ICTY, The Witnesses, their experiences 
there have hardly been ideal. Many witnesses who are the subject of protective measures—
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their names are not publicly disclosed in judgments; their identity is obscured in court, for 
example—enjoy little protection when they return home, if home is still in Bosnia.573 Although 
a majority of these witnesses have not faced serious problems as a result of their testimony, 
some have been harassed and even been targets of violence.574 
During our interviews with members of victims’ associations in Republika Srpska, this 
concern came up regularly. Emsuda Mujagic´, who leads an NGO based in Kozarac, said that 
“protected witnesses … as a matter of fact have no protection whatsoever.” She says that the 
combined effect of defendants’ short sentences and the lack of meaningful protection for wit-
nesses once they return home, “means a continuation of the torture for the victims today.”575 
So it is noteworthy that many witnesses who have every reason to say “enough” say they 
will testify before the ICTY whenever called to do so.576 Nusreta Sivac has been a witness in The 
Hague several times. A judge before the war, Sivac has been unable to return to her chosen 
profession, reportedly as retaliation by local Serb authorities for her testifying in The Hague. 
Indeed, she has been unable to find employment in the municipality where she lives, and has 
to commute to a town in the Federation for work. Despite the price Sivac has paid and the fact 
that “her freedom is under threat,” her associate Emsuda Mujagic´ notes, Sivac has ultimately 
remained willing to bear witness when asked because she knows what her testimony “means 
to justice, which has a higher importance.”577 
For many witnesses, testifying before the ICTY is important for reasons that can easily 
get lost in Bosnians’ long list of legitimate concerns. Their chief reason is moral, not instru-
mental, and it sifts down to a deeply felt need to bear witness for those who did not survive 
“ethnic cleansing.” In his study of ICTY witnesses, Stover writes that a majority of those he 
interviewed “stressed the compelling need to tell their story. They had survived unspeakable 
crimes while others had perished; it was their ‘moral duty’ to ensure that the truth about the 
death of family members, neighbors, and colleagues was duly recorded and acknowledged.”578
Time and again, we heard of similar motivations for testifying before the ICTY. Muha-
rem Murselovic´, the returnee activist in Prijedor, was detained in the infamous Omarska camp 
for the crime of being Muslim and has been a willing witness in several ICTY cases. Like the 
witnesses described in Stover’s study, Murselovic´ testifies out of a deep sense of duty toward 
those who perished: “I am obliged to witness, to testify on behalf of hundreds of my friends 
who have been murdered in Prijedor whose guilt was the same as mine. I survived that hell 
and I never regretted for the fact that I witnessed.”579
Goran Jelisic´ played a notorious part in the “ethnic cleansing” of Brcˇko. In its summary 
of the Jelisic´ case, the ICTY Web site recalls Jelisic´’s arrival in Brcˇko during the war: “He intro-
duced himself as the “Serb Adolf,” said that he had come to Brcˇko to kill Muslims and often 
informed the Muslim detainees and others of the numbers of Muslims he had killed.” Hun-
dreds of Muslim and Croat men and several women were taken to the Luka camp, formerly 
a warehouse just outside of Brcˇko, where they were “under armed guard and systematically 
killed.” Almost every day during that period, Jelisic´ “entered the Luka camp’s main hangar 
where most detainees were kept, selected detainees for interrogation, beat them and then often 
shot and killed them.”
Džafer Deronjic´ narrowly escaped being killed in Luka but is tormented by his perfect 
recall. “I remember everything,” he said, explaining why he was asked to testify in the Jelisic´ 
case. “I remember each time somebody lost a piece of his body” in Luka. For the past eight 
years, Deronjic´ told us, “I do not sleep at all,” and testifying against Jelisic´ did nothing to 
calm his nightmares. Yet when we asked if he wanted to testify, Deronjic´ did not hesitate: 
“Absolutely yes. It is in the interest of us all who survived the tortures to tell the truth, to tell 
the world what it was like. …”580
H. Concluding Observations
As this chapter reflects, many Bosnians are disappointed in the ICTY’s performance, some 
profoundly so. Yet, at least among the Bosnians we interviewed, the dominant view was that 
it was important to create “the Hague Tribunal.” Deronjic´ summed up his assessment of the 
court in terms that captured succinctly many of our interlocutors’ views: “As far as the Hague 
Tribunal, I’m not happy with its work. But the great thing was to have it established. It was 
excellent that it was established.”581 
 Many, like journalist Gojko Beric´, shudder to imagine what their country would be like 
were it not for the ICTY: “If there was no Hague, Miloševic´ would probably still be in power. 
If nothing else, he would at least be the head of his political party. Many ICTY convicts would 
still be active in politics and at this moment, summertime, these individuals would probably 
be having their vacations in some summer resort.”582 Senad Pec´anin, too, imagines a parallel 
universe without the ICTY. In his, “Probably Radovan Karadžic´ would be a member of Parlia-
ment. Ratko Mladic´ could be chief of staff of the army. Hundreds of war criminals could be 
highly ranked in all parts of state institutions. Without the ICTY, there would be no chance to 
have prosecutions of these most responsible people. If we put a hundred minuses, this one 
thing is heavier than all handicaps.”583 
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V. Truth and Acknowledgment
The official history of our region is being written in The Hague. There are so many different 
histories being offered here. … Now, through the Hague process… we can get the complete 
picture.584
Even with the ICTY, there are three truths.585
We have a big problem here regarding acknowledgment of the truth. Because you see it is 
well known to all that several alleged truths exist—Muslims’ truth, Serbs’ truth, and Croats’ 
truth.586
As we have noted, “justice for its own sake” emerged during our interviews as the most impor-
tant justification for the ICTY’s work for most of our Bosnian interlocutors. Yet many Bosnians 
also hoped the justice secured in The Hague would have a broader impact in the Balkans. 
And what mattered most to many is that the “truth” about wartime atrocities established in 
ICTY judgments be publicly accepted as factual truth and condemned without reservation or 
equivocation. 
In a setting where the overwhelming majority of wartime atrocities were committed 
by Serbs, it is particularly important to members of ethnic groups who bore the brunt of 
these crimes that Bosnian Serbs accept the “trial truth” established in The Hague and express 
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remorse for crimes committed in their name. For many, this is seen as a precondition to 
reconciliation; for others, this type of acknowledgment is seen as a proxy for reconciliation—
a key indicator of how far Bosnia has come in the process of social repair.
The issue of acknowledgment by Serbs looms especially large in the aspirations of many 
(non-Serb) Bosnians for another reason. As we noted in Chapter III and discuss in more detail 
here, denial has been a distinctive, though hardly uniform, feature of Serb discourse about 
wartime atrocities committed by Serbs. As Saša Madacki put it, “one part of the country is in 
constant denial.”587 Serbs’ unwillingness to acknowledge the complete truth of “ethnic cleans-
ing” has deepened survivors’ personal suffering and perpetuated the social rupture between 
Bosnia’s ethnic communities. Journalist Gojko Beric´ evoked the latter when, speculating about 
what would happen if the ICTY were to convict Radovan Karadžic´ of genocide but this finding 
were rejected by Bosnian Serbs, he said: “It’s not justice. In that case, we will have no trust 
among people.”588
Looking to broader issues of political community, persistent forms of denial are antithet-
ical to the notion of a national society that has achieved “common agreement on an interpreta-
tion of the past.”589 Although no one we interviewed believes that dispelling the fog of denial 
or justification would come solely or even principally through the work of the ICTY, those who 
emphasized this point hoped that the Tribunal’s findings of individual guilt, achieved through 
the crucible of criminal process, would radically shrink the margins of plausible denial.590 
 Many of our interlocutors—in particular urban intellectuals—emphasized that in their 
view, a crucial indicator of the ICTY’s success in fostering acknowledgement is whether lead-
ers and citizens within each of the country’s three major ethnic groups accept that members 
of their own ethnic group committed atrocities and acknowledge that this was wrong. Some 
made clear that this is important not only as a gesture of reciprocal acknowledgment and 
remorse. It is also, they say, how it will be clear that Bosnia has transcended the divisions 
that make most citizens view matters of consequence, such as responsibility for war crimes, 
through an ethnic prism. What is important is that Bosnians recover a common commitment 
to core values—that war crimes are wrong, whoever commits them.
In this chapter we address two principal questions: First, to what extent have Bosnians 
taken on board the factual conclusions set forth in ICTY judgments and acknowledged that 
wartime atrocities committed by members of their own ethnic group deserve unqualified 
condemnation? Second, within the bounds of what is possible and appropriate for a judicial 
institution, has the ICTY performed as well as it could in ensuring that facts established in its 
judgments as well as basic information about the nature of its work, are known and under-
stood in Bosnia?
A. Acknowledging and Condemning Atrocities
1. Acknowledgment by Serbs
As recently as September 2009, Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik ques-
tioned Serb responsibility for wartime massacres of civilians in Tuzla and Sarajevo, suggesting 
that Muslims had staged the events.591 The ICTY and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had by then determined that Bosnian Serb forces had carried out these attacks.592 Dodik’s com-
ments marked a recent nadir in public discourse, and at the end of this section we place his 
remarks in a broader context of troubling developments in Bosnia. We first consider whether, 
at least until the recent deterioration in Bosnia’s political landscape, there had been overall 
movement toward greater acknowledgment of wartime atrocities. 
Particularly during interviews in late 2006, we heard from a number of individuals 
who are in a position to observe trends over time that the prevailing rhetoric among Bos-
nian Serbs had changed—in particular, that it is relatively rare to hear the extreme brand of 
outright denial that Dodik expressed593—but that most Bosnian Serbs remained unwilling to 
acknowledge the extent of Serb responsibility for wartime atrocities and express unequivocal 
remorse. For example, Matias Hellman, then the ICTY’s liaison officer in Sarajevo, told us in 
late 2006 that the prevailing Serb discourse was not to deny that Serbs committed wartime 
atrocities but to suggest that the ICTY was biased against Serbs in its case selection, asking 
questions like, “Why haven’t you dealt with this crime against Serb victims?”594 Speaking well 
before Dodik’s recent remarks, civil society activist Mervan Mirašcˇija described the discourse 
of Bosnian Serb leaders this way:
Serbian politicians like Dodik realize they should talk about war crimes as something 
that was bad, they will say that people who committed them should be punished. They 
insist on individualization, but they won’t say there were no crimes. They may add, 
“but Serbs were also victims.” But they realize that it’s not profitable to deny. That’s a 
change.595
Rather than deny that Serbs committed wide-scale and systematic wartime atrocities, 
then, Serb leaders invoke the principle of individualization advanced by the ICTY itself, imply-
ing that such crimes as were committed were acts of individuals, not ones that engage broader 
responsibility among Serbs or leaders who acted in their names. 
As we note below, the related notion that “war crimes deserve to be punished whoever 
committed them” was a common theme in our interviews throughout Bosnia, across ethnic 
lines. The frequency with which this is affirmed may be a testament to the effectiveness of 
the ICTY’s normative power. But the phrase is also often invoked among Bosnian Serbs as a 
watchword for what many other Bosnians describe as an effort to equalize crimes committed 
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by members of all three major ethnic groups. Journalist Gojko Beric´ describes the prevailing 
Serb discourse this way: “Serbs, as is well known, would like to equalize those war crimes, 
make them relative by using the thesis that all three sides committed crimes in wartime and 
they claim that only Serbs are being prosecuted in The Hague—which of course is notorious 
nonsense.”596
Our interviews in the Republika Srpska (RS) town of Focˇa, where “ethnic cleansing” was 
brutally effective, captured in microcosm what is said to be the prevailing discourse among 
Bosnian Serbs. Josip Davidovic´, who represents an association of families of Serb soldiers 
killed during the war, expressed what he described as the common view in Focˇa:
The opinion that rules this town … is that all war crimes by all sides should be pros-
ecuted, on all three sides. But we believe that the war crimes against Serbs are not pros-
ecuted in the same volume as in the case of war crimes against Bosniaks and Croats. 
We also stand on the opinion that The Hague is established to bring Serbs to trial…. We 
also stand on the opinion that The Hague is a political court.597
As we noted in Chapter III, Focˇa has the chilling distinction of being the first town in 
history to produce a verdict finding that sexual slavery occurred in circumstances amounting 
to the crime against humanity of enslavement. When asked if he thought the defendants 
from Focˇa who had been convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity deserved to 
be punished, Davidovic´ said “yes,” and added: “All those who committed war crimes deserve 
to be tried… Whoever committed crimes should be brought before the face of justice.” Yet 
like many Bosnian Serbs, he insists that the number of persons the ICTY has prosecuted for 
crimes committed against Serbs is “so minor compared to trials against Serbs. It’s almost 
negligible.” As for the sentences imposed on the Focˇa defendants—the same sentences victims 
from Focˇa found painfully short598— Davidovic´ told us that “public opinion” among Serbs in 
Focˇa is that the sentences “are too high.”599 
Noting that several of the ICTY’s defendants came from “this town,” Gordan Kalajdžic´, 
an officer of an RS veterans’ group in Focˇa, continued: “It’s our opinion that the guilt is indi-
vidual and everyone should be responsible for what he did. So my organization never stood 
behind those [defendants]. If they have committed war crimes, they should be held respon-
sible.” Going farther than Josip Davidovic´ in acknowledging the broader truth of patterns of 
abuses during the war, Kalajdžic´ says, “The truth is the Bosniaks were the major victims. They 
suffered the most.” Yet he also went farther than Davidovic´ into the dominion of denial, saying 
that the executions of Muslims in Srebrenica were a “gesture of revenge by one segment of 
the Serb army for what the Bosnian Army did to Serbs in the first two years of the war.” And, 
he said, “it takes two to fight.” Like Davidovic´, Kalajdžic´ told us, “We Serbs see [the Hague 
Tribunal] as a political court” that does not treat everyone equally.600
We encountered another brand of non-acknowledgement when we interviewed Ljubiša 
Simovic´, president of the Association of Displaced and Refugees in Republika Srpska. When 
asked about the defendants from Focˇa who had been found guilty of bone-chilling crimes, 
Simovic´ could only talk about how upsetting their arrests had been. Indeed, he went on at 
some length about how “traumatic” it was for the defendants’ families when SFOR troops 
arrested the suspects. Like others, Simovic´ said the ICTY did not treat all sides equally, but 
instead focused on Serbs. Even so, he said “it was correct to form this court. But the way in 
which it works,” he added, “is not OK.”601
We heard a more determined form of denial from Nedjeljko Mitrovic´, president of the 
Republika Srpska Association of Families of Missing Persons in the RS capital of Banja Luka. 
Like others whom we interviewed in RS, Mitrovic´ affirmed that “whoever committed war 
crimes deserves to be punished” and even said that “whoever was prosecuted before the ICTY 
deserves to be.” Yet he referred to the three and one-half year siege of Sarajevo by Bosnian 
Serbs—for which two Bosnian Serbs have been convicted before the ICTY—as the “so-called 
siege.”602 In response to a request for clarification, Mitrovic´ replied that Sarajevo was a “front 
line” in a two-way war. When reminded that Serbs targeted civilians in Sarajevo throughout the 
siege, he immediately conceded the point but moved on to what he apparently sees as firmer 
ground: The ICTY is “one-sided, partial, biased.”603
In these and other interviews we heard what might be seen as progress in the sense 
that our Bosnian Serb interlocutors did not generally deny that Serbs committed specific 
war crimes (Mitrovic´’s comments aside) and often said that those who did deserved to be 
prosecuted. But many of our Bosnian Serb interlocutors went a long way toward neutralizing 
the point by asserting that: 1) everyone committed war crimes; 2) it is mainly Serbs who are 
prosecuted by a “political court”; and 3) the few Bosniaks who have been prosecuted have 
received lenient sentences.
Later we consider several contextual factors accounting for Bosnian Serbs’ failure to 
acknowledge fully and condemn war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs. For now, we note 
the relevance of a dynamic that one of our interlocutors in Focˇa, Josip Davidovic´, came close 
to acknowledging: strong peer pressure. In a tone that suggested he realized how his remarks 
must have sounded, Davidovic´ said near the end of our interview: “You have to be partial or 
biased when it is about your people, you have to be partial. This is an unwritten rule, regard-
less of how much you would like it to be different.”604 
Davidovic´ might have added that “you have to be partial” especially when speaking to 
foreign interviewer who may quote your remarks in a public report. During interviews in 
Prijedor, we were told that local Serbs “unofficially acknowledge” the ethnic cleansing that 
happened there during the war but, with rare exception, will not do so publicly. One of the 
few local Serbs who has acknowledged that Serbs in Prijedor committed “ethnic cleansing” 
wholesale, Milimir Popovic´, told us “many [Serbs] talk like this but won’t come out and [do 
so publicly].”605
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2. Srebrenica
Understandably, many Bosniaks (and others) consider Serb leaders’ and other Bosnian Serbs’ 
treatment of the genocide in Srebrenica as a key indicator of how far Serbs have traveled on the 
road to acknowledgement. As we chronicle in this section, recent years have seen significant 
progress in this regard, yet many Serbs remain unwilling to acknowledge that Bosnian Serb 
forces committed genocide in Srebrenica and to express remorse for their actions. 
Given the staggering scale of the slaughter and the systematically discriminatory fash-
ion in which at least 7,000 executions were organized, it would be impossible to deny the 
nature of the crime or to blame it on aberrant actors. Yet when Serbian authorities published 
an analysis of wartime atrocities in September 2002, the resulting document was a study 
in distancing, distortion, and denial. Issued more than a year after an ICTY Trial Chamber 
had ruled that the July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica was a genocide,606 the report stunned 
Federation authorities and citizens, as well as the international community. Time magazine 
summarized reactions to the report and its key findings this way:
Authorities in the Federation Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the interna-
tional community have severely condemned a report released by authorities in the 
Republika Srpska claiming the July 1995 massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica 
never happened. Though it is widely accepted that between 7,000 and 8,000 Bos-
niak men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serb forces when they took con-
trol of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia between 11 and 15 July 1995, the report offers 
a completely different story, blaming deaths on “exhaustion,” among other things.
The report—conducted in early September by the Republika Srpska’s Government 
Bureau for Relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)—claims that no more than 2,000 were killed, and that all were armed soldiers 
of the Bosnian Army and not civilians. Of those 2,000, the new study says that 1,600 
were killed in battle or while attempting escape, and 100 died simply because they were 
“exhausted.” The study also claims that it is possible that fewer than 200 members of 
the Bosnian Army were killed by members of the Bosnian Serb Army in acts of revenge 
or because they were not aware of the particulars of the Geneva Convention on prison-
ers of war.607
International organizations working in Bosnia were dismayed. The International Com-
mission on Missing Persons (ICMP) issued a statement noting that the RS report’s treatment 
of missing persons “contains what ICMP believes to be serious inaccuracies” and placing these 
in a broader context: “Manipulation of the issue of the missing for political purposes, includ-
ing the manipulation of numbers of missing, has been an ongoing practice within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that only serves to cause further pain and suffering in a society that has already 
suffered so much.”608 Then High Representative Paddy Ashdown said the report’s findings 
were “so far from the truth as to be almost not worth dignifying with a response. It is tenden-
tious, preposterous, and inflammatory.”609
The next two years brought a significant turnabout, however. During the 2003 anni-
versary of the Srebrenica massacre, then RS Prime Minister Dragan Mikerevic´ attended the 
annual commemoration ceremony in Potoc´ari for the first time.610 Mikerevic´ also acknowl-
edged that the by-then well established crimes had to be addressed, although he apparently 
did not use the word genocide: “These reports prove that there was a crime here. One needs 
to learn from one’s mistakes, and there have been a lot of mistakes in our history.”611
A mandate from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to conduct an investiga-
tion to establish the full truth relating to the Srebrenica massacre led to the next milestone. 
The commission established pursuant to the OHR mandate, which included one international 
and one Bosniak member, issued its report (later supplemented) on June 11, 2004.612 For the 
first time, RS authorities themselves compiled data on almost 7,800 victims of the Srebrenica 
massacre and identified 32 previously unknown mass grave sites.613 The report also stated that 
the perpetrators of the massacre “undertook measures to cover up the crime by moving the 
bodies” to other sites.614
Less than two weeks later, then RS President Dragan Cˇavic´ appeared on RS television. 
In his extraordinary remarks, Cˇavic´—a member of the party of Radovan Karadžic´—said that 
the report “undoubtedly establishes that in nine days of July 1995 atrocities were committed in 
the area of Srebrenica.” Then, in words that Bosniaks quote to the present day, he continued: 
“I have to say that these nine days of July of the Srebrenica tragedy represent a black page 
in the history of the Serb people.”615 The RS government itself issued an apology after the 
commission issued its final report.616 Even so, today Bosniaks often cite these events more 
to illustrate the resilience of Serb denial than to celebrate a watershed in the road toward 
acknowledgment. After quoting Cˇavic´’s historic “black page in history” statement, our inter-
locutors typically proceeded to note that Cˇavic´ lost his bid for re-election in 2006.617
Another moment of truth came in February 2007, when the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ruled that Bosnian Serbs committed genocide in Srebrenica.618 The ICJ’s key 
legal and factual conclusions relied heavily on the ICTY’s judgments, including in particular 
in the Krstic´ case.619
RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik’s first response to the judgment was to reject its 
finding of genocide and attribute the Srebrenica killings to rogue elements of the Bosnian 
Serb army.620 Accordingly, he said, individuals had to be held accountable, not the institu-
tions or people of RS.621 Two days after the ICJ rendered its judgment, the government of 
Republika Srpska issued a statement “express[ing] its deepest regret for the crimes commit-
ted against non-Serbs during the recent war in Bosnia and condemn[ing] all persons who 
took part in these crimes.”622 The government said it was “essential that a deepest apology be 
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extended to the victims, their families and friends, regardless of their ethnicity,”623 but appar-
ently stopped short of acknowledging political responsibility for genocide committed by its 
own armed forces. Again, the picture was mixed: While the RS government’s response to the 
judgment went farther in condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica than would have 
been imaginable ten years earlier, it also took care to avoid language of unqualified acceptance 
of responsibility, if only political.
In somewhat similar fashion, in late March 2010 the Serbian Parliament adopted an 
unprecedented declaration “condemning in strongest terms the crime committed in July 
1995 against Bosniak population of Srebrenica” and apologizing to the families of the vic-
tims.  Notably, however, the declaration avoided any reference to genocide.  What was still a 
landmark acknowledgment of the underlying facts was then further undermined by the parlia-
ment’s “expectation that the highest authorities in other states in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia will in the same way condemn crimes committed against the Serbs, and apologize 
and express condolences to the families of the Serb victims.”624 
To the extent that there has been movement in the direction of Serb acknowledgement 
of the Srebrenica genocide, a question of special relevance to this study is whether or to what 
degree the ICTY’s work has been a contributing factor (compared to, for example, the RS 
Commission report released in 2004). Damir Arnaut, a senior legal advisor to the Bosniak 
member of the BiH Presidency, is convinced that the ICTY’s finding in Krstic´ that Bosnian 
Serbs committed genocide in Srebrenica had a significant impact in this regard. Arnaut con-
cedes that there are enduring indicators of denial, such as the opposition of Serb members of 
parliament to a resolution that would declare July 11 a day of remembrance for the victims of 
genocide in Srebrenica (the interview in which he expressed this view took place some eight 
months before the aforementioned declaration by Serbia’s Parliament).625 But Arnaut believes 
that Krstic´ changed the dynamic between members of the ethnic groups who are represented 
in Bosnia’s trifurcated national government. Whereas in 1998–1999 it was common to hear 
Serbs deny that there was a genocide in Srebrenica, he notes, now “there is no denial that 
genocide happened.”626 On the level of daily interactions, Arnaut continued, “it helps that 
there are judicial findings. … When you talk about other issues, this elephant isn’t in the 
room” anymore.627
Like Arnaut, journalist Ivan Lovrenovic´ thinks that the Krstic´ judgment had a discern-
ible impact on the way that Serb politicians talked about Srebrenica. He attributes this to the 
judgment’s reminder that the international community is aware of what happened and will 
not allow the issue go away. And yet, Lovrenovic´ continued, “that’s when [Serb politicians] 
intensively started working on discovering victims on their side.” Whereas they had previously 
been “completely quiet even about their own victims,” after Krstic´ they were trying “to equalize 
[by saying] that Serbs were victims the same as others.”628
3. Acknowledgement on the part of other ethnic groups
Measured against an ideal to which many Bosnians aspire,629 in which leaders and individu-
als from all of Bosnia’s ethnic groups publicly acknowledge crimes committed by members 
of their own ethnic group and condemn them, no one would—and none of our interlocu-
tors did—claim that Bosnia has achieved this ideal. As noted in Chapter II, Bosniak political 
leaders have from the beginning of the post-Dayton period been willing to cooperate with 
the ICTY by ensuring that Bosniak suspects appear in The Hague. Still, like leaders of other 
ethnic groups, Bosniak political figures have treated defendants who return from The Hague 
as heroes.
As was often noted during our interviews, when the Bosnian army commander in Sre-
brenica, Naser Oric´, returned to Bosnia after his initial conviction (later overturned on appeal) 
and minimal sentence for crimes committed against Serb detainees, he was welcomed as a war 
hero.630 The Bosniak chairman of the Bosnian Presidency, Sulejman Tihic´, publicly welcomed 
the verdict as a vindication: “Now it can clearly be seen who was defending unarmed civilians 
and who was committing crimes,” Tihic´ said.631 Reflecting on Oric´’s reception as a war hero, 
Sevima Sali-Terzic´ said, “People celebrated Oric´ here, they didn’t understand he was guilty 
of anything.” (Again, this interview took place after Oric´’s conviction at trial but before his 
exoneration on appeal.) Sali-Terzic´ continued: “As long as someone found guilty of war crimes 
is celebrated as a hero something is terribly wrong, with politicians and with the people.”632 
Dobrila Govedarica noted that, apart from intellectuals—including the cosmopolitan 
media—there is “no understanding” among Bosniaks that “war crimes could also be com-
mitted by Bosniak soldiers.” If one raises the issue of war crimes for which Bosniaks have 
been prosecuted before the ICTY, the reaction is often defensive because condemning these 
crimes “could be seen as equalizing guilt.”633 We certainly encountered this reaction in some 
interviews: a number of Bosniaks expressed concern that the ICTY’s prosecution of Bosniaks 
was an effort to establish a “national balance” among perpetrators.634 Noting that a reluctance 
to confront war crimes by members of one’s own ethnic community was common in all three 
major ethnic groups in Bosnia, Govedarica said “Ninety-nine percent of Bosnians think of war 
crimes in terms of ethnic groups and from my point of view that’s a problem.”635
If the situation today is far from where it should be, some see overall progress com-
pared to the postwar years. Journalist Senad Pec´anin recalled that in 1997, Dani investigated 
war crimes committed by Bosniaks; most but not all of the victims were “innocent Serbs.” 
The story got picked up by the international media—and the journalists were attacked by the 
Bosniak leadership. Pec´anin recalled, “it was a terrible experience for us [we] received a lot of 
threats” and a bomb was thrown into Dani’s office. But “things have changed.” Now, he says, 
even leading politicians acknowledge that members of their ethnic group committed crimes. 
Still, among “ordinary people” within each ethnic group, there is an overriding focus on having 
“their own suffering acknowledged.”636
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4. Contextual considerations
Our interlocutors offered several explanations for the persistent patterns described above. 
Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ offered a social-psychological insight: “Sometimes the Hague Tribunal 
is like a mirror and if you see an ugly face, you reject it. But you know it’s true. But officially, 
you say ‘I’m nicer, etc.’”637 Others see the hand of historical memory, which weighs heavily 
in the Balkans, at play in many Bosnians’ reluctance to accept the truth about crimes com-
mitted by members of their own ethnic group. Reflecting on why many Bosnian Croats are 
reluctant to accept the guilt of Bosnian Croat defendants whom the ICTY convicted of war 
crimes, Dobrila Govedarica invoked a broader context: Croats, she recalled, have long been 
blamed in the Balkans for crimes committed in World War II, when their state was allied 
with Nazi Germany. “Finally, they get to a point where the Serbs, who took almost all the 
credit for being on the right side in World War II, are the most guilty ones” in the 1990s war. 
In addition, there is a deep-rooted perception that those who defend themselves cannot, by 
definition, commit a crime. In this setting, there are “strong psychological reasons to resist 
accepting responsibility.”638 
But while psychological dynamics are important, virtually everyone in Bosnia faults 
political leaders for perpetuating ethnic perspectives. As Mervan Mirašcˇija put it, “politicians 
use [the ICTY] for their own aims.”639 Likewise noting that “politicians maintain ethnic divi-
sionism to retain power,” Savima Sali-Terzic´ added that the attention Bosniak politicians pay 
to ICTY indictments “is a tool in pre-elections.”640
During the past year-and-a-half, RS leader Milorad Dodik has threatened secession if the 
Serb entity is not granted greater autonomy,641 and provoked a political crisis when he issued 
a decree purporting to nullify state institutions. Acknowledging Serb responsibility for geno-
cide, many point out, is hardly supportive of his political agenda. Conversely, Bosniak leader 
Haris Siladžic´ condemns the Serb entity as a creature of genocide642 and pivoted off the ICJ’s 
February 2007 genocide judgment to demand that Srebrenica be wrested from Serb control.643 
While many Srebrenica survivors we interviewed agree with his position, Bosnian intellectuals 
widely believe that Bosniak political leaders have nurtured victims’ suffering to entrench their 
own political positions, just as Serb leaders have perpetuated an anti-ICTY stance to advance 
a self-serving political agenda.644 A point emphasized by many of our interlocutors is that 
Bosniak leaders have “used and misused victims’ associations.”645 More generally, speaking 
of the issue of war crimes, Dobrila Govedarica noted, “political leaders aren’t very responsible 
when this issue is about.”646
Analyzing Bosnia’s complex political landscape is beyond the province of this report, 
but it is necessary to note that the ICTY’s impact in Bosnia, as elsewhere in the Balkans, is 
mediated by domestic political figures and the local media. With ethnic relationships in Bosnia 
tenser than they have been in years,647 Bosnians like Emir Suljagic´ wonder, “How do you trans-
late judicial findings of the Tribunal into political facts under these kind of circumstances?”648 
More generally, Bosnians’ perceptions of the ICTY and of its judgments appear to be at least 
in part a function of the specific ethno-political context in which they are situated.649 
Beyond recent political trends, a recurring theme pressed by many of our interlocutors 
is that Bosnians’ tendency to view issues, including those relating to war crimes, through an 
ethnic prism is in large part a legacy of Dayton. Journalist Ivan Lovrenovic´ made the point 
this way: “The scheme of ethnic conflict going on in wartime was in a way verified politically 
through the Dayton Peace Agreement. The military dimension has been removed, the war fin-
ished. Metaphorically speaking, it moved on to the political field and it’s still on today.” In this 
context, he says, the ICTY’s work is filtered through an ethnic lens, with each group approv-
ing of verdicts convicting “war criminals from the other ethnic group” and faulting the ICTY 
“when it reaches a verdict from our ethnic group.” In this setting, it is unlikely that establish-
ing facts at trial can by itself dispel denial. “Metaphorically, the ears are stuffed with cotton.”650
Later we consider how well has the ICTY performed in meeting the challenges pre-
sented by local actors who mediate the meaning of its judgments and who are key sources of 
most Bosnians’ information about the ICTY. First, however, we take up Bosnians’ perceptions 
of the significance of the ICTY’s verdicts in their own right.
B. Establishing the Truth
While many of our interlocutors in Bosnia are discouraged that “three versions of the truth” 
persist fourteen years after Dayton, we did not interview anyone who concluded that the ICTY 
was for that reason a failure. Instead, many believe that disappointments in this regard make 
the Tribunal’s role in establishing facts all the more important.
For victims who suffered unspeakable crimes, the affirmation in ICTY verdicts that their 
nightmare really happened—that a specific person was responsible and that what he did was 
criminal—appears to be all the more important in the face of denial by those who abetted the 
perpetrators through acquiescence or active support. Omarska survivor Muharem Murselovic´ 
evoked this notion when he told us he is “most satisfied with the realistic reflection of what 
happened in Prijedor through [the ICTY’s] verdicts and sentences.”651 Noting that the Tribunal 
has “extremely rich documentation” of Prijedor’s nightmarish experience, Murselovic´ said: 
“With that documentation, with those verdicts … the truth about the situation in Prijedor 
has been established, and this is the largest, the major achievement of the ICTY.”652 A recent 
study of victims in the area, however, suggests that even this achievement still pales against 
the prevailing reality with which they must contend on a daily basis.653
Noting that ICTY cases “established a lot of things that people forgot about,” journalist 
Nerma Jelacˇic´ observed that “it matters for [victims] so much.” Without its work, she says, “you 
wouldn’t be able to counter the political truth.” This is not to say that politicians have stopped 
manipulating the truth. But now “you have the alternative you can counter with.654 Sinan Alic´, 
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a journalist who directs the non-governmental organization “Foundation Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation,” believes that the work of the ICTY is “very important for the whole process 
of reconciliation because among us we would never be able to come to terms with what hap-
pened—are some war criminals? Was Srebrenica a genocide?” Alic´ recognizes that even with 
the ICTY, “there is no consensus and it will continue long after I am dead.” Nevertheless, he 
thinks the situation would be far worse “if there were no ICTY,” and believes it has already 
“made it harder to deny abuses.”655
Zdravko Grebo thinks that “it is an important test of the Hague Tribunal to prevent 
denial.” But like others, he does not conclude that the widespread treatment of war criminals 
as “national heroes” by “their ethnic group” means its work has not succeeded. “People can 
always say it didn’t happen but now there are documents. … Finally, you cannot say I didn’t 
know.”656 As for the question whether the Krstic´ judgment has had the sort of effect Damir 
Arnaut described on a wider scale, its importance to many Bosnians may be that, even if 
many still resist its finding of genocide, the deniers have been definitively judged to be wrong. 
Mirsad Tokacˇa may have had this in mind when he described what he called the Krstic´ judg-
ment’s importance “for Bosnian society”: “Finally there is no dilemma. … After this decision, 
there is no negation and refusing of the fact that genocide happened.”657
A number of our interlocutors, while acknowledging that the ICTY’s work has not yet 
persuaded Bosnians to acknowledge fully wartime atrocities, expressed the belief that its his-
torical legacy will be crucial in establishing a commonly accepted history in the future. Emir 
Suljagic´ believes the ICTY has thoroughly failed to achieve the main goals he says it set for 
itself—countering impunity and promoting reconciliation. But when asked if, in light of this, 
it was a mistake to establish the ICTY, he (like virtually everyone we interviewed) responded 
adamantly, “No, no!,” and explains that despite these failures the Tribunal has achieved some-
thing deeply consequential. Because of its work, there are “adjudicated facts that we can call 
upon, and that we can point to, that we can try and learn from and build upon which would 
not have been there had it not been for the Tribunal.” In his view, this alone “has justified its 
existence.”658 
C. Destruction of Personal Artifacts
While the ICTY’s “adjudicated facts” and the evidence that will become part of its archives may 
rank among its most important contributions, a disclosure in mid-2009 about the prosecu-
tor’s treatment of one source of evidence has been deeply unsettling for many Bosnians.659 
ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz confirmed reports that his office had disposed of some 
1,000 personal artifacts found in mass graves in late 2005 and early 2006 because they were 
“deteriorating, and presented a risk to health,” according to the prosecutor’s spokesperson, 
Olga Kavran.660 Except for this general explanation and Kavran’s suggestion that this action 
is standard procedure for prosecutors’ offices, the ICTY prosecutor has not clarified the cir-
cumstances behind this episode or indicated why efforts were not made to allow access to the 
destroyed artifacts for purposes of DNA testing and the like.
Survivors who have literally lost every tangible trace of their families were devastated, 
fearing that their only chance at recovering a physical link to their loved ones had been 
destroyed.661 Forensics experts expressed concern that the ICTY could have destroyed material 
that holds the key to determining the fate of those still missing—the personal truth which, as 
we noted earlier, may be the most important truth for many survivors.662 Mirsad Tokacˇa, who 
hopes that his database of wartime atrocities will help build the foundation for a “new culture 
of memory based on facts, not politics,” describes the prosecutor’s destruction of artifacts as 
“the biggest scandal of the Tribunal. Really, it’s the killing of memory.”663 
D. Ou treach
Most are in agreement—the ICTY didn’t get very close to the public in the former Yugoslavia. 
It wasn’t that present for people.664
Clearly, there is an enormous distance between the facts adjudicated in The Hague and the 
reality that is either known or acknowledged some 2,000 kilometers away in Bosnia. With 
judgments typically running hundreds of pages long, keeping abreast of the ICTY’s jurispru-
dence is a challenge even for lawyers who specialize in international humanitarian law. But 
for victims whose personal experiences form the facts set forth in ICTY verdicts, the Tribunal’s 
judgments may be completely inaccessible: Those who suffered searing losses include large 
numbers of rural and uneducated victims. Adjudicated facts aside, basic information about the 
way the ICTY has operated—whom it has indicted, why defendants who plead guilty receive 
reduced sentences and the like—has long been either manipulated by political and other lead-
ers or simply misunderstood by others.665 A recent empirical study in Bosnia found that even 
in places that had suffered the largest number of wartime casualties—places like Prijedor 
and Srebrenica—people interviewed “as a whole were poorly informed about the Tribunal.”666
And so two important questions are whether the ICTY itself could and should have 
done more to bridge the gap between The Hague and Bosnia. As we note below, the Tribu-
nal’s efforts to do so began belatedly and, after that, were not sufficient to overcome deeply 
entrenched misperceptions of both the Tribunal and the facts that it has established.
1. Early communication efforts
During the early years of the ICTY, the institution made scant efforts to communicate with 
those most affected by its work—citizens of Balkan countries. To be sure, travel to wartime 
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Bosnia was necessarily extremely limited during the first two and one-half years of the ICTY’s 
existence. But the Tribunal’s reticence to engage was also largely a function of judicial officers’ 
professional culture: In many countries there are strong norms to the effect that judges should 
“let the judgment speak for itself.” 
Yet this approach was problematic when applied by a court operating 2,000 kilometers 
away from those most keenly interested in its work—not least because the ICTY did not trans-
late its judgments into the local languages of the former Yugoslavia until 1999. And while the 
“remoteness of the Hague Tribunal from Bosnia and Herzegovina was a big one,”667 nationalist 
leaders in Bosnia were aggressively filling the void. Branko Todorovic´, who has played a lead-
ing role in educating other Serbs—“and all others in this country, as the level of knowledge 
was extremely limited among all”—about the ICTY’s work, recalled that “the criminal politi-
cal structures” in Republika Srpska were “in control of all the media” and were “able to have 
an immense effect on people’s opinions” about the ICTY. With the ICTY itself largely absent, 
“the reflections that were here in Bosnia and Herzegovina were only the ones that could have 
passed through the manipulations of the media bosses, the politicians here.”668
By around 1998, the Tribunal’s then President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and then Pros-
ecutor Louise Arbour became keenly aware that the Tribunal was “absolutely misunderstood” 
in the Balkans. Anton Nikiforov, who joined the prosecutor’s staff in 1998, recalled that local 
officials in the Balkans “were knowingly misrepresenting the Tribunal,” yet the court had 
“no capacity to work in the region [and] no capacity to speak in the regional language.”669 
Persuaded that this was undercutting the Tribunal’s work, Judge McDonald launched the 
Tribunal’s Outreach Programme, which became operational in October 1999,670 although the 
Tribunal had begun developing its outreach program in 1997, just over a year after the war in 
Bosnia ended and an outreach program became viable.671 
2. Bridging the Gap
As a former ICTY outreach officer noted, however, “It is much more difficult to dismantle 
already established misperceptions and propaganda than it would have been to start from 
the outset with updated and accurate information about the Tribunal.”672 The “enduring cost 
of time lost” was a constant theme in our interviews in Bosnia. So too, however, was “better 
late than not at all”: When we interviewed Nerma Jelacˇic´ in late 2006 (before she became a 
spokeswoman for the ICTY in 2008), she said that the ICTY was “now doing all it can” in 
terms of outreach but that its “impact would have been much bigger if it were doing in the 
‘90’s what it is doing now.”673 Jelacˇic´ was particularly impressed by a relatively recent initia-
tive of the ICTY Outreach Programme launched in 2004–05, called Bridging the Gap. As its 
name implies, this initiative aims to bridge the informational chasm between The Hague and 
local communities in Bosnia.
Under this program, once trial proceedings are completed (i.e., when there are no 
appeals proceedings ahead), ICTY officials and staff travel to the town where adjudicated 
crimes occurred and meet with local citizens and officials to explain how they investigated 
the crimes; to describe the outcome of cases, and to respond to questions. Bridging the Gap 
programs have been organized in Prijedor, Brcˇko, Konjic´, Focˇa, and Srebrenica.674
According to Branko Todorovic´, who played a major role in organizing these events, 
some of the local authorities where the events took place were “strictly against this” when first 
approached about convening such a program in their towns; Todorovic´ had to come up with 
funds for electricity and bathroom doors in the cultural center in Srebrenica because the local 
mayor doubted the need for such a program. (Heating was too expensive, however, “so it was 
held in a very cold room.”) Local authorities in Focˇa and in Konjic´ firmly refused to support 
the program, while the authorities in Brcˇko District were supportive and cooperative. Yet the 
turnout was larger than expected in all five programs. “Simply there is an authentic feeling 
among people to see what the Hague [Tribunal] is doing,” Todorovic´ explains.
After participating in Bridging the Gap events, Bosnians—including Serbs—whose 
knowledge of the ICTY had long been filtered by local political leaders and ethnic media were, 
in Todorovic´’s words, finally “able to see the factual truth, not the political truth,” and they 
grasped that “the truths are horrible.” One of the examples Todorovic´ cited involved a Bridging 
the Gap program in Brcˇko, where representatives of the ICTY described the outcome of a case 
from that town. Among Brcˇko’s Muslim community, it had long been rumored that Serbs had 
burned the bodies of Muslim victims in ovens normally used to cremate animals in a facility 
known as the Kafilerija. An ICTY police investigator explained that Tribunal investigators had 
looked into this report, and described how the investigators were able definitely to establish 
that Serbs had not in fact burned Muslim victims in the Kafilerija, as had long been rumored. 
Todorovic´ believes that if this expert had not been able persuasively to set this rumor to rest, 
“it would always cause hate” in Brcˇko. Instead, “the book on that was closed.”675
He described another memorable moment at the Bridging the Gap program in Focˇa. 
When people gathered for the program, the air was thick with tension. Then, the ICTY staff 
presented a videotape about their work on crimes committed in Focˇa during the war. Todorovic´ 
describes what happened next:
All present could see on a screen the guy who did the raping in Focˇa. And all of them 
could hear and see how the prosecutor was asking him, “Did you rape that little girl? 
And he said, “Yes, I did.” “And you were very well aware at that moment that she was 
only 12 years old?” And he said “Yes.” At that time he was probably 45 years old. And 
then the prosecutor repeated his question, saying “You knew that she was 12 at the 
most, and what else did you tell her?” He told her, “you know I would do many more 
terrible things to you but I shall not because I have at home a daughter” who is her 
age, “so I won’t.” So the prosecutor confirmed, “It’s true you have a daughter at home?” 
I was in the back rows and there were like 140 people there and [when the technical 
people changed the tapes] I closed my eyes and you wouldn’t believe it, for a moment 
THAT SOMEONE GUILTY  BE  PUNISHED   103
104    TRUTH AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT
there was such a silence ... that you can hear. It’s a horrible silence. And it lasted for [a] 
long [time]…. And for me it was the most important moment of the day. Then we had 
a lunch break, and you could see the change. Now the people …are leaving the room, 
looking down, some were commenting, “You know, we really didn’t know this, it is a 
horrible crime.”
Todorovic´ thought that many would not return after the lunch break but they did, and 
everyone stayed until the end of the program. Todorovic´ said, “I really think that they left a 
bit different.”676 Describing this same program, Nerma Jelacˇic´ said, “people were genuinely 
shocked.”677
Todorovic´ shared another perception of the dynamics at play during programs like 
the one described above. In his view, many of the “ordinary people” who were not involved 
in committing war crimes had a chance “to make a distance” from those who did. Todorovic´ 
recognized that the premise of their reaction—that participants believe that what they heard 
in the ICTY program “has nothing to do with me”—may itself seem to be a form of denial. 
But he noted that, if you insist that all Serbs are guilty, “you don’t give them a chance to 
change. And if you push a man to the wall, what can he do but say ‘yes, yes, I am the same, 
so what?’”678 Beyond their potential impact in advancing acknowledgment of crimes and con-
demning them, these programs, Todorovic´ believes, can help people understand that people 
from their communities “weren’t convicted because they were Bosniak, Serb, or Croat but 
because they committed crimes.”679 
While the programs described above suggest the potential impact of effective outreach 
efforts, it would be misleading to suggest that an occasional conference can fundamentally 
change deeply entrenched attitudes. Describing the seemingly transformative Bridging the 
Gap programs, Jelacˇic´ said, “You can genuinely plant that seed, and then you need to go back 
and water it.”680 This is not to say the follow up work has to be done by the ICTY, but it has 
to be done.
Refik Hodžic´, who played a central role in designing the Bridging the Gap project, was 
(once again) the Tribunal’s liaison officer in Sarajevo at the time of our July 2009 interviews. 
When we spoke with Hodžic´ then, he expressed concern about the project’s long-term impact. 
The day before we spoke, a nationalist group had disrupted the annual commemoration of 
the Srebrenica massacre, “chanting insults” against the Muslim survivors.681 Like many with 
whom we spoke, this came as yet another alarming marker of Bosnia’s increasingly heated 
political climate. And in this setting, it was hard to be optimistic about the ICTY’s ability to 
foster change. With limited resources—the ICTY has only one outreach officer in all of Bos-
nia—the ICTY is vastly outmatched when it comes to creating a compelling narrative. People 
living in the communities where Bridging the Gap programs have been convened “are exposed 
to other rhetoric” on a daily basis.682 
Srd¯an Dizdarevic´ believes that the ICTY’s Outreach Programme, not only “came too 
late” but remains “absolutely insufficient.”683 (We note that outreach is not covered in the 
Tribunal’s budget so the program has to rely on voluntary extra-budgetary funding, which has 
often been difficult to raise.) Noting the formidable obstacles that Bosnian journalists face in 
trying to cover proceedings in The Hague, Dani editor Senad Pec´anin believes the ICTY needs 
to do far more to ensure that its work is properly understood in the region. In his view, “The 
ICTY couldn’t be proud of their achievement in outreach.”684 
On the positive side of the ledger, several of our interlocutors noted that the ICTY’s 
outreach efforts have been strengthened by the fact that the public faces of the Tribunal are 
increasingly individuals from the Balkans. Bosnian journalist Nerma Jelacˇic´ is now an ICTY 
spokesperson. The prosecutor’s principal spokesperson, Olga Kavran, is from Serbia, and 
the liaison officer based in Sarajevo, Refik Hodžic´, is from Bosnia. Even though previous 
spokespersons were fluent in the local language, the individuals now representing the ICTY 
inspire greater confidence among Bosnians, Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ says, because they “know 
the region” and understand how news from The Hague will be understood in the Balkans.685
Yet many stress the need for far more comprehensive efforts to educate Bosnians about 
the Tribunal and the facts that it has helped clarify. Asserting that the ICTY’s Outreach Pro-
gramme is “doing a good job within the limits they have,” Saša Madacki believes the challenge 
is “how to reach those who are out of reach.”686
E. Conclusion: Beyond the Tribunal’s Reach
The ICTY faces formidable challenges in trying to ensure that its work is understood in Bos-
nia. But particularly in its early years, the Tribunal ceded the ground to local politicians who 
were only too eager to distort its work. As we have noted, advances have been made, such 
as the overhaul of the Tribunal’s web site in late 2008 (though this remains inaccessible for 
many Bosnians). 
But to note these concerns is not to suggest that it is solely up to the ICTY to counter 
distortion by local political figures and media. Recognizing the intrinsic limitations in any 
court’s ability to “educate” the public as well as the specific weaknesses of the ICTY’s out-
reach, a number of Bosnian civil society activists believe that a truth commission should be 
established. Among other contributions, they believe that such a body could provide younger 
Bosnians the chance to obtain a complete picture of the recent past, and could both confer 
and receive acknowledgment of crimes and sufferings. 
 Two principal initiatives for setting up a national truth commission in BiH have been 
launched—but thus far have failed. The first was launched in the late nineties and peaked at 
a “Truth and Reconciliation” conference, held in Sarajevo in 2000, with attendance of repre-
sentatives of more than one hundred non-governmental organizations from BiH. Proponents 
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of this initiative submitted a draft law on the truth and reconciliation commission to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH for consideration. But the draft never entered parliamentary 
procedure, principally due to lack of political will as well as fear among many victims that the 
work of the commission could result in amnesty for war crimes. Six years later, in May 2006, 
a parliamentary parties’ working group produced a similar draft law. Victims’ groups, human 
rights organizations, and the media were harshly critical of this effort, however, charging that 
it lacked transparency and involvement of civil society. The political parties, in turn, shifted 
the focus of their attention to the October parliamentary elections.687 Although a more limited 
effort to look at crimes in Sarajevo alone resulted in the establishment in June 2006 of an 
official fact-finding commission by the BiH Council of Ministers, this too never got off the 
ground.688 
More recently, a new initiative has formed to build a coalition of civil society organiza-
tions from throughout the countries of the former Yugoslavia to motivate the public and the 
national governments to create a Regional Commission on Establishing the Facts on War 
Crimes and Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, known as RECOM. 
As of late 2009, there were over 350 organizations from throughout the region who had com-
mitted to the process.689
The ICTY’s own stance towards such efforts has also evolved, perhaps evincing a greater 
institutional awareness of the enormity of the challenges associated with acknowledgement of 
past crimes and limitations on its own role. During an earlier period of the ICTY’s work, senior 
court officials opposed a truth commission, in part because they feared that its work could taint 
evidence that would later come before the Tribunal. Even as late as 2001, then ICTY President 
Claude Jorda was publicly ambivalent at best about the attempt to have a separate truth-seeking 
body exist concurrently with the Tribunal’s work.690 Yet by 2006 the ICTY’s public stance had 
shifted, and Tribunal officials have regularly participated in the public forums that led to the 
RECOM process, in which they have supported the idea.
VI. Impact on Domestic War 
Crimes Prosecutions
The Hague Tribunal opened the door for national courts to start trials of war criminals … This 
is one of the major achievements of the ICTY.691
The phrase “transitional justice” captures one of the most tangible and perhaps most enduring 
ways in which the ICTY has had an impact in Bosnia and Herzegovina (although the phrase is 
used here in a particular sense)692: The Tribunal has played a distinctive role in spurring and 
shaping a major transition within Bosnia’s domestic system for prosecuting wartime atrocities. 
Along with the Office of the High Representative as well as other international and domestic 
actors, the ICTY helped launch a specialized war crimes chamber within the newly established 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.693 
For reasons explained in this chapter, the work of the chamber, which has operated since 
early 2005, represents a major advance in Bosnia’s own efforts to provide a judicial reckoning 
for wartime atrocities. That an effective war crimes process was established in Bosnia also 
ranks among the ICTY’s most important legacies. Yet as we also make clear in this chapter, in 
some respects limitations in the Bosnian chamber’s work point up limits to the ICTY’s impact.
The Tribunal’s role in launching this innovation represents a significant evolution in its 
broader relationship to justice in the former Yugoslavia. As noted earlier, when it established 
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the ICTY, the UN Security Council conceived of the Tribunal as a peace-enforcement measure 
whose principal contributions would be to deter further atrocities and, quite simply, provide 
justice through the very process of prosecuting those responsible for atrocities the world had 
failed to prevent. At a time when domestic prosecutions were not seen as credible to the extent 
they occurred at all, the ICTY at first largely took the place of domestic legal processes of reck-
oning with 1990s era atrocities. Relatively early in the ICTY’s life, the Tribunal began to play a 
second role. From 1996 through 2004, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICTY played 
a supervisory role in relation to Bosnian war crimes prosecutions by reviewing proposed war 
crimes indictments of national prosecutors. Only about midway through the Tribunal’s life did 
key international actors fundamentally reconceive the Tribunal’s relationship with domestic 
courts in the Balkans. In this third phase, the ICTY became a key catalyst for ramping up 
Bosnia’s domestic capacity to prosecute wartime atrocities. 
A. The ICTY’s Relationship with Bosnian Courts: Phase I
1. Primacy
In its early years, the ICTY operated in marked detachment from local courts. While seeking 
to answer victims’ calls for justice through its own prosecutions, the Tribunal also inevitably 
represented a judgment by the international community that local courts in the Balkans were 
largely unable to mount credible prosecutions of wartime atrocities themselves. 
As we note below, this judgment was amply justified at the time the ICTY was cre-
ated and for years after. Legally, however, the Tribunal’s statute from the outset made room 
for local courts to play a role complementary to that of the ICTY. In the technical jargon of 
international law, the ICTY’s relationship with domestic courts in Bosnia and elsewhere is one 
of “primacy”: While the ICTY exercises concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts in the 
former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, those courts must defer to the ICTY if it decides to assert its 
jurisdiction in a case.694 In principle, however, national courts’ displacement in specific cases 
need not entail their broader disqualification as partners in the project of rendering justice 
for atrocious crimesIndeed, in his report to the Security Council proposing what became the 
ICTY Statute, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali affirmed the important role 
of national courts in the process of accountability: “In establishing [the ICTY],” Boutros-Ghali 
said, “it was not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction by national courts with respect to such acts. Indeed national courts should be 
encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with their relevant national laws and 
procedures.”695 The first president of the ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese, made a similar point 
in the ICTY’s first annual report to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, noting 
that the ICTY “does not monopolize criminal jurisdiction over certain categories of offences 
committed in the former Yugoslavia.”696
But if his words seemed to invite states to exercise jurisdiction, Judge Cassese’s mes-
sage was more likely directed at Western European countries that were capable of prosecuting 
fugitives from justice rather than courts in the Balkans. Noting “the huge number of potential 
cases and the fact that many defendants may find themselves in countries whose authorities are 
willing and prepared to bring them to justice,” Judge Cassese explained that “it was felt it would 
be salutary if national courts exercised their jurisdiction under their own legislation or on the 
strength of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”697 For good reason, courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia were not seen as credible partners in the ICTY’s 
project of justice during its early years. When the ICTY was created in May 1993, the war in 
Bosnia was in full rage—hardly an ideal setting for impartial and secure prosecutions of those 
responsible for depredations still underway. While Bosnian courts undertook a limited num-
ber of war crimes prosecutions even before the conflict ended, these were widely and strongly 
criticized by independent observers.698 Indeed, Bosnia’s Human Rights Chamber later found 
“[m]any of the trials”699 processed by local courts in this period to have been unfair.
Particularly in the immediate aftermath of Dayton, there were powerful disincentives 
for Bosnian courts to hold credible war crimes trials. Until 2003, such trials were held before 
cantonal and district courts in the two entities and before the Basic Court in Brcˇko.700 Entity 
courts “would only have jurisdiction over individuals of their own ethnic group—whom they 
did not want to subject to criminal prosecution,”701 and there was not yet a state-level court 
that could transcend the partiality of these courts. 
While Bosnian courts were particularly ill-suited to render impartial justice for war-
time atrocities, the 1990s conflict had wider implications for Bosnia’s judiciary, shattering a 
system that was already burdened by the legacy of its communist tradition. The Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) described the Bosnian judiciary in the early 
years of peace this way:
[The] loss of skilled members of the legal profession and the judiciary, as well as the 
physical destruction and lack of proper equipment or facilities significantly hampered 
the ability of the courts to administer justice properly or efficiently. … Outdated and 
inadequate procedural laws contributed to the inefficiency of the system. The loss of 
many pre-war judges resulted in the judiciary and prosecutors’ offices, in different parts 
of the country, being dominated by the majority ethnicity. New, inexperienced judges 
and prosecutors were appointed on ethnic and political grounds. The prosecution of 
war crimes, in particular, ineffectual investigations, excessive and systematic delays in 
the resolution of trials and dubious decisions, compounded by a lack of public faith in 
the judicial system, brought into serious question the applicability of the rule of law.702
Far from seeking to encourage war crimes prosecutions by Bosnian courts in the years 
immediately following Dayton, then, the international community was instead more con-
cerned about “[t]he possibility of arbitrary arrests and unfair trials” there.703
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In larger perspective, to the extent that the international community in general, and 
the ICTY in particular, addressed local authorities on the subject of war crimes prosecutions, 
their emphasis was overwhelmingly on the importance of national authorities fulfilling their 
legal obligation to arrest those whom the ICTY had indicted and transfer them to The Hague. 
In light of donor states’ more recent support for a hand-off from the ICTY to local courts, it 
is easy to forget that, during the Tribunal’s early years, international efforts to assure justice 
for Bosnia’s victims focused overwhelmingly on “the international rather than the national 
justice system.”704
2. Supervisory
In 1996, the relationship between the ICTY and Bosnia saw an important change, trans-
forming the ICTY’s role vis-à-vis Bosnian courts from one of primacy in a broader context of 
concurrent jurisdiction to one of supervision and restraint. This relationship was to last for 
eight years.
The ICTY’s supervisory role evolved as a solution to an early challenge to the fragile 
peace secured at Dayton: In late January 1996, Federation authorities arrested two senior 
Republika Srpska army officers—one of whom, General Ðjorde Ðjukic´, was a close aide to 
Ratko Mladic´—after they took a wrong turn into Federation territory,705 accusing the two men 
of responsibility for war crimes. Although the Federation was legally entitled to arrest individu-
als suspected of war crimes, its action in this instance was seen to “violate[] the free-movement 
provisions of Dayton.”706 The specter of arbitrary arrests had potentially broad repercussions 
at the time of these arrests. As the OSCE recalled in a 2005 report, “[p]roviding for freedom of 
movement [within Bosnia], especially to refugees and displaced persons, was crucial to the suc-
cess of holding free and fair municipal elections in September 1996, especially as candidates 
and voters were being encouraged to stand and vote in their pre-conflict constituencies.”707
The episode provoked what the New York Times described as “the most serious” dispute 
“to arise between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government since the signing of the 
Balkan peace agreement” one month earlier.708 A British NATO officer stationed in Bosnia 
described the arrests as “provocative and inflammatory.”709 In this setting, the Bosnian gov-
ernment asked the ICTY to question the detained Serbs to determine whether they should be 
indicted.710 Then ICTY Prosecutor Richard Goldstone sought the Serbs’ provisional arrest and 
transfer to The Hague for questioning and possible indictment.711
To avoid a repetition of this incident—in the words of Dayton peace negotiator Richard 
Holbrooke, “to ensure that we would never again have to struggle with the consequences of 
a surprise arrest” in Bosnia712—the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia agreed during the 
first post-Dayton Compliance Summit in Rome in mid-February 1996 that local authorities 
would not arrest anyone on war crimes charges without first obtaining approval from the ICTY 
prosecutor.713 The ICTY’s Web site summarizes the process born of the Rome Agreement and 
its achievements this way:
Rules of the Road
In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), returning displaced 
persons and refugees voiced fears about arbitrary arrests on suspicion of war crimes. 
To protect against this, the [Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)] agreed to operate a “Rules 
of the Road” scheme under which local prosecutors were obliged to submit case files to 
The Hague for review. No person could be arrested on suspicion of war crimes in BiH 
unless the Tribunal’s prosecution had beforehand received and assessed a case file to 
contain credible charges.
The Rules of the Road procedure, established under the Rome Agreement of 18 Febru-
ary 1996, regulated the arrest and indictment of alleged perpetrators of war crimes by 
national authorities. As part of the Tribunal’s contribution to the re-establishment of 
peace and security in the region, the ICTY prosecutor agreed to provide an independent 
review of all local war crimes cases. If a person was already indicted by the OTP, he 
could be arrested by the national police. If the national police wished to make an arrest 
where there was no prior indictment, they had to send their evidence to the OTP. Under 
the Rome Agreement, decisions of the OTP became binding on local prosecutors.
Applying international standards, OTP staff reviewed 1,419 files involving 4,985 sus-
pects, and advised local prosecutors whether or not they had enough evidence to pro-
ceed. Approval was granted for the prosecution of 848 persons.714
To the extent that its principal aim was to “assist in ensuring the free movement of 
people throughout” Bosnia by heading off insufficiently supported indictments,715 the Rules 
of the Road process succeeded. In the words of a Bosniak official, the program “helped enor-
mously in making the country more functional and making freedom of movement a reality” 
in postwar Bosnia.716 
The ratio of cases approved by the ICTY to those submitted indicates that the ICTY 
prevented thousands of poorly-substantiated war crimes charges from being instituted.717 Of 
the reviews it completed, the OTP found sufficient evidence to indict on war crimes charges 
roughly one-sixth of the suspects submitted for its review.718 In the view of two former ICTY 
officials, moreover, the process may have had a positive, albeit limited, benefit for local pros-
ecutors: “Given the large number of cases reviewed, local prosecutors no doubt did begin to 
get a better sense of the relevant international standards.”719
But these contributions may have come at a cost. Strapped for resources,720 “the ICTY 
was notoriously slow in reviewing cases”721 submitted by Bosnian authorities, according to law 
professor William Burke-White. 
Some have suggested that the Rules of the Road process had a deeper impact on the 
Bosnian judiciary, sapping its morale and inhibiting initiative. In a 2005 interview, a senior 
Bosnian court official told a researcher that some Bosnian prosecutors experienced a “loss of 
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face” in having to seek international approval to proceed, a process they found “shameful.”722 
The sense of shame inherent in this process was, according to a study by the human rights 
centers of Berkeley University and the University of Sarajevo, compounded by the ICTY’s poor 
communication with some of the jurists who submitted files for approval. Based on interviews 
with “thirty-two Bosnian judges and prosecutors with primary or appellate jurisdiction for 
national war crimes trials” in 1999, this study reported that:
ICTY officials failed to keep their Bosnian colleagues informed of the status of the [Rules 
of the Road] investigations, even in response to direct inquiries. … A judge reported 
that after having submitted twenty-five case and waiting eight months, the ICTY had 
not responded. Other judges and prosecutors stated that they too had submitted files 
several years before and had received no communication … These professionals viewed 
the ICTY as unresponsive and detrimental to the ability of Bosnian courts to conduct 
national war crimes trials.723
Several observers share the jurists’ judgment that the Rules of the Road process inad-
vertently contributed to Bosnian courts’ protracted inability to play a major role in war crimes 
prosecutions. The overall impact of the Rules of the Road process, in two writers’ words, was 
to “shut down all efforts by Bosnian government authorities to utilize justice to remove war 
criminals from powerful post-war positions.”724 Believing that the process of seeking ICTY 
approval had a demoralizing effect on Bosnian prosecutors, Burke-White draws a link to Bos-
nian courts’ desultory performance in respect of cases cleared for prosecution by the ICTY. 
Of the 846 cases in this category,725 Burke-White notes, “only fifty-four (11%) had reached trial 
stage in domestic courts by January 2005.”726
But it would be unfair to lay primary or even major blame for the Bosnian judiciary’s 
failures at the ICTY’s doorstep.727 As noted earlier, by all accounts the Bosnian judicial system 
suffered serious, systemic problems as it emerged from the wreckage of armed conflict as well 
as from a deeper legacy of communist rule728 and these were hardly limited to war crimes 
prosecutions. A November 2000 report by the International Crisis Group squarely laid blame 
for the abysmal record of follow-up by courts in Republika Srpska on the nationalist structures 
in which they were embedded: “A number of war crimes cases have already been referred by 
The Hague to local courts and more can be expected,” the ICG wrote, “but these cases have 
simply shown up the inability of the Bosnian justice system, as presently constituted, to handle 
war crimes cases.”729 
Years after the Rules of the Road program ended, moreover, courts in Republika Srpska 
have been slower than courts in the Federation in bringing war crimes suspects to justice.730 
While the district prosecutor’s office in Banja Luka has been proactive in prosecuting war 
crimes cases,731 it is typically described as an exception to the general rule.
Responding to a question about the Berkeley/University of Sarajevo study during a 
July 2009 interview, Damir Arnault, a senior advisor to the Bosniak member of the Bosnian 
Presidency, suggested that its “anti-imperialistic instinct” was well meaning but misplaced. 
“Some of these [ judges] are incompetent. These courts were trying to do war crimes cases and 
they just couldn’t do it.”732 Interviewed the same week, a representative of the Bosnian Serb 
government, Jovan Spaic´, did not say anything that would call Arnault’s assessment into ques-
tion. Instead, he offered various explanations for why investigating judges in Republika Srpska 
did not aggressively pursue war crimes cases during or in the years after the 1990s conflict, 
none of which even hinted at the harmful effects of the Rules of the Road process. In Spaic´’s 
view, “It would be hard to expect … judges to operate so soon after the war when everything 
was so unstable, people were moving; it would have been hard to make witnesses come.”733 
The perceptions of Bosnian jurists who participated in the Berkeley/University of Sara-
jevo study should, moreover, be placed in context. At the time that study was conducted, 
Bosnian judges felt “beleaguered” as a result of well-founded criticism from a wide range of 
international actors as well as “pressure from those within, particularly politicians and crimi-
nal elements who act with impunity.”734 (Indeed, a former judge, Vehid Šehic´, told us that 
he resigned from his position as a judge in the District Court of Tuzla in 1994 because the 
judiciary was at that time in the thrall of a “political climate” inimical to war crimes prosecu-
tions.)735 
The real question, then, is not whether the ICTY can fairly be blamed for the troubling 
record of Bosnian courts in prosecuting war crimes during the first half of the Tribunal’s life. 
Instead, it is whether a different approach by relevant international actors—and here, the ICTY 
would not be the logical lead actor736—could have been more effective in helping prepare the 
Bosnian judiciary to mount credible war crimes prosecutions sooner. We come back to this 
question at the end of this chapter.
B. Creating a National Partner737
After years of stagnation, Bosnia’s courts became the focus of ramped up international reform 
efforts in the early 2000s. The reform that followed was far-reaching, and included com-
prehensive vetting of the country’s judges and prosecutors as well as the replacement of an 
inquisitorial with an adversarial criminal procedure.738 The ICTY’s prosecution office played 
an important role in this vetting process.739
By 2002-03 the reforms also included key steps toward the establishment of a domestic 
war crimes chamber within a new Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.740 This facet of broader 
judicial reform efforts received significant impetus from the ICTY, which was coming under 
pressure to plan for an eventual hand-off process. With this, the ICTY’s relationship with 
Bosnian courts underwent a major transformation.
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1. Impetus for change
Although the ICTY had from the outset been pressed to produce results,741 this intensified sev-
eral years into its work, when the United Nations expected to see more in the way of tangible 
results. In a 1999 study commissioned by the UN General Assembly, a group of experts noted 
that “[m]ajor concerns” had been voiced by a range of actors about “the slowness of the pace 
of proceedings” before the ICTY and its sister court, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), as well as about the associated costs. The experts asked, “more pointedly … 
why, after almost seven years and expenditures totaling $400 million, only 15 ICTY and ICTR 
trials have been completed.”742 While the experts’ recommendations focused on ways the two 
tribunals could streamline procedures, their report served to catalyze planning of a different 
sort in The Hague: It provided “a little nudge” to the ICTY judges to begin “thinking ahead 
towards formulating a completion or exit strategy.”743 Anticipating that the Security Council 
would soon press them to wind up the ICTY’s work, the Tribunal’s judges seized the initiative 
to shape the Hague Tribunal’s completion strategy.
Transferring cases not yet tried in The Hague to domestic courts—a subject addressed 
only briefly in the experts’ study744—became a key component of the completion strategy that 
emerged from the ICTY and which was later adopted by the UN Security Council.745 More 
particularly, transferring cases of comparatively low-level suspects746 would free up human 
resources in The Hague and thereby enable the Tribunal to focus on high-level suspects—the 
centerpiece of what became the ICTY’s completion strategy.747 
There were, to be sure, other reasons for transferring some of its caseload to local 
courts. In an address to the Security Council on November 27, 2000, then ICTY President 
Claude Jorda introduced the idea of “relocating” some ICTY cases to domestic courts by noting 
the potential implications of recent political changes in the former Yugoslavia:748
The political upheavals recently witnessed in the Balkans have gradually changed the 
perception of the International Tribunal held by the States from the region. However, 
must these upheavals not also lead us to change our own view as to the ability of these 
States to try some of the war criminals in their territory? From this perspective, must we 
not, for example, further promote the new national reconciliation processes the Balkan 
States are setting up, such as the truth and reconciliation commissions?749
Even so, ICTY officials appeared to be motivated more by the Tribunal’s need to complete 
its core work than by their secondary desire to foster greater participation by local courts in the 
project of accountability for wartime atrocities. This came across in Judge Jorda’s November 
2000 address to the UN Security Council as well as in his subsequent remarks to the Coun-
cil. Describing recent discussions among judges of the ICTY and ICTR and then UN Legal 
Advisor Hans Correll, Judge Jorda made the case for transferring some cases to Balkan courts:
In examining the results and prospects of their mission after eight years’ activity, [the 
judges] first discussed whether … the International Tribunal should not focus more on 
prosecuting those crimes constituting the most serious breaches of international public 
law and order, that is mostly, the crimes committed by the high-ranking military and 
political officials. After all, it is those crimes which principally jeopardise international 
peace and security. … 
The cases of lesser importance for the Tribunal could, under certain conditions, be 
“relocated”, that is, tried by the courts of the States created out of the former Yugoslavia. 
This solution would have the merit of considerably lightening the International Tribu-
nal’s workload, thereby allowing it to complete its mission at an even earlier juncture. 
Moreover, it would make the trial of the cases referred before the national courts more 
transparent to the local population and so make a more effective contribution to recon-
ciling the peoples of the Balkans.750
2. Joint planning for the future War Crimes Chamber 
The ICTY would not, however, be in a position to transfer cases to the former Yugoslavia 
unless the judges were satisfied that transferred cases would be fairly tried. As then ICTY 
President Claude Jorda explained to the Security Council, the “[m]ost important” condition 
for transferring cases to national courts was their ability “fully to conform to internationally 
recognised standards of human rights and due process in the trials of referred persons.”751 
Strongly preferring to transfer cases involving crimes committed in Bosnia—the overwhelm-
ing majority of its docket—to Bosnian courts,752 senior ICTY officials nonetheless believed that 
its judiciary “display[ed] shortcomings too great for it to constitute a sufficiently solid judicial 
foundation to try case referred by the Tribunal.”753 Thus they intensified their efforts to ensure 
that the Bosnian judiciary would be capable of receiving transferred cases.754
A solution was found when the Tribunal’s efforts linked up with a broader judicial 
reform drive already underway. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) had recently 
initiated a comprehensive judicial reform effort in Bosnia.755 While the ICTY’s goal was to 
“identify a trustworthy domestic court” to which it could transfer war crimes cases,756 the OHR 
was engaged in broader efforts aimed at streamlining and modernizing Bosnia’s judiciary; 
assuring judicial and prosecutorial independence, integrity, and competence; and ensuring an 
appropriate ethnic balance among judges.757 While the ICTY naturally focused on war crimes 
prosecutions, the key preoccupation of the OHR was the development of judicial institutions 
that could tackle organized crime—a pervasive and daunting challenge in Bosnia even today.758 
In due course, the two institutions’ interests converged and a consensus plan emerged.759 
Crucially for the ICTY, the broader reforms instituted by the OHR included the establishment 
of a new Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as well as imposition by the High Repre-
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sentative of a new national criminal code (CC) that would define crimes over which the court 
would have jurisdiction, and a new code of criminal procedure (CPC).760 
By mid-2002 the ICTY and OHR formulated a joint plan of action,761 at the heart of 
which was a proposal to establish a specialized war crimes chamber within the new Court of 
BiH that could receive certain cases transferred from the ICTY and which would play a filter-
ing role for war crimes cases instituted before local courts in Bosnia.762 In effect, then, the 
specialized chamber for war crimes was grafted onto a new court already in formation, now 
given a further mandate. 
For the ICTY, connecting its completion strategy to a judicial innovation in Bosnia was 
a challenge as well as a solution. Creating the legal framework for transferring cases to Bosnia 
would have been complex under any circumstances, but the task was further complicated by 
the far-reaching nature of judicial reform then underway in Bosnia.763 The reform task, as one 
writer noted, involved “the construction rather than the reconstruction of a state-level criminal 
justice system.”764
Almost a year after the ICTY and OHR formulated a joint plan of action, the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) finally mandated the High Representative to implement the 
proposal to establish a war crimes chamber within the new Court of BiH.765 Then, planning 
speeded up.766 The ICTY, by then under the leadership of a new president, Judge Theodor 
Meron, and the OHR created several joint working groups to address a range of issues relat-
ing to the legal framework for transferring indicted cases to Bosnia’s State Court.767 These 
working groups became the principal forum in which the ICTY helped shape the design of 
the war crimes chamber and, importantly, the legal framework that would govern the transfer 
of indictments from The Hague to Sarajevo. While the ICTY negotiators worked above all to 
ensure that the chamber would meet international standards, the OHR’s core aim was to build 
“a sustainable justice sector at the state level which could trigger reform in the entities, as well 
as having the capacity to deal with cases transferred from the Tribunal.”768 
The joint discussions soon led to consensus about the basic structure of the Bosnian 
War Crimes Chamber (BWCC).769 The chamber would be part of Bosnia’s domestic court 
system, applying domestic law, but with international participation.770 The Special Depart-
ment for War Crimes, staffed by national and international prosecutors, would be created in 
the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH.771 Crucial to the chamber’s design, international judges and 
prosecutors would be phased out after five years.772 
Soon after this plan was formulated, the Security Council intensified pressure on the 
ICTY to meet the deadlines for completing the work it had proposed to the Council; in so doing 
the Council supported the role of the BWCC. In August 2003, the Council adopted Resolu-
tion 1503, which “reaffirm[ed] in the strongest terms” a previous statement by the Council’s 
president endorsing 
the ICTY’s strategy for completing investigations by the end of 2004, all trial activities at 
first instance by the end of 2008, and all of its work in 2010 … by concentrating on the 
prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for 
crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction and transferring cases involving those who may 
not bear this level of responsibility to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, 
as well as the strengthening of the capacity of such jurisdictions.773
Noting that “an essential prerequisite to achieving” these goals “is the expeditious estab-
lishment ... and early functioning of a special chamber within the State Court of Bosnia … 
and the subsequent referral by the ICTY of cases of lower- or intermediate-rank accused to 
the Chamber,”774 the resolution called on donors to support the OHR’s effort to create the 
special chamber.775
Legislation establishing the BWCC as well as the Special Department for War Crimes 
(SDWC) in the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH had already been imposed by the High Representa-
tive in January 2003; these laws entered into effect two months later.776 A Law on the Transfer 
of Cases, which addressed many of the ICTY’s preconditions for transferring indictments and 
resulted from a joint ICTY-OHR Working Group, was introduced before the national parlia-
ment in June 2004 and was adopted by the end of the year.777 
On its side, the ICTY judges amended Rule 11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to establish a procedure for transferring indictments to another court. Under 
this rule, a three-judge Referral Bench of the ICTY determines whether to transfer to an 
appropriate domestic court an indictment that has already been confirmed but in respect of 
which trial has not yet commenced before the ICTY. Reflecting the imperatives that gave rise 
to the new procedure, amended Rule 11 bis provides that judges on the Referral Bench must, 
“in accordance with Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), consider the gravity of the crimes 
charged and the level of responsibility of the accused.”778 On the matter of which countries 
could receive transferred cases, Rule 11 bis provides that the Referral Bench must be “satisfied 
that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried 
out” before it can approve a referral.779 As a further safeguard once cases are transferred, the 
bench can order that protection orders previously imposed in respect of witnesses or victims 
remain in force as indictments are transferred to a domestic court.780
The War Crimes Chamber was finally launched on March 9, 2005, two years after the 
Court of BiH itself began operating.781 Even before the chamber became operational, the ICTY 
prosecutor had begun transferring information to the state prosecutor during the second 
half of 2004. She also informed the BiH Presidency by letter dated August 27, 2004 that the 
OTP was no longer in a position to review war crimes cases and that the prosecutor of BiH 
should take over authority for such cases effective October 1, 2004.782 Thus the “supervise and 
restrain” phase of the ICTY’s relationship to Bosnian courts ended before the contemporary 
era was fully launched.
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While the ICTY and OHR were satisfied that the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber and 
the Special Department for War Crimes were capable of handling cases transferred pursu-
ant to Rule 11 bis, the prospect of domestic prosecutions of persons indicted in The Hague 
aroused concern among some victims, who still trusted the ICTY more than they trusted 
Bosnian courts.783 They were hardly reassured when the first person transferred pursuant to 
11 bis, Radovan Stankovic´, escaped from prison in May 2007 following his conviction before 
the BWCC for wartime atrocities, including multiple rapes, enslavement, and torture of civil-
ians in the town of Focˇa—which was also the site of his escape.784 Although this was not the 
fault of the BWCC, which generally received high marks for its conduct of the Stankovic´ case, 
the episode reinforced victims’ concerns about whether Bosnia was ready to take over cases 
initiated in The Hague.
Since then, confidence in the BWCC has grown, though substantial challenges remain. 
Just as victims cite a litany of what they consider to be failings of the ICTY, they recite a raft of 
disappointments in the BWCC’s work.785 Yet despite these, a 2008 survey of public attitudes 
toward the Court of BiH and the Prosecutor’s Office (POBiH) found that “[m]ost representa-
tives of war victims’ associations … were generally satisfied with the work of the Court and 
Office of the Prosecutor of BiH,”786 while a majority of citizens “believe that the Court and 
the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH are the most important institutions for prosecution … of war 
crimes.”787 At the same time, however, the same study highlights enduring public concerns as 
well as misperceptions about the Court of BiH.788
Reflecting on the BWCC and SDWC in July 2009, Mirsad Tokacˇa, who directs the non-
governmental Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo, summed up their achieve-
ments this way: “They have produced really excellent results in a short period.”789 While the 
ICTJ, the OSCE Mission to BiH,790 and others have identified a number of concerns relating to 
the BWCC, it has generally received high marks for its overall performance and is now seen as 
a model form of hybrid court.791 And despite the fact that the ICTY acted to create the BWCC 
only when pushed to do so by the imperatives of its completion strategy, many now rank its 
contribution in this regard as among the Tribunal’s greatest accomplishments.792 
3. War crimes prosecutions before Bosnian courts: The ICTY’s imprint
In view of the BWCC’s emergence as a core element of the ICTY completion strategy, it is not 
surprising that cases originating in The Hague formed an important part of its initial docket. 
But cases before the BWCC originating in The Hague are not limited to those transferred 
pursuant to Rule 11 bis. In fact, although the ICTY’s need to transfer indictments of relatively 
low-level suspects provided crucial impetus to the establishment of the BWCC, only six cases 
involving ten suspects have been transferred to Bosnia under the Rule 11 bis rubric.793
a. Rule 11 bis cases
While Rule 11 bis cases transferred to Bosnia have been few in number, they have had a broad 
impact on the country’s new system for prosecuting war crimes. As noted earlier, Rule 11 bis 
provides that the ICTY Referral Bench may transfer indictments to a domestic court only if it 
is satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial, though this is hardly the only reason the 
war crimes chamber would be bound to meet international standards. Pursuant to the Dayton 
Agreement, Bosnia is bound to apply the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
country’s Constitutional Court has ensured that it does so.794
More significantly, Rule 11 bis provides for further assurances once a confirmed indict-
ment has been transferred. The ICTY prosecutor can designate observers to monitor domestic 
cases that originated in an ICTY indictment on his or her behalf,795 and the Tribunal can recall 
a transferred case if local proceedings fall short of international standards.796 The prosecutor 
requested the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to perform an 
ongoing trial monitoring role on its behalf in BWCC cases arising out of Rule 11 bis transfers 
and it agreed to do so.797 Although the OSCE’s writ on behalf of the ICTY prosecutor extends 
to these cases only, its Judicial and Legal Reform Unit in Sarajevo monitors all of the cham-
ber’s cases and the mission would almost certainly have monitored 11 bis cases on its own 
initiative to the greatest extent possible within its regular monitoring capacities even without 
being asked to do so by the ICTY prosecutor. Even so, a formalized relationship with the ICTY 
enabled the OSCE Bosnia mission to establish a specialized section to focus on the 11 bis cases 
as its main priority.798 
Its capacity to monitor these cases comprehensively has had a knock on effect: The 
OSCE’s detailed critiques of the national court proceedings addressed systemic concerns early 
on, preparing the fledgling chamber to perform at a higher level as it has taken on other cases. 
For example, the OSCE’s monitoring reports in the initial Rule 11 bis cases flagged problems 
relating to the manner in which ICTY detention orders were reviewed by the Court of BiH. 
By the time the third indictment was transferred, the court’s practice changed.799 Other issues 
flagged by the OSCE in its 11 bis monitoring reports—relating for example to protection of wit-
nesses, pretrial custody, and the rights of witnesses to request compensation from the accused 
through the criminal proceedings—have either been addressed by the court and prosecutor or 
have at least raised awareness about the need to resolve them comprehensively.800 The OSCE 
unit notes that its reporting has not been the sole reason for these improvements; it has often 
“worked in synergy with the efforts of numerous actors.”801 Yet its 11 bis monitoring role doubt-
less contributed to positive change. 
This is not to suggest that the procedures put in place by the ICTY and OHR to govern 
11 bis cases have invariably enhanced trial proceedings before the BWCC. In its initial report 
on the first 11 bis trial before the BWCC, the OSCE’s Bosnia Mission identified a number of 
gaps and ambiguities in the Law on the Transfer of Cases,802 which was enacted to provide a 
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legal framework for Rule 11 bis transfers803 Resolving these issues has inevitably complicated 
the processing of early cases before the chamber. In similar fashion, some of the requirements 
built into the transfer process, which were designed to protect the integrity of ICTY indict-
ments,804 ensure the safety of witnesses who provided evidence to the ICTY prosecutor and 
preserve the value of other ICTY-generated evidence, have given rise to legal challenges and 
cumbersome processes that necessarily result in delays.805 
Yet any fundamentally new court like the BWCC would face novel legal challenges, 
regardless of whether it was bound to honor special rules concerning the transfer of cases 
from an international court. (Indeed, the ICTY itself had to resolve a raft of legal challenges 
in its early trials.) In the view of BWCC officials, far more difficult challenges have come 
from Republika Srpska leaders who oppose an institution whose very existence represents an 
enhancement of central authority and which could credibly prosecute war crimes.806 
If ICTY requirements for the transfer of cases have at times complicated early BWCC 
trials, the Tribunal has also been a helpful resource in resolving many of the BWCC’s early 
challenges. According to staff in the OSCE Mission to Bosnia, ICTY jurisprudence has pro-
vided valuable guidance to the BWCC in its resolution of thorny legal issues, including some 
that may have arisen in part out of the BWCC’s desire to comply with standards emanating 
from The Hague. 
The OSCE Bosnia mission cites an example relating to a problem that arose early in the 
chamber’s life: The BWCC was widely criticized for going too far in its efforts to protect victim-
witnesses in two early cases involving allegations of systematic rape, excluding the public from 
almost the entire trial proceedings in the cases of Radovan Stankovic´ and Nedo Samardžic´.807 
Since then, the chamber has been more judicious in its use of closed sessions. While wide-
spread criticism of the closed trials was doubtless a key factor, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia 
believes that the standards for witness protection developed by the ICTY, along with public trial 
standards developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, have provided 
importance guidance to the BWCC as it has adjusted its approach to witness protection.808
b. Transfer of evidence
Another byproduct of Rule 11 bis was that the transfer of evidence that accompanied trans-
ferred indictments provided the fledgling SDWC a helpful boost in its early years, enabling it 
to go to trial without having to undertake the same level of extensive investigation already done 
by the ICTY. In fact, the SDWC’s first prosecution of an 11 bis case was “based only on Hague 
evidence,” according to the first chief prosecutor of BiH, Marinko Jurcˇevic´.809 
Yet the process of transferring evidence was hardly seamless. Two suspects were trans-
ferred to the state court in Bosnia before the evidence supporting their indictments arrived 
there810 Branko Peric´, then president of Bosnia’s High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 
(HJPC), dryly recalled the dilemma facing state court prosecutors: “We have an indicted guy 
but the documentation is still in their archives. It was senseless [ for the SDWC] to charge 
him”811 until supporting evidence arrived from The Hague. According to officials in the SDWC, 
however, this happened “only once or twice.”812
Until amended to correct the problem, the Law on the Transfer of Cases imposed 
another challenge: ICTY documents had to be transferred to Bosnia in hard copy. In the “rela-
tively small case of [Radovan] Stankovic´,” former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte recalled, 
her staff had to print, authenticate and transfer some 14,000 pages of documents.813 Process-
ing these documents placed enormous burdens on the receiving end too.814 This burden was 
alleviated in July 2006, when the BiH Parliament amended the Law on the Transfer of Cases 
to allow ICTY documents to be transferred electronically.815 
Other problems were harder to fix. Because OTP investigations were undertaken with 
the expectation that cases would be tried in The Hague, ICTY investigators and prosecutors did 
not prepare files in the local languages of the former Yugoslavia. One of the national prosecu-
tors who worked on an 11 bis case, then SDWC chief David Schwendiman, recalled that he “had 
terrible trouble because most of the information was in English.”816 After all, he noted, “No 
one gave any consideration to the fact that [the Bosnian State Court’s] language is Bosnian.”817 
During interviews in June-July 2006, some former and current members of the SDWC 
staff described other “teething problems” in their relationship with the ICTY. One of the Bos-
nian prosecutors told us that, while the ICTY had never failed to fulfill her requests for infor-
mation, key items were sometimes delivered “in a sea of documents,” many not admissible 
or useful.818 In a subsequent interview, SDWC officials recalled that during the early operation 
of the department, the ICTY prosecutors “didn’t know what we needed, so they gave us every-
thing.”819 Other staff members described early problems with database formats and technical 
access to documents. Although the ICTY provided the SDWC access to its evidence disclosure 
suite—an invaluable resource to the department’s work—the SDWC had not yet received an 
ICTY index that would facilitate searches for handwritten documents in the database when 
we interviewed SDWC staff in the summer of 2006.820 Despite these and other challenges, 
those interviewed in 2006 gave the ICTY generally high marks for the support it provided 
even during the “teething” period, saying Tribunal prosecutors had done the best possible in 
light of the challenges they described.821 
Interviewed three years later, when the SDWC had largely completed first instance tri-
als of 11 bis cases,822 local prosecutors had high praise for the contributions made by Hague 
prosecutors. Reflecting on his office’s relationship with the ICTY, Chief Prosecutor of the 
State Court Milorad Barašin told us: “It’s indisputable that the Hague Tribunal gave us major 
support in setting up this institution and getting cases going.”823 Barašin characterized coop-
eration with the Hague Tribunal as “great,” adding: 
And really, whatever we asked in accordance with [the law] we have received. Above all, 
I have to compliment them on their efficiency. Always they have been available, espe-
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cially the prosecutorial office of the Hague Tribunal. If we ask for something today, it’s 
possible to get it the next day.824
While the comparatively small number of Rule 11 bis transfers played an outsized role 
in shaping the BWCC and its early docket, the chamber’s caseload is far more extensive than 
that generated by such referrals—and so, too, is the ICTY’s role. A second category of cases 
prosecuted by the SDWC grew out of investigations instituted by the ICTY prosecutor that did 
not lead to indictments by the time the Tribunal had to conclude its investigations. Known as 
“Category II” cases in recognition of the fact that “Rule 11 bis cases were the first priority” in 
the ICTY’s completion strategy, what was transferred to the Bosnian State Court was more 
accurately described as “collections of materials associated with particular crimes”825 than a 
trial-ready case file. 
ICTY prosecutors transferred fourteen Category II cases involving approximately 40 
suspects for transfer to Sarajevo826 in the hope that their investigatory work would not “simply 
be left on the proverbial wayside.”827 In an effort to narrow the gap between the raw evidence 
in Category II files and a criminal case, an OTP Transition Team prepared “a summary of the 
‘case,’ outlining the principal factual and legal issues as well as an accompanying analysis.”828 
A third category of the SDWC’s prosecutions has a different connection with the ICTY. 
These are cases “already cleared in accordance with the Rules of the Road procedure in The 
Hague”829 and not referred for prosecution by a cantonal or district court. As noted earlier, 
the ICTY prosecutor transferred her office’s Rules of the Road files to Bosnian authorities 
beginning in October 2004. At this time, the SDWC began receiving electronic copies of the 
877 files that had been given an “A” marking,830 signifying that the ICTY OTP believed that 
there was sufficient evidence in the file submitted by Bosnian prosecutors to support war 
crimes charges. For these cases, the SDWC undertook a review during the first half of 2005 
to determine which cases it would retain for prosecution itself—a total of 202 files831—and 
which, instead, it would refer for investigation by cantonal and district prosecutors pursuant 
to the process outlined below.832
If, as noted earlier, the Rules of the Road process played a key role in stabilizing post-war 
Bosnia, it is less clear how helpful the ICTY review process was for Bosnian prosecutors who 
received stale files years after they were submitted to the Hague Tribunal for its review. (This 
is not surprising, as the OTP review was intended to assess sufficiency, and not completeness, 
of the evidence in the files.) According to then SDWC head David Schwendiman, “The ICTY 
Rules of the Road files have not proven to be reliable except as starting points for [essentially 
new] domestic investigations. They do not translate immediately into prosecutable cases, partly 
because they are old, but mostly because they were and are incomplete”833—even when deemed 
by the ICTY to contain sufficient evidence to support an indictment.834 
The fourth and final category of cases prosecuted by the SDWC comprises cases initi-
ated in Bosnia that did not flow through the Rules of the Road process. When interviewed in 
December 2006, Vaso Marinkovic´, then head of the SDWC, was unable even to estimate how 
many cases fell into this category, noting that new cases “are coming in on a daily basis.”835 
Like the case files returned by the OTP in late 2004, these cases might be prosecuted before 
the Court of BiH or before a court in one of the entities or in Brcˇko.836 How to decide whether 
cases should be prosecuted before the BWCC or instead referred for trial elsewhere has pre-
sented vexing challenges, which we address later. 
3. Transfer of expertise and jurisprudence
a. Coordination, collaboration, and training
Alongside its transfer of case files, the ICTY has provided ongoing support in the form of 
expert guidance to prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel in Bosnia. To facilitate collabora-
tion between ICTY and local prosecutors, the OTP established a Transition Team within the 
office, whose function is to coordinate with local prosecutors in the former Yugoslavia on both 
11 bis and Category II transfers.837 According to officials in the SDWC, lawyers in their office 
“work really closely” and “constantly” with prosecutors at the ICTY. “When we get a case” from 
the ICTY, one said, “we send our people up there. It’s a terrific relationship.”838
In addition, judges from the BWCC have traveled to The Hague, while prosecutors 
from Bosnia have participated in various symposia with their counterparts in the OTP aimed 
at sharing professional experiences.839 Moreover, ICTY judges and prosecutors, as well as 
defense counsel who have practiced before the Tribunal, have given lectures as part of Bosnian 
programs aimed at training local defense counsel.840
While the ICTY’s contributions in bolstering domestic capacity have been “immensely 
important”841 to the BWCC and related offices, they should not be overstated. As two for-
mer ICTY prosecutors acknowledge, “[m]uch less has been done” by the ICTY “in terms of 
transferring … know-how, that is assistance on how to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes 
cases,” than in transferring evidence. Emir Suljagic´, a former journalist who covered the ICTY, 
goes further. In his view, “There was no strategy behind the completion strategy” in terms of 
“transferring know-how, unless you call seminars transferring know-how.”842 In an interview 
in late 2006, the liaison officer of the ICTY acknowledged these limitations, noting that the 
participation of ICTY personnel in training seminars and the like is not part of a “structured 
… program,” in part because the Tribunal did not have funding to provide training on a pro-
grammatic basis.843
Several recent initiatives that form part of the Tribunal’s high-profile strategy to dem-
onstrate its “legacy” commitment may partially address Suljagic´’s concerns. In July 2009, 
prosecutors from Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia began a six-month internship at the ICTY to 
work in an intensive way with the OTP. During this period, according to the ICTY’s Web site, 
the Balkan prosecutors would “have an opportunity to learn about methodologies of search-
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ing and reviewing large volumes of material as applied by OTP criminal analysts and be the 
contact points for colleagues in their respective national prosecution services working on war 
crimes investigations and cases.”844 At least one Bosnian defense lawyer has also had a fel-
lowship at the ICTY.845
A second effort is a joint project among the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR), the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(UNICRI), and the ICTY which was launched in May 2008. After a year-long consultation 
process with local actors and international organizations that have been engaged in judicial 
capacity building within the region, the project identified outstanding judicial needs and evalu-
ated the effectiveness of past efforts.846 In addition, in May 2009 the ICTY published a com-
prehensive guide to what it calls its “developed practices” that captures practical operational 
procedures in areas such as investigations, judgment drafting, management of the Detention 
Unit and legal aid policies.847 
It bears repeating that, while this chapter focuses on the ICTY’s contributions, numer-
ous other organizations have played a major role in preparing Bosnian lawyers for war crimes 
prosecutions. While ICTY personnel have often participated in programs organized by others, 
their engagement constitutes a comparatively small part of a larger picture.848
b. From The Hague to Sarajevo
Expertise has also migrated from The Hague to Sarajevo in another form: Many of the inter-
national personnel who have staffed the Court of BiH in its early years have had previous 
experience in The Hague.849 These officials and staff have been able to bring to their jobs in 
Bosnia a wealth of expertise.
Three of the international judges serving on the BWCC as of July 2009 previously 
worked as prosecutors at the ICTY,850 while Judge Almiro Rodrigues, who was an ICTY judge 
from 1997 to 2001, served as one of the international judges on the BWCC from April 2005 
to April 2009. Judge Meddžida Kreso, president of the state court, believes that the presence 
of international judges on the court “gave us a lot of good results in the sense of applying 
international standards.”851 Former HJPC President Branko Peric´ believes that the contribu-
tions of judges with previous ICTY experience were especially important, noting that Bosnian 
judges on the state court told him “how helpful Judge Rodrigues was for them” as they first 
confronted the myriad challenges associated with trying complex war crimes cases.852 
Peric´ contrasted the former ICTY judge’s contributions with those of other international 
judges who lacked a previous background in war crimes cases and who were in much “the 
same position as domestic judges” when it came to inexperience in this area. Thus, he con-
cluded, the BWCC and the SDWC would be improved if more judges and prosecutors with 
previous ICTY experience could be involved, “perhaps in the form of counselors and monitor-
ing teams for judges and prosecutors” in Bosnia.853 Peric´ was not alone in noting that interna-
tional judges and prosecutors are not necessarily “real experts” in international humanitarian 
law.854 Similar concerns have routinely arisen in respect of other hybrid tribunals, highlighting 
the importance of reviewing recruitment practices to enhance the possibility of appointing 
highly qualified jurists.855 
c. Guidance in case law
But while the presence of judges with prior ICTY experience has doubtless facilitated the 
BWCC’s knowledgeable application of international humanitarian law in the cases before 
it, the Hague Tribunal’s contribution in this regard is not limited to cases in which a former 
ICTY judge or prosecutor participated.856 As the fledgling Bosnian War Crimes Chamber first 
confronted complex issues of international humanitarian law, it found guidance for many of 
these issues in the jurisprudence of the ICTY.857 
As discussed earlier, among the ICTY’s most widely-noted achievements is its contri-
bution, along with that of the ICTR, in developing case law recognizing that crimes of sexual 
violence are war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or acts of genocide when other ele-
ments of these crimes are present. For example, in a breakthrough judgment in 2001, the 
ICTY convicted two defendants of the crime against humanity of enslavement for treating two 
women as sexual slaves—the first time this charge had been found applicable to gender-based 
violence.858 
Less obvious is how these legal milestones have affected the thousands of victims of 
wartime violence across the globe. Through its case law, the BWCC has filled in a small part 
of the picture: In its first judgment in an 11 bis case, the BWCC convicted the defendant of 
crimes against humanity, resting in part on its finding that he committed the crime against 
humanity of enslavement, for crimes of sexual violence.859 In this and other judgments the 
court in Sarajevo has stood on the shoulders of the ICTY, ensuring that crimes of sexual vio-
lence receive the legal opprobrium they deserve.860 Reflecting on this development early in 
the BWCC’s work, University of Sarajevo Professor Jasna Bakšic´ Muftic´ told us that, while 
it was difficult at that point to predict whether rape would be prosecuted more often as an 
international crime in Bosnia, “what is important is that it is now part of our jurisprudence. 
… This is really important.”861
Yet just as the ICTY has been faulted for its failure to bring charges of sexual violence 
in particularly egregious cases where the evidence warrants, the Court of BiH has been criti-
cized for under-prosecuting crimes of sexual violence.862 According to Amnesty International, 
moreover, “The majority of cases related to war crimes of sexual violence in which the WCC 
has delivered a final judgment were either cases which had been directly transferred to the 
BiH judiciary from the ICTY under Rule 11 bis or cases which relied on the investigative work 
which had already been done by the ICTY.”863 Even so, a substantial number of cases brought 
before the BWCC have involved convictions for charges of sexual violence.864
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d. Applying lessons learned from ICTY missteps
At times, staff who brought prior ICTY experience to Bosnia have helped improve upon the 
state court’s approach by applying to their work in Bosnia lessons learned the hard way in The 
Hague. The experience of Lucia Dighiero exemplifies the point. In December 2004, Dighiero, 
who had worked in the ICTY’s Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) since 2002, became the 
first director of the Witness and Victim Support Section (WSS) of the Court of BiH. As an ICTY 
victim support officer observed, Dighiero was able to “take the bits that were helpful” from her 
experience in the ICTY’s VWS and “transfer[] her … skills to the locally recruited staff,” while 
adapting expertise developed in The Hague to a different context.865 Dighiero recalled that, as 
the unit in Sarajevo was being established, “they had a concept but no practical experience” 
in working with vulnerable witnesses.866 Dighiero was able to bring to bear a broad range of 
practical experience in setting up the new office, which she applied in hiring and training staff 
and,867 most important, in establishing protocols for assisting witnesses.
In Dighiero’s view, the ICTY’s “main influence” on the office she helped launch, “was 
the idea of this VWS.”868 While the VWS provided an important model and a key source 
of expertise, the ICTY’s approach also provided a cautionary tale. For Dighiero, it was all 
important that the fledgling BWCC avoid “this bureaucracy with the ICTY,” where staff in the 
VWS could not directly address judges about witnesses’ psychological state but instead had to 
communicate through the UN hierarchical structure of intermediate officials. “At the ICTY,” 
she recalled, “it was very formal.” At the BWCC, she could communicate directly with judges 
about witnesses’ practical needs in the courtroom—things as mundane as a witness’s need to 
take a 15-minute break—and “they listen to us … they accept that we’re part of the process.”869
Dighiero also made sure that her office could establish contact with witnesses earlier 
than was possible in the ICTY. The VWS generally did not get involved with witnesses until 
they received a summons. “Often,” Dighiero recalled, “issues were coming up that could have 
been solved” if the section had been able to establish contact sooner.870 At the Court of BiH, 
her office is able to establish contact sooner: in the case of prosecution witnesses, typically two 
to three months before they testify.871
4. Completing the “completion strategy”
Like many victims of wartime atrocities, Josip Drežnjak and Drago Zadro had hoped to find 
justice in The Hague—but now realize that the only justice they may find will come from 
domestic courts. And like many victims, the men have found that justice in Bosnia might be 
found, if at all, in courts that were not addressed in the ICTY’s completion strategy.
Both men lost several relatives in a notorious 1993 massacre in Grabovica in which 33 
Croat civilians were slaughtered by Bosniak soldiers. The victims included Drežnjak’s mother, 
father, and sister-in-law; Zadro lost his mother, father, brother, sister-in-law, and a four-year-old 
niece, and has raised the slain toddler’s two brothers, who managed to escape the slaughter.
The ICTY prosecuted just one person for the Gravobica massacre, charging a senior 
Bosniak military official, Sefer Halilovic´, with command responsibility for the Grabovica mas-
sacre and for the murder of 25 inhabitants of the nearby village of Uzdol in September 1993. 
On November 16, 2005, an ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted Halilovic´. Although it confirmed the 
fundamental facts of the Grabovica massacre, the chamber found that the prosecution failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually commanded the operation that 
claimed so many civilian lives.872 
Survivors of the massacre were devastated. When Halilovic´ went to The Hague, Drežnjak 
recalled, “we expected that he would be sentenced, that the verdict would be reached, that jus-
tice would be met.”873 Intimately familiar with the facts of the massacre, Zadro was “one hun-
dred percent sure that he would be convicted. … I counted on it one hundred percent.”874 But 
they “lost almost every hope” after Halilovic´ was acquitted, Drežnjak told us. Now, Halilovic´ 
serves in the national parliament, and victims who believe he was responsible for their rela-
tive’s deaths “see this guy on TV, in the media, every day.”
While Halilovic´’s acquittal frustrated their hope of finding redress in The Hague, 
Drežnjak and Zadro continue to believe, fourteen years after the Grabovica massacre, that 
justice is necessary. “After all that one has been through,” Drežnjak explained, “it’s very often 
the case that you cannot even sleep well. But then you have to find someone to tell about it 
all. … We just want to see justice.”875 
Zadro says he has found “at least something, some small comfort,”876 in convictions 
imposed by Bosnian courts, but their limitations are also painful. In October 2003 (before 
the BWCC became operational), Enes Šakrak, a soldier who pleaded guilty to killing Zadro’s 
mother and four-year-old niece because “his conscience could not stand it any longer,”877 
became the first person sentenced for the Grabovica massacre; Šakrak was sentenced to 10 
years’ imprisonment.878 Soon after, the cantonal court imposed a nine-year sentence on Mus-
tafa Hota, who pleaded guilty to killing a 79-year-old man and his wife during the same mili-
tary operation.879 According to Drežnjak and Zadro, three other soldiers implicated by Šakrak 
were convicted in Bosnian courts of participating in the murder of Zadro’s relatives but “they 
haven’t served their sentences yet” because “there’s no room in prison” for them.880 Recount-
ing this, Drežnjak asked, “Can you imagine how we feel? They wait for us to go crazy.”881
Like anyone who has endured tragic loss, each of these men’s suffering is unique. But 
the challenges they describe are systemic, affecting victims across Bosnia who are still seeking 
justice for wartime atrocities. Just as the ICTY could prosecute a small fraction of wartime 
atrocities, the Court of BiH can handle a fraction of the war crimes cases that now fall to Bos-
nian courts to complete. Yet only the state court has been adequately prepared to meet this 
challenge, creating what many perceive as “double standards for justice” in Bosnia.882 Civil 
society activist Dobrila Govedarica believes that the ICTY’s role in the creation of the BWCC 
is one of its most important achievements but notes that it is “limited to the state court. We 
now have the problem of how to apply it to lower courts.”883 
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This is not to minimize the ICTY’s role in creating the BWCC and ensuring its effective 
operation.884 Yet the Bosnia experience highlights an important lesson for other contexts in 
which international courts may play a role in addressing mass atrocities. Specialized courts 
may play a necessary and essential role in prosecuting certain cases but their capacity will 
always be limited. Accordingly, planning for prosecutions should always take account of the 
role that regular courts ultimately should play in complementing their work. 
Just as important, the ICTY’s experience highlights an important lesson that the SDWC 
failed to take on board in its crucial start-up years: Specialized war crimes bodies like the 
ICTY, the BWCC, and the SDWC will surely be faulted if they devote their finite resources to 
prosecuting comparatively low-level suspects. Just as the ICTY was faulted for taking on com-
paratively low-level cases in its earlier years—a misstep eventually addressed in part through 
the vehicle of 11 bis transfers—the SDWC’s early indictments have drawn wide criticism.885
The pith of this criticism is that the SDWC has failed to develop a coherent approach to 
determining the cases it will prosecute886 and those it will refer to district or cantonal courts 
for prosecution.887 The Collegium of Prosecutors of BiH took a first cut at this question in 
guidelines adopted in late 2004. Under those guidelines, the Court of BiH would try “highly 
sensitive” cases, while “sensitive cases may, contingent upon the discretion of the Chief Pros-
ecutor, be remitted for trial to the cantonal and district courts.”888 It quickly became clear, how-
ever, that the criteria of “highly sensitive” and “sensitive” provided scant practical guidance. 
Two years after these criteria were adopted, Branko Peric´, then president of the HJPC, 
stated bluntly, “The prosecutor’s office doesn’t have a strategy.”889 According to Peric´, the state 
prosecutor had “taken over more than 100 war crimes cases from cantonal courts, … and then 
they were overloaded with cases they can’t solve” given the SDWC’s finite capacity.890 In his 
view—one that is widely shared—many of the cases taken over by the state court included 
comparatively low-level suspects, which should be left for prosecution by cantonal and district 
courts.891 
Delays in developing clear and principled criteria for selecting cases has left victims to 
wonder why their own cases did not merit prosecution at the state level while other victims’ 
cases did.892 In a country starkly divided along ethnic lines, the seeming lack of neutral princi-
ples for selection has needlessly provided further grist for Bosnian Serbs’ recurring charge that 
case selection is fueled by ethnic bias.893 (Reflecting the fact that Serb forces committed the 
largest proportion of war crimes, the SDWC has indicted more Serbs than Bosniaks or Croats.) 
Closely related to the importance of finalizing appropriate criteria for the selection of 
cases and ensuring that these are understood by the Bosnian public, the SDWC needs to make 
a realistic assessment of the number of cases it will be able to prosecute, prioritize its caseload 
accordingly, and manage public expectations about what it can realistically achieve. Otherwise, 
it risks repeating a major misstep by the ICTY—devoting substantial resources to prosecuting 
comparatively low-level cases in its early years and then having to readjust its caseload in the 
face of finite time.894 
In recent years, state authorities have taken further steps to address this issue.895 In 
February 2009 the SDWC adopted draft guidelines for selecting cases for prosecution before 
the BWCC that flesh out the barebones criteria set forth in earlier policy statements while 
nonetheless avoiding rigid standards.896 As a foundation for implementing its selection guide-
lines, the SDWC has also been working to establish a comprehensive database of all wartime 
atrocities and potential defendants, as well as a database of all war crimes cases that have been 
instituted before any Bosnian court.897
Now, fifteen years after the armed conflict in Bosnia came to an end, the need to finalize 
and implement the SDWC’s selection strategy is more urgent than ever. As one of our Bosnian 
interlocutors noted, when it comes to cases before the BWCC “time is not an ally,” because 
many witnesses have already died while others are growing reluctant to testify.898 “It’s not that 
they don’t want to see justice satisfied,” he explained, “they do.” But “this situation is taking 
way too long,” and many fear that appearing as a witness in cases before the state court can 
disrupt the new lives they have begun to build.899
5. Lessons for the future
a. Planning a role for domestic courts from the outset
In view of the achievements of Bosnia’s War Crimes Chamber and Special Department for War 
Crimes in the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH, the question must be asked: Could the international 
community have done more sooner—in particular, before pressure mounted on the ICTY to 
hand off lower-level cases to domestic courts—to prepare Bosnian courts to prosecute war 
crimes cases fairly? We raise this question not to criticize the ICTY in hindsight, but rather in 
the hope of guiding future policy decisions concerning the relationship of international and 
domestic courts.
A number of our Bosnian interlocutors believe, in the words of Mirsad Tokacˇa, that 
“a local partner” for the ICTY “should have been developed much sooner.”900 Tokacˇa faults 
the Peace Implementation Council, the High Representative, and other international actors 
who “ignored this for a long time,” saying “everything will be realized by the ICTY.”901 In a 
December 2006 interview, Nerma Jelacˇic´, then a journalist covering the BWCC for the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), told us that she too believed the chamber could have 
been established earlier, though perhaps with a more heavily international nature, and asked, 
“What if you had created it in 2000? Imagine where you would be in 2006.” Where you would 
be, Jelacˇic´ continued, is “farther along in ending impunity.”902 
In Jelacˇic´’s view, the costs of delay are substantial. Among other tolls, “the passage 
of time has allowed some beliefs to become more concrete;” now, it is “harder to change 
attitudes.”903 Nidžara Ahmetaševic´, the editor of BIRN Bosnia and Herzegovina, agrees that 
planning for the war crimes chamber could have taken place sooner. Had this happened, she 
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believes, Bosnia could have gone farther, sooner in “fac[ing] the past”—which she is convinced 
is “the only way for us … to look to the future.”904
Others insist that the BWCC could not have been established sooner. When asked 
whether he agreed with one assessment, described below, which identified 1998 as a year of 
lost opportunity to begin the process of bolstering domestic capacity to prosecute war crimes, 
the chief prosecutor of BiH emphatically disagreed, saying “it was not possible at all” in view 
of the prevailing security situation and political will at the time. “Even today everybody is trying 
to destroy this court,” he noted. “If it had been established sooner, it would never be opera-
tional.”905 In similar fashion, civil society leader Tarik Jusic´ considers suggestions that the 
BWCC could have been established sooner to be “absurd,” and notes: “That it actually works 
and there are no bombs are amazing. Ten years ago this would have been unimaginable.”906
 Judge Meddžida Kreso, president of the Court of BiH, insists that it was “impossible to 
transfer cases sooner” but offers a different reason, citing the absence until several years ago 
of the legal framework and institutions needed to support the BWCC.907 Branko Peric´, former 
president of the HJPC, made much the same point, saying he did not believe “domestic courts 
were capable of handling war crimes cases before January 1, 2005.”908 
Edin Ramulic´, a survivor of the infamous Omarska camp in Prijedor who helped found 
the victims’ association Izvor, agrees that “it was impossible to create the state court sooner, 
before these [ judicial] reforms occurred.”909 But he recognizes that this point begs the ques-
tion whether comprehensive judicial reform could have occurred sooner. In his view, the 
international community “would have initiated [ judicial] reforms sooner” if the ICTY had “not 
been there as an excuse.”910 With the ICTY operating in The Hague, however, and with other 
international actors involved in postwar Bosnia facing a long list of urgent and demanding 
priorities—among them, securing the return of refugees and addressing housing needs—
judicial reform “wasn’t on the list”911 and “a few very important years were simply lost.”912 But 
while Ramulic´ believes that the very existence of the ICTY delayed judicial reform by creating 
the “illusion that the Tribunal would solve the problem on its own of all the war criminals,” 
he adds that the BWCC “would not have been established” at all if the Hague Tribunal had 
never existed.913
Damir Arnault, a senior advisor to the Bosniak member of the Presidency, has a some-
what different take on the question but ends up close to Ramulic´’s view. He notes that even 
in 2004, it was impossible to create the Court of BiH “through the will of political elites” in 
Bosnia. Instead, laws establishing the Court and Prosecutor’s Office of BiH, respectively, were 
imposed by the High Representative that year. Because this action did not rest upon on the 
support of Bosnian leaders, Arnault reasoned, “It’s not clear why the High Representative 
couldn’t have done this sooner.” Indeed, he continued, in some respects the High Represen-
tative’s action was “riskier in 2004” than when NATO forces were in Bosnia “in force in the 
1990s.”914 “The question,” Arnault concluded, “is whether you could convince governments 
to give money for the project sooner.” After all, the ICTY “was just beginning to do its work” 
in the late 1990s, as it finally began to secure custody of indicted suspects. In this setting, 
governments might have seen efforts to build a domestic war crimes court as a “ploy to get 
around the ICTY” just when it was finally becoming truly effective.915
In a somewhat similar vein, Fidelma Donlon, a former head of the OHR’s Criminal 
Institutions and Prosecutorial Reform Unit and former deputy registrar of the Court of BiH, 
believes that key donors’ already substantial financial contribution to the ICTY may have con-
tributed to the international community’s tardiness in preparing domestic courts to handle 
war crimes cases: donors thought their existing contributions were sufficient.916 Additionally, 
she writes, “many diplomats misconstrued the Rules of the Road agreement” in ways that led 
them to “believe that there were procedures in place to address problems with national trials, 
when in fact there were not.”917 “With the benefit of hindsight,” Donlon concludes, the Peace 
Implementation Council’s 1998 meeting, in which it addressed the need for judicial reform 
but failed to address war crimes prosecutions in particular, was a lost opportunity to “compre-
hensively audit the work of the national authorities in relation to war crimes cases and develop 
a strategy to combat impunity.”918
It is of course impossible to know whether the international community could have 
made greater headway in preparing Bosnian courts to handle war crimes prosecutions had it 
made concerted efforts sooner. What seems relatively apparent, however, is that “there was 
no clear strategy” about judicial reform for years, and “a lot of time was wasted.”919 At the very 
least, the experience in Bosnia highlights the risk that the operation of an international court, 
however necessary, may induce an unwarranted complacence when it comes to domestic 
courts.
More broadly, the Bosnia experience highlights the crucial importance of recognizing 
early on that any international court can try only a small fraction of those responsible for mass 
atrocities and national courts must be adequately prepared to play a major role in providing 
justice. If the need for effective local partners became clear only when the ICTY was pushed 
to contemplate winding up its work, in the future this point should be clear from the moment 
that an international court becomes involved in prosecuting mass atrocities.
During an interview in March 2007, ICTY Judge Wolfgang Schomburg drew the same 
conclusion. Noting that “the ICTY is only one wheel in the entire machinery” of transitional 
justice, he said that “one of the most important lessons to be learned … in the future, when 
establishing an international tribunal, is that you must take care to ensure that a functioning 
judiciary worth its name be established at the same time in the area, i.e. capacity building 
from the outset.”920
b. The role of international actors
While the best approach for bolstering domestic courts’ capacity to undertake complex war 
crimes cases depends on the particular circumstances of each context, the model forged in 
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Bosnia represents an advance that may be worth considering in other contexts. As a hybrid 
court organized under domestic law, the chamber was thoughtfully designed to enhance local 
capacity in ways that would endure after international participants were phased out. In par-
ticular, the BWCC is the first hybrid court that was designed from the outset to become a 
fully national court after a period of progressively diminishing international participation.921
As noted earlier, the participation of international actors, particularly those with previ-
ous experience at the ICTY, is widely thought to have helped prepare their domestic coun-
terparts to apply international humanitarian law as well as international standards of fair 
process. But in a country still deeply riven along ethnic lines and whose judiciary has long 
been subject to political pressures, international judges, prosecutors, and other staff have 
served another role that is equally important: They have helped assure that the BWCC is 
impartial and insulated from political pressures. Although journalist Nidžara Ahmetaševic´ 
doubts whether international judges in the Court of BiH are overall more competent than the 
Bosnian judges, she believes that their presence is crucial in preventing political interference 
and assuring impartiality.922 And as Chief Prosecutor of BiH Milorad Barašin observed: “It’s 
extremely important to have international judges for perceptions of neutrality [on the part of ] 
common people.”923 
There is another dimension, Barašin added. Describing the dynamic within the SDWC, 
Barašin—who is ethnically Serb—told us that a Bosniak colleague “would prefer to say every-
thing he knows to an international colleague than to me.”924 Thus in societies emerging from 
ethnic violence, international staff may inject a crucial dynamic not only in the public eye but 
also within judicial institutions.
At a time when it had been envisaged that Bosnia’s war crimes institutions could oper-
ate without international judges and staff, the need for their participation remained strong in 
light of myriad factors, including what one study termed “the current political climate in the 
country.”925 Thus, on Dec. 14, 2009, the High Representative for BiH extended the mandate of 
international judges and prosecutors working on war crimes cases for a further three years.926 
The decision followed the failure of the Bosnian Parliament to amend the relevant legislation 
in a way that would allow for continued participation of internationals in the work of the 
SDWC and in the BWCC. Bosnian Serb members of the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly 
opposed unanimously their continued presence and blocked adoption of the law.927 Indeed, 
RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has repeatedly claimed that the ongoing involvement of 
international judges and prosecutors threatens the legitimacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
sovereign state, while his opponents dismiss the rhetoric as an attempt to head off corruption 
allegations that have been leveled against him.928 
Although the BWCC has faced and continues to confront a raft of difficult challenges, 
it has emerged as a model for transitional justice efforts elsewhere.929 Within Bosnia, the 
chamber is one of “the strongest state institution[s] we have,” in the view of journalist Nidžara 
Ahmetaševic´—and one that is playing an important role in Bosnians’ ongoing process of reck-
oning with the dark pages of its recent past.930 Although the challenges ahead require serious 
attention, the BWCC already stands as one of the most significant of the ICTY’s legacies in 
Bosnia.
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surges in, say, Serbs’ support and that of other groups. The highest percentage of Serb respondents 
supporting the ICTY’s work, 32.90 percent, was registered in the September 2003 survey; that 
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presented at the conference “Pathways to Reconciliation and Global Human Rights,” Sarajevo, Aug. 
16–19, 2005.
245. Id.
246. See Merima Husejnovic´, “Hague Tribunal’s Prestige Fades as Closure Looms,” Balkan 
Insight, Sept. 17, 2009.
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255. For example,Josip Drežnjak said he had derived some satisfaction from the fact that, even 
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Drežnjak, president, Association of Missing Croat Persons from Grabovica, Mostar, July 18, 2009. 
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Brcˇko District, Brcˇko, July 22, 2009.
256. This conception tracks closely with common conceptions of retributivist-based theories of 
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258. Interview with Mirsad Tokacˇa, president, Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo, 
Sarajevo, Dec. 6, 2006.
259. Interview with Senad Pec´anin, editor, Dani, Sarajevo, Dec. 6, 2006.
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845. Interview with Jasmina Pjanic´, director, Criminal Defense Support Section of State Court of 
BiH, Sarajevo, July 14, 2009.
846. The final report of the project, Supporting the Transition Process: Lessons Learned and Best 
Practices in Knowledge Transfer. http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/39685_en.pdf.
html, was published in September 2009.
847. ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, ICTY and UNICRI, June 2009, http://www.icty.org/x/
file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/icty_manual_on_devel-
oped_practices.pdf
848. Among other organizations, the American Bar Association Central and Eastern Europe 
Initiative (CEELI) has organized a wide range of war crimes training programs for Bosnian lawyers, 
including defense counsel. Interview with Dubravka Piotrovski, ABA CEELI, Sarajevo, Nov. 29, 
2006.
849. This has included management expertise. Michael Th. Johnson, the first registrar of the BiH 
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When the United Nations Security Council established 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in May, 1993, expectations were low. 
War was still raging in the Balkans, and the creation of 
the Tribunal was perceived as an attempt by Security 
Council members to save face after failing to stanch 
the violence then wracking the region. 
Few could have foreseen the deep and lasting effects 
of the ICTY on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Balkans, 
and international law. What began as an ad hoc 
response to the war’s atrocities set a precedent that 
marked the beginning of the post-Nuremberg era of 
international justice: since the ICTY’s founding, the 
international community has established courts to 
address atrocities committed in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor Leste, as well as a 
permanent International Criminal Court with more than 
100 states parties. The ICTY has also directly contributed 
to national war crimes prosecutions, both in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and throughout the region. Moreover, 
the ICTY has created a rich jurisprudence of 
international humanitarian law that now informs 
the work of other national and international courts.
In That Someone Guilty Be Punished, Diane F. 
Orentlicher, professor of law at American University, 
looks at the effects and effectiveness of the ICTY, 
including lessons to improve future efforts to provide 
justice for survivors of atrocious crimes. Perhaps 
most importantly, Orentlicher examines the impact 
of the Tribunal through the words and experiences 
of those in whose name it was established: the 
victims and survivors. Their expectations, hopes and 
disappointments are chronicled alongside the Tribunal’s 
achievements and limitations. Based on hundreds of 
hours of interviews—and featuring the voices and 
perceptions of dozens of Bosnian interlocutors—
That Someone Guilty Be Punished provides a 
comprehensive and complex portrait of the ICTY 
and its impact in Bosnia.
